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Abstract
Depending on their needs for enhancing and sustaining their business and market values,
some firms choose to operate with a corporate governance structure of CEO duality, in
which an executive serves as the CEO and the chairperson of the board of directors. The
problem addressed in this study is that past empirical and theoretical studies of the
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance of organizations across different
industries have generated ambiguous results, and no studies have focused specifically on
the relationship between CEO duality and financial performance of not-for-profit
hospitals. Based on agency and stewardship theories, and considering that CEO duality’s
effects on firms’ financial performance are contextually specific to each type of industry
and dependent on certain industry conditions, the purpose of this quantitative study was
to answer 3 research questions that examine the relationship between CEO duality,
presence of physicians on governance board, hospital size, hospital age, board size, and
financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. This study used multiple regression
analyses of data of financial indicators from 146 U.S. not-for-profit hospitals selected
from the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development database of California,
for the period from 2009 to 2012. The results of this study suggested CEO duality and
presence of physicians on healthcare governance were not related to financial
performance of not-for-profit hospitals. The outcomes of this study can promote positive
social change by bringing awareness of appropriate healthcare governance structures that
enhance organizational effectiveness and sustain hospitals’ charitable missions of
provision of community services and transformation of communities and society.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
Good corporate governance is integral to the growth and survival of modern
corporations. Because of globalization, corporations now conduct business in all parts of
the world, creating more challenges for governments to control and hold organizations
accountable for their actions (Addullah & Valentine, 2009). However, the recent crises
resulting from the global financial meltdown and numerous corporate scandals, which
researchers linked to immoral management and poor governance, have triggered
institutional investors, individual shareholders, regulatory entities, and other stakeholders
to press harder for better corporate governance structures for publicly traded and private
corporations. As part of an attempt to deter immoral management and corporate debacles,
both professionals and academics have placed CEO duality and the decision whether or
not to split the role of CEO/chairperson as central issues in the search for appropriate
corporate governance structures (Tenello, 2011). According to Tenello (2011), at the
beginning of 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted policies to
require public corporations to declare the structures of their board and provide
explanations and circumstances for why they have opted to operate with their current
corporate governance structures.
In a typical modern public corporation, the board of directors exists as a
governance body as well as a mechanism to ensure the separation of ownership and
control, facilitating effective monitoring and evaluation of performance processes
independent from management and the execution of decisions. The board of directors
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exists in a modern corporation to resolve or keep at bay issues associated with inherent
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. Due to a diffuse base, owners,
shareholders, or stakeholders do not or cannot directly monitor managers. Therefore, the
board of directors is established to represent all stakeholders and exercise absolute
fiduciary duty to manage a firm in the best interest of all stakeholders.
Depending on operational circumstances and business needs, some firms choose
to operate with a governance structure of CEO duality, in which an executive holds both
positions of CEO and chairperson of the board of directors. Meanwhile, other
corporations may opt to fill the CEO and the board chairperson positions with two
separate individuals, having CEOs reporting to chairpersons, who in turn work
collaboratively with other board directors to oversee the performance of top executive
teams. According to Monks and Minow (2008), based on data collected from the
Corporate Library, about 1,800 out of the largest 3,300 publicly traded companies operate
with a CEO duality structure.
Although boards of directors have the legal rights and the ultimate responsibility
to oversee the management, in reality, the boards may face challenges in fulfilling their
fiduciary duties due to their own limitations and the advantages of the management they
are supposed to control and monitor. While the management team has expertise,
specialized knowledge, control, and time to operate firms, the boards of directors, whose
members are primarily comprised of independent directors, are limited in time and
information to execute organizational objectives effectively (Finkelstein, Hambrick, &
Cannella, 2009). Arguably, the effectiveness of the boards is reduced further when CEOs
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who are also the chairpersons of the boards may attempt to play dominant roles and to
diminish the effectiveness of board members (Gove & Junkunc, 2013).
Albeit slowly, the Federal government, the SEC, American stock exchanges, and
shareholders have pressed public companies to split the dual CEO/chairperson role and to
adopt a two-tier governance structure in order to enhance business transparency (Abels &
Martelli, 2011). According to Abels and Martelli (2011), two-tier structures ensure
independent CEOs manage corporations, while separate chairpersons control activities
related to board functions, such as recruiting executives, seeking CEO succession,
compensating executives, and conducting other traditional board activities. Noticeably, in
the eyes of shareholders and stakeholders, the chairperson should be independent and not
an employee of the company whose board she or he is heading, resulting in meaningful
independence between the board of directors and the management.
Background of the Study
Under stewardship or administrative theory, executives and managers are viewed
as trustworthy stewards who act for organizational goals rather than for their personal
objectives, and the relationship between the shareholders and the management should be
built upon trust, thus minimizing the costs of controlling and monitoring the actions of
the management (Adbullah & Valentine, 2009). Accordingly, stewardship theorists have
argued that CEO duality empowers CEOs to manage organizations efficiently with clear
and unambiguous leadership, resulting in improved firm performance (Boyd, 1995; Kang
& Zardkoohi, 2005; Nicholson & Kiel 2007). In the same vein, David, Schoorman, and
Donaldson (1997) posited that CEO duality facilitates harmony between shareholders,
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boards of directors, and managers, leading to a system that is more effective and efficient
in reaching organizational objectives of profit maximization.
In contrast, agency theorists have argued that when acting as CEO and
chairperson of a corporate board, a CEO may become too powerful and adversely
influence the monitoring function of the board, thus potentially decreasing its
effectiveness in governing the organization and evaluating the performance of the top
executive team (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008; Jensen & Meckling,
1976; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the
relationship between shareholders and the management of a corporation is the
relationship between principals and agents, and the agents will not always act in the best
interests of the principals. Therefore, under the agency theory, there is a need to have a
controlling and monitoring mechanism. Farma and Jensen (1983) argued that if the CEO
is also the chairperson of the board, the CEO might dominate the decision process, thus
diminishing the controlling and monitoring function of the board. According to Farma
and Jensen, under CEO duality, corporations lack the true separation of decision control
and decision management, which are integral functions of principals and agents,
respectively.
Semadeni and Cannella (2012) claimed that for more than 2 decades, these
opposing and divergent views between stewardship and agency theories about the effects
of CEO duality to organizational performance have motivated researchers to conduct
empirical studies to understand the real influences of CEO duality and organizational and
board characteristics (e.g., board size and board independence). However, past academic
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and professional empirical studies of the relationship between CEO duality and firm
performance have generated inconsistent and unsettled results (Kang, 2005; Lawal, 2011;
Shukeri, 2012; Tenello, 2011). Some researchers reported that there was no negative
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance (Chugh, Meador, & Kumar,
2011; Pandya, 2011; Yang, Lu, & Li, 2011), or that CEO duality constrained board
independence and aversively affected firm value and operating performance (Bliss, 2011;
Harjto 2008). Nevertheless, Rechner and Dalton (1991) suggested firms with CEO and
chairperson positions held by two individuals consistently outperform those with CEO
and chairperson invested in one executive. In a recent review, Lawal (2012) examined
several past studies of corporate performance and board dynamics in which CEO duality
was included and suggested that past researchers have made some errors in being too
focused on a single theory and using inappropriate statistical tools, consequently
generating ambiguous findings.
Problem Statement
Considering the healthcare system’s economic size and potential impacts on
society and people, the importance of the role of governance in healthcare should not be
overlooked. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2012) reported that
hospital spending in the U.S in 2012 represented one-third ($882.3 billion) of the total
healthcare spending ($2.8 trillion). According to the American Hospital Association
(2014), hospitals provide about 35% of employment in the healthcare industry.
Furthermore, healthcare boards are increasingly charged with managing rising costs,
continuously developing sciences and technologies, and addressing increasing demand
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for patient safety, efficiency, effectiveness, ethical issues, and sustainability (Barnett,
Perking, & Powell, 2001; Hamilton, 2008).
Although researchers have generated substantial work on the influences of roles,
size, structure, composition of boards, and CEO duality on firm performance for more
than 2 decades (Lawal, 2012; Krause, 2013), no researchers have sought specifically the
relationship between CEO duality and financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals.
Bennington (2010) asserted that researchers have not conducted specific studies on the
correlation between strategies and board compositions, CEO duality, overall hospital
performance, and nonprofit hospital board members’ levels of involvement in strategic
decisions. According to Bennington, while healthcare governance environments have
changed drastically, professionals and academics have provided few suggestions for
better models of healthcare boards.
Furthermore, the corporate governance model for private healthcare organizations
might not be the appropriate corporate board model for not-for-profit hospitals due to
their unique challenges (e.g., unpaid board members and absence of physicians on the
boards) and total dependence on awarded commitment and support from external donors
and benefactors (Howard & Seth-Purdie, 2005). Not-for-profit hospitals need effective
healthcare governance boards and consistent support of external stakeholders in order to
continue meeting their community service obligations.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this quantitative research was to investigate the relationship
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, hospital age,
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hospital size, board size, and financial performance of not-for-profit U.S. hospitals.
Considering the inclusiveness of the outcomes of past studies, the insufficient studies on
the effects of governing boards on the performance of hospitals, the not-for-profit
hospitals’ unique organizational nature, and their dependence on awarded commitments,
which make them face higher risks of failure, this study contributed by providing
additional insights regarding the effects of CEO duality and clinical governance on the
performance of organizations. Furthermore, as the SEC has started issuing regulations
requiring firms to reveal and provide explanations for their chosen board models, this
study provided critical information for not-for-profit healthcare organizations seeking a
corporate board structure that might be most appropriate for their organizations.
Nature of the Study
Using a quantitative research approach, I analyzed available secondary data to
investigate the relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the
governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board size, and financial performance.
Specifically, the goal of this study was to answer questions regarding the relationship
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, hospital age,
hospital size, board size, and financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. Using
secondary data for this study was advantageous because of the massive availability of
existing data pertaining to financial statements and corporate governance reported by notfor-profit organizations. The remainder of this chapter includes research questions, null
hypotheses, associated alternative hypotheses, and dependent and independent variables.
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Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Question 1: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age,
hospital size, board size, and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals?
H10: There was no significant statistical relationship between CEO duality,
presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board size,
and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals.
H1a: There was a positive, statistically significant relationship between CEO
duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board
size, and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals. CEO duality and presence of physicians
on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, and board size enhance total margin
of not-for-profit hospitals.
Research Question 2: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age,
hospital size, board size, and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals?
H20: There was no significant statistical relationship between CEO duality,
presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board size,
and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals.
H2a: There was a positive, statistically significant relationship between CEO
duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board
size, and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals. CEO duality and presence of
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physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, and board size enhance
operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals.
Research Question 3: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age,
hospital size, board size, and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals?
H30: There was no significant statistical relationship between CEO duality,
presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board size,
and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals.
H3a: There was a positive, statistically significant relationship between CEO
duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board
size, and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals. CEO duality and presence of
physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, and board size enhance
free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals.
Statistical Model
The premise of this study was to find if there was a relationship between CEO
duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board
size, and the financial indicators of not-for-profit hospitals. By design, this study
involved the analysis of the relationship between several independent and dependent
variables. Multiple regression was the most appropriate statistical model for
understanding the relationship between several independent variables and dependent
variables (Field, 2009). Therefore, I used the multiple regression model to test the
hypotheses. Chapter 3 of the dissertation provides detailed descriptions of and rationale
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for the method design, data, and statistical model used to test hypotheses based on the
research questions.
Independent and Dependent Variables
The research questions and the associated hypotheses were designed to investigate
the relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards,
hospital age, hospital size, board size, and financial performance of not-for-profit
hospitals. The independent variables for the three hypotheses and the three alternative
hypotheses were CEO duality, the presence of physicians on the governance board,
hospital age, hospital size, and board size. While the first independent variable was
categorical, the last four independent variables were continuous. The dependent variables
for the three hypotheses and the three alternative hypotheses were total margin, operating
margin, and free cash flow, respectively.
To calculate the independent variable, CEO duality, a value of 1 was assigned to
firms with CEO duality and a value of 0 was assigned to firms without CEO duality. The
second independent variable, the presence of physicians on governance boards, was
measured by assigning 1 to each physician present on the board. If no physician was
present on the board, a value of 0 was assigned. The hospital size was measured by the
logarithm of total assets of the hospital. The hospital age was derived from the logarithm
of the difference from the year of this study (2014) and the year of the hospital’s
incorporation. The board size was measured as the number of directors of the governance
board. The same measurement of the independent variables applied to the three
hypotheses and the three alternative hypotheses.

11
For measuring the dependent variable in Hypothesis 1, the total margin value was
calculated by dividing net income by total operating revenue. For the dependent variable
in Hypothesis 2, the operating margin was measured by dividing the difference between
total operating revenue and total operating expenses by the total operating revenues. The
dependent variable, free cash flow, in Hypothesis 3 was estimated using annual growth
rate of 7.3% reported by the American Hospital Association and adopting the formula
used by Singh, Wheeler, and Roden (2012). More details of calculation of the free cash
flow variable are explained in Chapter 3, the methodology of the study.
Theoretical Framework
A theoretical framework serves as a lens that guides and focuses a research study.
As noted by Ennis (1999), a theoretical framework identifies and describes major
elements and constructs of the research of interest. By elaborating on a theoretical
framework, I hypothesized and explained the meanings of CEO duality and clinical
governance as attributes of effective healthcare governance that affected the financial
performance of not-for-profit hospitals. Specifically, as shown in Figure 1, agency and
stewardship theories and clinical governance served as lenses to guide the focus of this
study, which examined the relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on
governance board, and financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals.
The agency theory explained the conflicts of interest inherently existing in
corporations, creating the need to separate ownership and control in order to facilitate
effective monitoring and control mechanisms of corporate board. The stewardship theory
depicted intrinsic motivation of CEOs serving nonprofit organizations and the unitary
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leadership inherited from CEO duality, justifying the rationale of CEO duality as an
appropriate governance structure for not-for-profit hospitals. The clinical governance
construct elaborated the advantages of having physicians, who often possess and acquire
intensive clinical experiences, as members of governance boards of organizations in the
healthcare sector.
As Figure 1 shows, the two components of healthcare governance of not-forprofits hospitals include CEO duality and physicians as board members. Financial
performance measures include operating margin, total margin, and free cash flow. The
multiple regression models designed for determining the relationships between variables
of interest contain the components of healthcare governance board and financial
measures. The identified variables used in the regression model were based on the
literature related to studies of corporate governance, specifically the financial measures of
not-for-profit organizations. Researchers and practitioners use operating margin, total
margin, and free cash flow as the most common indicators for measuring financial
performance of hospitals (Cleverley, Song, & Cleverley, 2010; Schuhmann, 2008). The
operating margin of a hospital indicates the total operating revenue in comparison to its
total operating expenses. If total operating revenue exceeds total operating expenses, the
hospital operates with a profit. The total margin or total profit margin compares a
hospital’s net income against its total operating. Free cash flow shows the cash inflows
and outflows rather than its accounting earnings and represents the amount of cash left
over after undertaking the firm’s operations and making all investments necessary to
ensure the continuation of operation (Horngren, Foster, & Datar, 2006). The free cash
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flow indicator shows the minimal survival strength of an organization (Schuhmann,
2008).
Healthcare scholars have addressed the corporate model and the philanthropic
model as the governance models in healthcare sectors (Alenxander, Morlock, & Gifford,
1998). Table 1 illustrates the attributes of the corporate model and the philanthropic
model that differentiate each model from one another. According to Alexander and Lee
(2006), while hospitals with corporate models emphasize competition position and
changes to enhance operational efficiency, market standing, and financial viability,
hospitals operating with philanthropic models tend to focus primarily on preserving
hospital assets and fiduciary obligations to the community. Morlock, Nathanson, and
Alexander (1988) posited that for not-for-profit hospitals, governance boards perform
mostly ceremonial functions, largely dedicating decision-making processes to CEOs and
medical staff or a few active board members. There is a need for researchers to identify
governance models that not-for-profit hospitals can adopt to enhance their effectiveness
and performance.
Researchers have tested empirically and showed that healthcare organizations,
specifically hospitals, with governance structures having the attributes characterizing a
corporate model performed better than hospitals with philanthropic models in terms of
quick responses to changing environmental conditions (Alexander, Lee, Weiner, & Ye,
2006). However, the impacts of the philanthropic model on the performance of hospitals
have not been explored fully. According to Alexander and Lee (2006), different
governing board configurations contribute to differences in the performance of not-for-
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profit hospitals. Therefore, I expected the two components of healthcare governance of
not-for-profits hospitals, CEO duality, and physicians as board members providing
corporate expertise and clinical experience and bridging the gaps of different attributes
and organizing principles between philanthropic and corporate models, resulting in an
ideal governance model for not-for-profit hospitals.
The goal of this study was not to establish causation of financial performance
because in order to determine all of the possible causes of firm performance, I would
have had to include other variables such as business, social, and legal environments and
many others factors. Identifying and accounting all potential variables that cause financial
performance was beyond the scope of the study. Chapter 3 of this dissertation addresses
an in-depth discussion of the research design, resources of data, financial measurement,
statistical models, and statistical data analysis.
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Clinical
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Figure 1. Theoretical framework.
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Table 1
Philanthropic and Corporate Models of Hospital Governing Boards
Philanthropic model

Corporate model

Large board size

Small board size

Wide range of perspectives/backgrounds

Narrow, more focused
perspectives/backgrounds

Small number of inside directors

Large number of inside directors

Little management participation on board

Active management participation on
board

No formal management accountability to

Direct management accountability to

board

board

No limit to consecutive terms for board

Limit to consecutive terms for board

members

members

No compensations for board services

Compensation provided for board
service

Emphasis on asset preservation

Emphasis on strategic activity

Note. Adapted from J. A. Alexander & S. Y. Lee (2006). Does governance matter?
Board configuration and performance in not-for-profit hospitals. Milbank Quarterly,
84(4), 733-758.
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Definition of Terms
There are several terms used in this research study. The following terms are
assigned with special operational definitions because of their relevance to the theoretical
framework and this research study.
Board of directors: A body of appointed members who oversee the activities of
an organization. Duties of the board include establishment of policies and objectives,
selection and evaluation of CEO performance, securing of adequate financial resources,
approval of fiscal budgets, design of compensation contract of company management,
and responses to stakeholders on the performance of the organization.
Board monitoring/control: Activities of a board of directors in performing
ongoing monitoring, internal control, and evaluation of executives or top management of
corporations.
CEO duality: A governance structure or situation in which the CEO also holds the
position of the chairperson of the board of directors.
Clinical governance: Systematic approach health care organizations that employ
to maintain and improve the quality of patient care. Clinical governance parallels with
corporate governance with respect to corporate accountability for clinical quality,
leadership, organizational culture, and organizational quality structures (Wright,
Malcolm, Barnett, & Hendry, 2001). Furthermore, clinical governance entails three
attributes comprised of high standards of care quality, responsibility and accountability
for patient care standards as well as a constant pursuit of improvement (Som, 2004).
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Corporate governance: The system designed to direct and control a corporation.
Through corporate governance structure, corporations design mechanisms for monitoring
policies and decision making processes, and for responses to social, regulatory, and
market environments. Through corporate governance, corporations pursue their
objectives, align interests of involved parties, and distribute rights and responsibilities
among stakeholders, such as boards of directors, managers, employees, shareholders, and
others (Ballinger & Marcel, 2010).
Healthcare financial indicators: As noted by Schuhmannn (2008), 11 financial
indicators of hospital financial performance include bed occupancy (percentage), average
length of stay (days), operating margins (percentage), current ratio, cash on hands (days),
accounts receivable (days), average payment period (days), inpatient gross revenue
(percentage), outpatient gross avenue (percentage), contractual allowance write-off
(percentage), and personnel expense (percentage of operating revenue). Researchers use
data of these financial indicators to derive profit margin, total margin, and free cash flow
for study of financial performance of healthcare organizations.
Immoral management: The management style that is devoid of ethical principles
and conducts business activities and decisions considered opposite to ethical standards.
Organizations practicing immoral management have short-term focus, often view and
exploit employees as means of production, and have no concerns for the needs, rights,
and expectations of their employees (Inoue & Aubrey, 2014).
Intrinsic motivation: A motivation in which individuals engage in activities that
maintain their self-concepts (Egley, 2003). According to Egley (2003), certain
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individuals will engage in intrinsically motivating activities for the interest and
enjoyment associated with those activities rather than for the reward.
Not-for-profit hospitals: Hospitals that operate as nonprofit entities, for charitable
purposes, and frequently as affiliations of religious denomination. In the United States,
not-for-profit hospitals coexist with their counterparts, such as government owned public
hospitals and privately owned for-profit hospitals, to deliver medical care (Singh, 2013).
Residual claimants: Individuals or agents, such as employees, suppliers,
bondholders, and shareholders, who receive a residual amount after the corporation
accounts all of the costs of productions or services (Brink, 2010).
Residual claims: The right of individuals or agents, such as employees, suppliers,
bondholders, and shareholders, to the profit after the company has met all obligations of
payment (Brink, 2010; Srinivasan & Phansalkar, 2003).
Residual risks: The remaining risks that arise after other known risks have been
foreseen and eliminated. Residual risk is the term popularly used in disciplines such as
economic and finance (Schneider & Valenti, 2011).
Specialized knowledge: Advanced level of knowledge and expertise in
organizational processes and procedures. Individuals such as physicians, surgeons,
engineers, lawyers, and others in very specialized fields often possess specialized
knowledge.
Assumptions
There were several assumptions noted for this study:
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1. The theoretical framework built on agency, stewardship, and identified
constructs was appropriate for the study of the effects of CEO duality on firm
performance of not-for-profit hospitals.
2. Clinical governance enhances the effectiveness of governance boards, which
in turn affects financial performance.
3. Physicians possess knowledge of clinical governance.
4. CEO duality, presence of physicians on board, hospital size, hospital age,
board size, and financial performance are logical for the testing of the
hypotheses formulated for this study.
5. The list of not-for-profit hospitals randomly selected from databases
containing governance and financial data of targeted organizations represented
all not-for-profit hospitals in the State of California.
6. The secondary data, which were not originally collected for the study, used for
the analysis of the current study were accurate and complete.
Limitations
Patton (2003) emphasized that when developing research plans, researchers
should consider and anticipate limitations, thus addressing and providing details of steps
undertaken to minimize the effects of the identified limitations. The primary limitation of
this study is the use of secondary data, which were not originally collected for the study.
The secondary data used for analysis in this study only approximate the kind of data
intended for testing the hypotheses, and thus can potentially introduce errors to the
conclusions and the generalization of the current study. Scientists often use the
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triangulation of data to reduce the potential error and to enhance the accuracy of analysis
and outcomes of the study (Patton, 2003). However, the triangulation of data was not
feasible for this study. Therefore, I planned to collect financial and governance data of
the not-for-profit hospitals listed in the Office of Statewide Health Planning and
Development (OSHPD), which contained reliable and comprehensive data of healthcare
organizations operating in the State of California. The conclusions and generalization of
this study would be applied only to the not-for-profit hospitals in the State of California.
Furthermore, due to the scope of the current study of the relationship between CEO
duality and financial performance, some variables relevant to corporate governance
constructs (i.e., organizational leverage, market environments, board independence, and
organizational identification of CEO) may be missing from the research design or the
analysis model. Future researchers can expand this study by exploring different variables
using different constructs or assumptions.
Delimitations
The focus of the current study was CEO duality, presence of physicians on the
governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board size, and financial performance of
not-for-profit hospitals. The sample size was 146. The data used for analysis were public
records and financial reports filed and reported publicly by healthcare organizations. The
financial reports, the board structures, and executives of not-for-profit hospitals were
obtained from the OSHPD websites databases, which contain reports published and filed
by healthcare organizations from multiple years. Specifically, the proxy statements and
financial statements reflecting board structures and firms’ performances from the 2009 to
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2012 were the primarily targeted data used to compile statistical analysis using SPSS
software. The OSHPD database contains nonprofit, for-profit, and publically owned
healthcare organizations. The not-for-profit hospitals were selected from the OSHPD
database as the population for the study. The websites of not-for-profit hospital were
obtained the Healthcare ATLAS websites. The board size and hospital age information of
not-for-profit hospitals were acquired from the websites of each hospital. The outcomes
of this study should be applied only to not-for-profit hospitals in the State of California.
The findings of the study cannot be broadly used to explain circumstances surrounding
CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, hospital size, hospital age,
board size, and financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals operating in other states
and other countries.
Significance of the Study
Past studies of corporate governance and financial performance of firms have not
focused on the healthcare industry. Moreover, the presence of physicians on governance
boards is relevant to healthcare governance because clinical governance is a critical part
of healthcare. This study is different from prior research because its outcomes may
contribute to the extant body of knowledge in the field regarding the implications of CEO
duality, the presence of physicians, hospital age, hospital size, and board size on the
financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals.
Unlike other industries in which clinical governance is not relevant to the
operation of business, the successful function of healthcare governance boards and the
transformation of healthcare organizations depend on the effectiveness of corporate and
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clinical governance (Colin-Thome, 2013). Furthermore, results of past studies on CEO
duality’s effects on firms’ financial performance have been ambiguous, and CEO
duality’s effects are contextually specific to each type of industry (Young et al., 2000)
and dependent on certain industry conditions (Boyd, 1995). This study may generate
findings on the effects of CEO duality and presence of physicians providing clinical
governance, hospital age, hospital size, and board size, specifically as applied to not-forprofit hospitals.
Political and community leaders have increasingly pressed not-for-profit hospitals
to enhance their effectiveness and performance for the benefit of communities (Owen,
2005). Not-for-profit hospitals are also faced with challenges associated with pay-forperformance initiatives strongly endorsed by the government (Lee, Chen, & Weiner,
2004). Moreover, although primarily applied to corporations, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 has affected the external regulations and external oversight of governance board
structures and conduct for various not-for-profit hospitals (Greene, 2005). These
developments have highlighted the importance of having effective governance for notfor-profit organizations. The results of this study may assist not-for-profit hospitals or
their administrators to implement appropriate and effective governance that would
enhance their organizational performance and fulfillment of external regulation and
oversight regulations.
Walden University defines positive social change as any transformation that
would deliver positive outcomes (Laureate Education, n.d.). Walden students, in their
pursuit of becoming scholars, apply ideas, strategies, and actions to promote the
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development of individuals, communities, organizations, and institutions that would
promote improvement of human and societal conditions (Laureate Education, n.d). The
focus of this study is organizational governance, which is a core subject and application
of the principles of social responsibility (ASQ & Manpower Professional, 2010).
Corporate governance is a control mechanism that ensures the optimum use of the
human, physical, and financial resources of an enterprise (Khiari, Karaa, & Omri, 2007).
Good governance has a positive impact on corporate performance, particularly financial
performance (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). By examining the effects of CEO duality and
exploring the impacts of the presence of physicians on governance boards on the
financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals, this study may potentially generate
results that help not-for-profit hospitals become successful and efficient with their
governance and financial management. Therefore, the results of this study may help notfor-profit hospitals adopt and operate with an appropriate corporate governance structure,
which would enhance their organizational effectiveness and allow them to continue their
charitable missions of providing community services and transforming communities and
society.
Summary and Transition
This chapter established that there was a deficiency in prior studies of the
relationship of corporate governance and financial performance of not-for-profit
hospitals. Despite their charitable mission and economic importance, the integral function
of corporate governance to their survival and growth, the potential implication of CEO
duality to financial performance, and the contextual and contingent nature of healthcare
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organizations, researchers have not yet sought to understand the relationship between
CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, hospital size, hospital age,
board size, and financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. Having a clear
understanding of the implications of CEOs on financial performance could be critical to
the governance process and operations for not-for-profit hospitals, thus possibly
suggesting an appropriate corporate governance structure for not-for-profit hospitals that
would contribute to the survival and continuation of delivering medical care of nonprofit
hospitals. In the process, the purpose of this research was to seek the relationships
between CEO duality, the presence of physicians on boards, hospital age, hospital size,
board size, and the financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals.
The conceptual model guiding this study portrayed the aspect of specialized
organizational knowledge of CEOs, informed by the theoretical framework of
stewardship and agencies theories with respect to the intrinsic motivation and proper
monitoring and control of CEO duality on the effectiveness of corporate board. As
another dimension of the model, physicians’ clinical experiences are critical to clinical
governance and integral components of healthcare governance boards, necessitating the
rationale for the presence of physicians as members of the board, contributing to the
effectiveness of the board, and thus enhancing financial performance.
Despite of the limitations and delimitations associated with using secondary data
for statistical analysis and the targeting of organizations that may not represent the entire
population of organizations of interest, the assumptions and research questions justified a
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study that may advance the existing knowledge of the field. The findings of this study
might offer an appropriate model of corporate governance board for nonprofit hospitals.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation reviews corporate governance theories,
contemporary research on corporate governance, CEO duality, and financial
performance. The healthcare governance board, clinical governance, financial
performance, and not-for-profit organizations are also reviewed. Chapter 3 lays out the
research design and methodology, details the selection and rationale of research
strategies, and presents the data analysis used to determine the relationship between CEO
duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, hospital size, hospital age, board
size, and financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
In this chapter, I review prior studies on corporate governance and financial
performance. The review proceeds from general to specific, discussing aspects of
corporate governance and CEO duality with respect to organizational performance. The
goal of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the link between corporate
governance, specifically CEO duality, and firm performance. The literature contained in
this review establishes the foundation for addressing the relationship between CEO
duality and financial performance of not-for-profit healthcare organizations.
In the first section, I present the concept of separation of ownership and control,
depicting basic reasons for controlling and monitoring the entrenchment of executive
management groups. The second section addresses the concept of CEO duality. The third
section shows corporate governance theories with an emphasis on the agency and
stewardship theories dominantly used in studies related to corporate governance. The two
theories constitute the theoretical framework of the study. The fourth section addresses
major themes of studies of the relationship between corporate governance, specifically
CEO duality, and financial performance of organizations across different industries. The
fifth section indicates healthcare governance. The last section shows hospital financial
indicators. This literature review assists in conveying the existing knowledge related to
the field, the knowledge gap, and the focus of this research project.
The key terms for the research for literature materials included CEO power, CEO
duality, corporate governance, boards of directors, board dynamics, agency theory,
stewardship theory, firm performance, return on equity, healthcare governance, clinical
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governance, healthcare financial indicators, and not-for-profit hospitals. Business,
management, and health science databases within the Walden University library, such as
Business Source Complete/Premier, ABI/Inform Complete, Emerald Management
Journals, SAGE Premier, MEDLINE, and PubMed, provided the relevant research
articles for the review. Google Scholar was also used in the search. The review includes a
significant number of articles published within 5 years of the current study. However,
because studies related to corporate governance and firm performance have spanned
more than 2 decades (Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2013), this literature includes
reviews of articles that are over 5 years old in order to define theories of corporate
governance and the history of the discipline. Furthermore, the literature review includes
published books by authors popularly known in the field.
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama and Jensen’s (1983b) discussion of the separation of decision and risk
bearing functions, or the separation of ownership and control, provided a foundational
proposition for agency theory and monitoring mechanisms for decision making in large
corporations, financial mutual organizations, professional partnerships, and nonprofit
entities. According to Fama and Jensen, the organizational decision process includes
initiation, ratification, implementation, and monitoring. In the initiation step, managers
generate resource utilization and structure contractual proposals. The ratification step
allows the organization to consider and choose decision initiatives. In the implementation
step, managers execute the ratified decisions. Lastly, in the monitoring and rewarding
phase, the organization conducts performance evaluations of the agents carrying out
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decisions and implements rewards (Alchian, & Demsetz, 1972). Fama and Jensen
emphasized that the initiation and implementation steps represent the decision
management function, while the ratification and monitoring activities entail the decision
control function.
Depending on the nature or type of business, an organization chooses an
appropriate structure for its decision process. Proprietorships, small partnership, and
closed corporations may decide to have decision management and decision control
handled by one or a few agents because it is possible and efficient to deter agency
problems between decision makers and residual claimants by restricting residual claims
to the decision makers (Fama & Jensen, 1983a). However, in a complex organization,
because specific and critical information relevant to decision making often inherently
diffuse among several agents throughout an organization, it is difficult and less efficient
to have the residual claimants involved in both decision management and decision
control. To avoid this limitation, the organization may delegate decision making or
decision management to all agents of different organizational levels who have specific
knowledge (Fama, 1980). Regarding compensation establishment, organizations set up
incentive structures to reward agents who initiate and implement decisions and
compensate parties who represent principals to ratify and monitor decision management
functions.
Furthermore, in complex organizations, due to residual claims diffusing among
many agents, it is costly to involve all agents in decision control. Therefore, in complex
organizations, decision initiatives developed by agents at lower levels are delivered to
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agents at higher levels for ratification and monitoring (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). The
board of directors, often comprised of decision agents who ideally do not gain financially
from their decisions, ensures the separation of the management and control of the most
important decisions of organizations (Clarson, 1995; Connelly & Limpaphayom, 2004;
Dalton & Dalton, 2005; Krause et al., 2013).
Farma and Jensen (1983b) emphasized that the separation of residual risk bearing
from decision management generally promotes decision systems in which decision
management functions are distinct from decision control functions. Furthermore, Fama
and Jensen argued that investing decision management and decision control in a few
agents leads to situations where these few agents are the primary residual claimants.
Therefore, the separation of decision management and decision control restricts or
minimizes the power of individual agents to expropriate the interests of residual
claimants, avoiding agency problems, which explains the rationale for CEO duality with
respect to firm performance.
CEO Duality
CEO duality refers to a governance structure in which one executive serves as the
CEO and the chairperson of the corporate board of directors of the company (Abebe,
Angriawan, & Liu, 2010; Chien, 2008; Krause et al., 2013; Lawal, 2012). The key factor
of CEO duality in relation to corporate governance and firm performance is the notion of
CEO power. According to Mueller and Barker (1997), a powerful CEO can command a
strong and unambiguous organizational leadership, which could result in good
organizational performance. However, while some concentration of CEO power (e.g.,
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CEO duality) positively affected firms’ values and operating performance (Carty, 2012),
too much CEO power (e.g., CEO plurality, defined as a CEO who is also chairperson and
a member of compensation committees, audit committees, or nominating committees) has
brought negative effects on operations and values of organizations (Harjoto, 2008). Even
CEO duality alone can negatively affect firm performance and the independence of
director board (Amba, 2013; Bliss, 2011; Brawn & Sharma, 2007).
Splitting roles of CEO and chairperson within public companies has occurred in
the United States. Based on the 2008 data, approximately 61% of CEOs of U.S. firms
held the positions of CEO and chairperson, and 26% held the positions of CEO,
chairperson, and president (Abels & Martelli, 2011). However, according to Abels and
Martelli (2011), data from 2010 showed there was a decline in CEO duality as companies
moved away from that governance structure in an attempt to improve transparency and
corporate independence. Furthermore, there was a decline in the number of firms
retaining their retired CEOs as chairpersons of their boards of directors. Importantly,
Abels and Martelli emphasized that some industries accepted CEO duality more than
others did due to the complexities of their business environments. The following section
addresses corporate governance theories that underlie the philosophy and implications of
CEO duality.
Corporate Governance Theories
Dubey (2008) explained that the literature in social science includes two types:
conceptual and empirical. While the conceptual type concerns concepts and theories, an
empirical literature review includes reports on past studies that are similar to the
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proposed research. Manmu, Yasser, and Rahman (2013) posited that multiple theories,
such as agency, stakeholder, stewardship, and institutional theories, deliver a better
understanding of corporate governance in the context of CEO duality and firm
performance. To review in detail the findings of past studies on the relationship between
CEO duality and firm performance, the discussion now turns to descriptions of the
agency and the stewardship theories prominently used by past and current researchers
studying CEO duality and firm performance.
Agency Theory
Research studies in CEO duality have largely been associated with agency theory,
which mainly focuses on the different functions of agents and principals as well as
agency costs. While agents (e.g., executives and high-level managers) hired by principals
(e.g., owners, shareholders, or other stakeholders) perform day-to-day operations, boards
of directors represent principals to serve as governance bodies, overseeing CEOs and
other executives. Specifically, directors monitor and evaluate management performance
of the CEO and the executives of an organization (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Shen, 2005).
In approaching studies arguing that CEO duality is not a desired option for
effective corporate governance, researchers used agency theory to establish the view that
separating the CEO and corporate board chairperson positions enhances the board
function (Aguilera et al., 2008). According Manmu et al. (2013), a CEO who is also the
chairperson of the board could potentially undermine the effectiveness of the monitoring
and control mechanism of the corporate board, whose job as a governance body is to
oversee the CEO and the executive team. Agency theorists have argued that executives
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tend to act opportunistically for their own benefits rather than those of the principals
(Drucker, 1954; Levy, 1981; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). Therefore, a powerful CEO might
establish goals that vary from those of shareholders, causing agency costs (Jensen, 1976).
To reduce agency costs and to ensure board independence, Mamum et al. (2013)
posited that organizations established controlling and monitoring mechanisms in the form
of proper and effective board structures to help deter CEOs and executives from pursuing
their own interests at the expense of the organizations and the immediate stakeholders.
Specifically, as agency theorists would argue, corporations attempt to avoid or reduce
agency problems by having a corporate governance structure with one position for CEO
and a separate position for chairperson of the corporate board (Farma & Jensen, 1983;
Levy, 1981; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). In addition, firms with good corporate governance
protect shareholder interests by establishing suitable incentive schemes for CEOs, which
could help align the interests of the CEOs with those of the shareholders (Donalson &
Davis, 1991). Therefore, according to agency theory, CEO duality is negatively
associated with firm performance because it could incur agency costs and impede board
independence. Reversely, CEO nonduality, in which one individual holds the CEO
position while a different one serves as the chairperson of the board, would be the
desirable form because, theoretically, CEO nonduality governance structures could
facilitate board independence and minimize agency costs.
Stewardship Theory
Contrary to the argument of agency theorists, stewardship theorists have asserted
the combination of power inherited from being the CEO and chairperson of the board
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(i.e., CEO duality) provides the CEO with ultimate autonomy and the unity of command
to make decisions that serve the best interests of the organizations in a timely manner
(Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). For instance, with the knowledge of an insider, CEO duality
offers the CEO a clear direction and faster responses to external events critical to the
success of an organization (Boyd, 1995).
Stewardship theorists view corporate managers as motivating individuals whose
interests align with the objectives of corporations (Davis, Schoorman, & Donalson,
1997). Resonating with the perspective of McGregor (1960), who through the theory of Y
suggested people are self-directed individuals, corporate managers work hard to meet
corporate goals. Similarly, analogous to Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of human needs,
steward theorists have argued that in trying to be good stewards, people achieve selfactualization, social standing, and recognition. Arguably, placing the control and
monitoring mechanisms with executives would discourage self-motivating individuals
from being productive and proactive in maximizing benefits for the principals (Argyris,
1981). Therefore, considering the adverse effects of separating the CEO/chairperson
position and the associated control and monitoring, under stewardship theory, CEO
duality is good for firm performance.
Reconciliation of Agency and Stewardship Perspectives
Despite the opposing propositions of the two theories, agency and stewardship
theories can work complementarily. Recently, Boivie, Lange, McDonald, and Westphal
(2011) focused on psychological factors that could mitigate agency problems in corporate
control and attempted to reconcile and integrate the agency and stewardship perspectives
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on organizational behaviors. Specifically, Boivie et al. sought empirical evidence of a
positive relationship between CEO organizational identification and the decoupling of
firm performance from CEO pay or perquisites and demonstrated how internal
psychological factors, such as organizational identification, could influence the agency
costs.
Boivie et al. (2011) argued that a CEO who identifies strongly with her or his
organization tends to find it difficult to justify personal enrichment to himself or herself
when firms are not performing well, and CEOs with higher levels of organizational
identification would be least likely to incur expensive perquisites. Furthermore, Boivie et
al. asserted that board control is less necessary with CEOs who have higher
organizational identification, and high organizational identification would moderate the
negative effects of board independence on the decoupling of high CEO pay and generous
perquisites from firm performance. Boivie et al.’s data analysis suggested that high levels
of CEO organizational identification related to less subsequent decoupling of CEO cash
compensation from firm performance and less subsequent use of perquisites. In addition,
CEO organizational identification moderated the tendency for board independence to
reduce CEOs’ self-serving activities. The findings of Boivie et al.’s study seemed to
suggest that, even in CEO duality structures, CEOs who a have high levels of
organizational identification act in the best interests of their organizations and do not
always pursue narrow self-interests. The organizational identification of CEOs helps
integrate the agency perspectives with those of stewardship with respect to corporate
control and organizational behaviors.
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Importantly, the findings of Boivie et al.’s (2011) study also indicated that neither
agency theory nor stewardship theory alone could fully explain the influence of CEO
duality on organizational performance. Lawal (2012) advised that researchers studying
board dynamics and CEO duality should not rely on a singular theory. Recently, some
researchers in the field have advocated for using a multiple theories paradigm or other
theories in studies of CEO duality performance implications (Krause & Semadeni, 2013;
Lawal, 2012; Manmu et al., 2013). In the next section, I elaborate on the implications of
the multiple theories approach.
Multiple Theories Approach
Some researchers have pressed for a better research method using various theories
comprised of agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, and institutional
theory in order to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship
between corporate board performance, CEO duality, and firm performance. For instance,
by comparing and contrasting each theory with respect to CEO duality and the
relationship between companies and business environments and stakeholders, Manmu et
al. (2013) attempted to depict how a multiple theories model would help researchers
understand the effects of corporate governance on corporate performance. Agency
theorists argued for managing and monitoring roles of the board on the CEO to eradicate
agency costs associated with opportunistic activities of the CEO (Boyd, 1995; Jensen,
1993; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). In contrast, stewardship theorists opposed, arguing
that restraining monitoring and controlling mechanisms could motivate executives and
empower them with the autonomy to make decisions in the best interests of companies
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(Block, 1996; Davis & Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1988; Peggy & Hugh,
2001).
The stakeholder theory is also concerned with corporate governance mechanisms
in the context of the rights to information about organizational operation. As important
entities such as shareholders, employees, customers, lenders, suppliers, governments,
local charities, and various interest groups could help companies become successful, they
have the rights to information about how executives govern their businesses with respect
to transparency and societal responsibility (Freeman, 2004; Friedman & Miles, 2006;
Robert, 1992). Regarding the application of the institutional theory to corporate
governance, due to high levels of regulation, companies strive to meet certain corporate
governance standards to establish their business legitimacy to operate in markets
(Kathleen, 1988; Krishna, 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Manmu et al. (2013)
emphasized that one theory could not explain effective corporate governance, and when
combined, agency theory depicts the management and principals while stakeholder and
institutional theories address social relationships, regulations, and enforcement.
Major Themes in Studies of CEO Duality
With foundational propositions, theoretical approaches, and the theories
dominantly used in studies of the relationship between corporate governance, CEO
duality, and firm performance introduced, this section addresses past research studies
and their findings. The findings of extant literature related to CEO duality mainly include
five major categories comprised of the consequences, the antecedents, and the firm
performance implications of CEO duality, board dependence, and organizational slack.

38
The review outlines these major themes of the effects of CEO duality, contextualizing the
focus of the current study.
Consequences of CEO Duality
Regarding the consequences of CEO duality with respect to succession effects,
Krause et al. (2013) recognized that (a) CEO duality increases power and comes with a
corresponding increase in accountability; (b) a more powerful CEO is more accountable
for firm performance; and (c) separating CEO and chairperson does not often lead to
more effective monitoring. Secondly, regarding the consequences of CEO duality on
entrenchment activity, boards with CEO duality tend to adopt antitakeover measures to
undermine the value and the voting power of a potential takeover (Sundaramurthy, 1996).
In addition, boards with CEO duality often devote less effort on monitoring activities,
and organizational factors such poor performance and CEO duality moderated this effect
(Bierman, 2010).
Antecedents of CEO Duality
Researchers examining antecedents of CEO duality with respect to the role of
firm performance in determining how firms choose duality suggested that, historically,
strong firm performance often precedes consolidation of CEO and chairperson positions,
while poor firm performance often leads to the splitting of the top roles (Harrison, Torres,
& Kukalis, 1988). In terms of the antecedents of governance characteristics, according to
Harrison et al. (1988), when the board has already possessed a high level of
independence, the independence of chairperson might not benefit organization more.
Additionally, when CEO power is high, vigilant boards may choose a nonduality
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structure. Reversely, when CEO power is low, the CEO may need more supports rather
than monitoring, and thus a vigilant board would adopt a duality structure (Findelstein &
D’ Aveni, 1994). Furthermore, when monitoring activities appear to be more costly,
especially under conditions of strategic complexity, boards tend to reduce monitoring and
prefer the separation of CEO and chair positions simply as a means of accessing
information rather than for monitoring (Krause et al., 2013).
With respect to the individual-level antecedents, CEO tenure and age play a role
in a firm’s decision to adopt CEO duality (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008). Specifically,
according to Linck et al. (2008), firms often consolidate the two top positions as the CEO
ages. Furthermore, in apprentice separations, in which the former CEO remains chair, and
demotion separations, in which the CEO still remains in that role but relinquishes the
chair position to a director of the board, CEOs tended to be oldest, and middle-aged,
respectively, whereas boards use demotion separation to give young CEOs who are not
performing optimally a second chance.
Firm Performance
Past research of the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance
showed no concrete direct and simple relationship (Krause et al., 2013; Lawal, 2013).
Rechner and Dalton (1989), the first researchers in the field, began the study of the
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance by analyzing Fortune 500
companies. When measuring firm performance using accounting-based measures of
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and return on investment (ROI), Rechner
and Dalton concluded that firms without CEO duality outperformed those with CEO
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duality. In contrast, when examining the mean shareholder return of U.S corporations in
various industries, Donaldson and Davis (1991) found that the shareholder return for
firms with CEO duality was significantly greater than that for those without CEO duality.
Nevertheless, Daily and Dalton (1992, 1993) found CEO duality had no effect on firm
performance in either accounting or market-based measures for small firms.
Given the conflicting evidence of the relationship between CEO duality and firm
performance, researchers studying CEO duality focused on the organizational outcomes
immediately after announcements of changes in the leadership structure of the boards.
Baliga, Moyer, and Rao (1996) studied the performance effects of CEO duality on three
circumstances: reactions of the market in response to changes in board leadership
structure, companies’ operating performance after changes in board leadership structure,
and the market values gained by firms with CEO duality and firms without CEO duality.
Baliga et al. analyzed a sample of Fortune 500 firms and found no support for a
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance.
Attempting to identify patterns of findings in prior studies related to board
composition, leadership structure, and company performance, Dalton, Ellstrand, and
Johnson (1998) performed a meta-analysis. Dalton et al. noticed that different
performance measures used in studies did sometimes change the relationships between
variables. According to Dalton el al., while the market-based measures gave slightly
positive correlation between CEO duality and performance, the accounting-based
measures suggested a slightly negative correlation.
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Researchers continued CEO duality scholarship by examining its effects on
interim CEO succession and strategic change. Arguing that in a CEO succession a firm
might face risks of top management dissolution, Ballinger and Marcel (2010) argued that
CEO duality fosters top management unity. Ballinger and Marcel’s analysis of S&P 500
firms supported this argument. Quigley and Hambrick (2012) investigated the effects of
CEO duality on strategic change in firms going through CEO succession in which former
CEOs were retained as board chairs. Based on an analysis of U.S high technology
companies, Quigley and Hambrick concluded that firms that retained their CEOs as board
chairs following succession events faced obstacles with strategic change, negatively
affecting their ultimate performance.
Contributing to the literature on CEO duality’s effects on firm performance
following CEO succession, Krause and Semadeni (2013) focused on three types of
splitting the CEO and corporate board chairperson positions: apprentice, departure, and
demotion. Krause and Semadeni explained that, in apprentice separation, the former CEO
remains chair, whereas in departure separation, the CEO/chair leaves the company, and
the company installs two separate individuals to hold the CEO and board chair positions.
In demotion separation, the former CEO remains CEO but relinquishes the corporate
chairperson position to another director of the board. Based on their analysis of S&P 500
companies, Krause and Semadeni asserted that the performance benefits achieved from
the separation depend on the circumstances in which the separation happened.
Specifically, according to Krause and Semadeni, demotion separation positively
influences firms’ future performance when past performance declined. Furthermore,

42
according to Krause and Semadeni, the search for the link between CEO duality and firm
performance is far from finished and should continue, and CEO duality’s performance
implications are conditional and complex.
Board Independence
Bliss (2011) investigated whether CEO duality undermined or compromised the
role of boards of directors in higher quality audits. Bliss argued that independent directors
on the board would most likely demand more audit work, resulting in higher quality
audits, and there would be an association between the audit fee pricing and the
proposition of an independent board. Secondly, Bliss theorized that CEO duality would
moderate the higher quality audits demanded by independent boards of firms with CEO
duality, and the positive association between audit fee pricing and the proposition of
independent directors would be weaker in firms with CEO duality. Furthermore, audit
firms tended to perceive larger boards as risky clients, thus requiring greater audit efforts.
These assumptions set the foundations for Bliss’s examination of the association between
audit fee pricing and the proposition of independent directors of boards of firms with or
without CEO duality leadership structures.
Bliss’s (2011) findings suggested that companies with more independent boards
demand higher audit quality and efforts and that this association is only present in
companies without CEO duality, suggesting that CEO duality constrains board
independence. The findings of this study also supported the proposition against CEO
duality, as CEO duality might compromise the effectiveness and the independence of the
board of directors.
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Organizational Slack and Firm Performance
Past researchers explored direct relationships between CEO duality and
organizational slack and firm performance. Specifically, Peng (2010) examined how
CEO duality and organizational slack affect the performance of China’s state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) and privately-owned enterprises (POEs). Peng defined absorbed slack
and unabsorbed slack as underutilized capacity and uncommitted cash flows and
untapped lines of credit, respectively. According to Peng, the integral link between how
boards monitored and controlled the CEO and how the CEO tapped into organizational
unabsorbed slack to operate could influence firm performance.
Peng (2010) argued that, while CEO duality might increase the speed of making
decisions and reduce potential conflicts at the top, CEOs in CEO duality organizations
could use organizational slack for their benefit at the expenses of the organizations.
Specifically, due to inherent agency problem associated with CEO duality, Peng
proposed that in China’s SOEs, CEO duality reduced the positive relationship between
organizational slack and firm performance, as the CEO of SOEs would tend to use
organizational slack for their own benefit at the expense of the company. Furthermore,
due to the nature of SOEs being passive in decision making, having CEO duality for
making fast decisions might not be necessary or applicable. Contrary to China’s SEOs,
Peng argued that POEs were more proactive regarding the turbulent markets, and CEO
duality enabled CEOs to make faster decisions in strategically utilizing organizational
unabsorbed slack, thus positively influencing firm performance.
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The main findings implied that organizational slack was positively related to firm
performance. However, while CEO duality was positively related to firm performance in
POEs, it was negatively related to firm performance in SOEs. The practical implication is
that when judging whether CEO duality or organizational slack are negative or positive
for companies, Peng (2010) suggested practitioners should contemplate and approach
organizational slack and CEO duality with an integrative and contingent perspective.
A Contingency Approach
Boyd (1995) used the framework of the agency and stewardship theories to
investigate the relationship between CEO duality and performance. Specifically, Boyd
applied three dimensions of environmental uncertainty (munificence, dynamism, and
complexity) to examine these factors in relation to CEO duality. Boyd explained
munificence depicts the abundance of resources in the environment while dynamism and
complexity are concerned with environmental volatility and inequalities among
competitors, respectively. Boyd concluded that CEO duality has positive effects on firm
performance in some industry conditions and negative effects on other conditions.
Specifically, CEO duality was good for companies operating in conditions of resource
scarcity and high complexity. The practical implication of Boyd’s study is that when
considering the separation of the positions of CEO and chairperson, firms need to
consider the merit of CEO duality versus the potential abuses associated with agency
problems and recognize that, under some circumstances, CEO duality could help firm
performance.
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Following Boyd’s (1995) lead in examining the relationship between CEO duality
and firm performance in various conditions or circumstances, Braun and Sharma (2007)
examined empirically the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance of
family controlled public firms (FCPFs). Braun and Sharma assumed that the separation of
CEO and corporate board chairperson would provide an important check in making sure
that a single executive did not dominate decision-making processes, and the nondual
structure suggested the controlling family’s awareness of the noncontrolling
shareholders’ interests. Furthermore, an FCPF with family members owning large shares
and a duality governance structure might hurt firm performance due to possible extreme
entrenchment by the family. Grounded by the perspectives of stewardship theorists,
Braun and Sharma posited that family members already act like corporate stewards,
protecting companies and making decisions in the best interests of the organizations.
Furthermore, the combination of high level of ownership of the family operating the firm
and a CEO duality structure would stimulate the family to commit to organizational
effectiveness and commitment.
However, Braun and Sharma’s (2007) analysis suggested the separation or the
unification of CEO and board chair did not have any impact on firm performance.
Nevertheless, family ownership moderated the relationship between CEO duality and
firm performance. Specifically, the results indicated that family ownership influences the
shareholder return in firms without CEO duality structures, but not in their counterparts,
suggesting that the separation of the CEO and board chair position is more effective when
the family is not entrenched through high ownership. The results of Braun and Sharma’s
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(2007) study reinforced the contingent aspect of the relationship between CEO duality
and firm performance.
Elsayed (2010) demonstrated the determination of the appropriateness of the
board leadership structure depends on some contextual variables, such as firm size, age,
past performance, and ownership structure, and that the CEO nonduality structure (the
agency theory) and the CEO duality structure (the stewardship theory) were valid in
certain conditions. According to Elsayed, prior poor financial performance correlated
positively with CEO duality, and as firms became bigger, the probability that firms would
split the CEO and chairperson position increased. Secondly, old firms tended to adopt the
CEO duality structure. In terms of the effects of ownership, managers increased their
ownership to enhance their voting power and to initiate and press for decisions that
served their interests and weakened the independence and monitoring power of the board.
Thirdly, considering the perspectives of agency theory, Elsayed theorized that higher
employee ownership would serve as an effective insider control mechanism in a CEO
duality situation, and institutional investors, with their knowledge and ability to hire
professionals, are more likely to challenge and control firm performance. Furthermore, to
counteract their inability to control management, private shareholders leaned toward the
CEO nonduality structure. Moreover, in the developing market, where corporate
governance was not well established and monitoring would incur more costs, foreign
investors with modest investments preferred CEO nonduality as an ideal governance
structure.
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The outcomes of Elsayed’s (2010) examination of the relationship between CEO
duality and firm factors including size, age, managerial, individual, institutional, and
foreign investors empirically suggested that board leadership structure varies with firm
size, age, and ownership structure. While CEO duality correlated negatively with firm
size, it was positively associated with firm age. Old firms tended to adopt CEO duality, as
they preferred fast response to environmental changes or unified decision-making
processes as part of efforts to adapt. Moreover, the preference of board leadership
structure varied with the type of ownership. Specifically, insider shareholders seemed to
prefer CEO duality structures while institutional, private, and foreign holders sought
CEO nonduality structures. Similar to the notion of the reconciliation of the opposing
agency and stewardship theories, Elsayed emphasized that both agency and stewardship
theories could be complementary to each other under certain business conditions,
Researchers also studied CEO duality with firms going through restructuring.
Cashen (2011) focused on the effect of board leadership in firms that decided to execute a
portfolio restructuring due to poor performance. Cashen suggested that firms adopted or
moved away from CEO duality structures as corrective actions to align the interests of
shareholders. Specifically, Cashen explored whether portfolio-restructuring firms
exhibited a reduction in CEO duality in the postrestructuring period. Cashen’s findings
supported the proposition that restructuring firms did change governance structures along
with other restructurings in order to enhance organizational performance. Based on
Cashen’s analysis, in nonrestructuring firms, poor performance did not have any impact
on CEO duality. However, for high and low performance categories, restructuring firms
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eventually chose nonduality structures, while the restructuring firms in the moderately
performing group exhibited duality structures. Seemingly, companies took these adoptive
actions as corrective means to align the interests of shareholders. Noticeably, Cashen
suggested the proposition that firms would need to adopt nonduality governance
structures to reflect socially valid and desired trends.
Industry Contingency
Expanding on the contingency approach of Boyd (1995), Young, Stedham, and
Beekun (2000) focused on corporate governance and contexts specific to each industry.
In this study, Young et al. (2000) used multiple theoretical frameworks to study corporate
governance issues in hospitals. In addition to using agency perspectives stressing the
need of a control procedure to align interests of the principles (owners) and the agents
(CEO), and to avoid having a CEO as a chairperson, which could potentially lead to
problems of conflicts of interest, Young et al. also deployed the approach of institutional
perspective. From an institutional view, organizations sometimes are under constant
pressure to conform to accepted norms, and thus establish corporate boards to serve a
linkage role and to maintain a legitimate relationship with the external environment.
Young et al. concluded that board independence, competition, and managed care
penetration are important factors that influence boards to adopt CEO formal evaluation.
Young et al. emphasized that organizations should not attempt to improve governance
through policies that aim to increase board independence. Instead, organizations should
consider broader contextual factors that are specific to each industry.
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The proposition that the effects of corporate governance vary contingently
depending on the type of industry resonates with the work of Brickley, Cole, and Jarrell
(1997). Based on the costs associated with the separation of the CEO and chairperson
titles, Brickley et al. (1997) asserted no leadership structure obviously worked best for all
industries, and perhaps the optimal leadership structure depended on the economic
circumstances facing the firm. Based on the descriptive and regression analysis of the
characteristics and effects of leadership structures of large U.S. companies, Brickley et al.
noted that no firms in the samples of interest had an independent outsider as chairperson,
and after splitting the titles during CEO transitions periods, most firms reverted to CEO
duality structures over time. The findings confounded the interpretations of past studies
that compared firm performance with different leadership structures. Furthermore,
Brickley et al. concluded that in firms that separated the titles, the chairperson often had
detailed knowledge of the company and often owned high stock ownership. In addition,
firms used the titles of chairperson, CEO, and president as incentive in their succession
plans for CEOs. In contrast to the conclusions of previous studies investigating link
between CEO duality and firm performance, the researchers found no evidence that CEO
duality did not have a direct relationship with inferior accounting and market returns.
Researchers have extensively studied the relationship between CEO duality and
firm performance across industries in the past two decades. However, as reviewed in this
section, past empirical results have not been conclusive (Kang, 2005; Lawal, 2011;
Shukeri, 2012). One of the gaps in extant literature in this field is that prior researchers
have examined both small and big corporations operating in different industries, but none
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of these researchers has focused specifically on for-profit or not-for-profit organizations
in the healthcare sector. Considering that CEO duality and firm performance are
contextually specific to each type of industry (Boyd, 1995; Cashen, 2011; Elsayed, 2010;
Young et al., 2000), further study of the effects of CEO duality on the financial
performance of healthcare organizations could potentially deliver some additional
contributions to the existing knowledge of corporate governance research. The discussion
now turns to healthcare governance.
Healthcare Governance
American hospital boards face greater expectations of management accountability
and carry the ultimate responsibility for the quality of care provided by their
organizations and for overall performance (Alexander, Weiner, & Bogue, 2001;
Chambers, 2012). The roles of hospital boards range from establishing and initiating
policy, mission, and strategic direction to interacting with key external constituencies,
organizing fundraising activities, monitoring hospitals, and evaluating management
performance (Lee, Alexander, & Wang, 2007). Importantly, Flanning and Power (2008)
claimed healthcare organizations manage both corporate governance and clinical
governance, making healthcare governance complex. The following section discusses the
essential aspects of clinical governance in hospital boards.
Clinical Governance
Brennan and Flynn (2013) defined clinical governance as standards, structures,
and systems that healthcare organizations establish and apply to create a culture and to
govern clinical activities. According to Brennan and Flynn, as a subset of clinical
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governance, clinical accountability and responsibility bestowed on healthcare
organizations involve the monitoring and oversight of clinical activities, including
regulation, audit, assurance, and compliance by boards of directors, regulators, and both
external and internal auditors. Brennan and Flynn emphasized clinical governance is an
evolving concept in the healthcare sector, and to the extent that patient safety and high
quality care have become focal points of state and federal regulations, the responsibility
and the accountability of a typical hospital board continue to increase. As a result, both
for-profit and not-for-profit hospital boards rely on governance education and best
practices to assist their members in meeting their fiduciary responsibilities.
Regulatory entities, communities, and various constituencies have argued that the
governance and management of clinical governance improve delivery of clinical practice,
and thus deliver better healthcare quality (Goodman, 2002; Thomas, 2002). The Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization (JCAHO) has made it clear
that hospital boards are responsible for overseeing clinical quality (Jonas, Kovner, &
Knickman, 2008). Faced with these high expectations and demands, boards of healthcare
organizations have embraced clinical governance as an added responsibility. Hacker,
Liford, and Jordan (1999) and Stanton (2006) asserted that healthcare boards now
consider clinical governance as important as corporate governance because it promotes
and ensures an integrated approach to good practices, improved quality, and most of all
connects administrative and clinical elements, providing a comprehensive framework for
clinical accountability (Brennan & Flynn, 2013; Onion, 2000).
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Ultimately, healthcare boards pursue effective clinical governance in order to
meet patients’ high expectations about healthcare quality and safety, to assist in
collaborative efforts and efficiency among clinical teams, to increase job satisfaction for
healthcare professionals, to improve clinical outcomes, and to reduce significantly
medical errors (Gerada & Cullen, 2004). However, in order to achieve effective clinical
governance, a healthcare board needs to be a collaborative effort between boards, CEOs,
and executives, as well as leaders of the physicians and other licensed independent
practitioners (Brennan, & Flynn, 2013). The latter leader group uniquely exists in
healthcare organizations, but not in other business sectors, and enhances the
organization’s ability to achieve its goals by providing technical knowledge, clinical
experiences, and decision making with respect to safety and high quality care. Therefore,
considering licensed medical staff or physicians as members of the governing body in
healthcare sector addresses the unique challenges faced by the leadership of healthcare
organizations.
Governance in Not-For-Profit Hospitals
Governance is a critical matter for both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations
in healthcare sector. However, by some measures, not-for-profit hospitals appear to
encounter more challenges with respect to governance than their for-profit counterparts
do. For instance, recruiting volunteer board members with relevant expertise to assist notfor-profit hospitals manage rapid changes in technology, shifting government policies,
intense market competition, and burdensome liability exposure can be difficult (Roberts
& Connors, 1998). According to Robert and Connors (1998), ineffective governance
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leads to poor and detrimental decisions within an organization, resulting in bad
investment or ill-planned program initiatives, and consequentially creating financial
troubles or other problems sometimes difficult to recognize and correct for a hospital.
Essentially, the boards of not-for-profit hospitals have to ensure that the management
measures risks prudently in order for the organization to survive in the long run to
continue its mission. Strategically, boards focus on long-term strategies and survival by
proactively anticipating several years in advance the issues and changes that may arise in
the marketplace.
The board of a not-for-profit hospital has greater involvement in operational and
program management issues because the board must balance its stated mission with the
need to build financial resources, ensuring the hospital’s long-term viability (Steane &
Christie, 2001). Moreover, unlike a for-profit organization, a not-for-profit hospital does
not have to meet owners’ demands for a return on their equity investment. However, a
not-for-profit hospital has to satisfy mandates from both internal and external
constituencies, including physicians admitting patients to the hospital, private insurers,
government payers including Medicare and Medicaid, regulators, and bondholders.
In the healthcare sector, members of an effective board must have divergent skills,
including knowledge specific to the healthcare industry and clinical experience. Boards
also need to understand quality and safety issues, third-party reimbursement
methodologies, and accounting, legal, and business and investment management.
Furthermore, to meet challenges adequately, governing boards of healthcare delivery
organizations and their committees also require candid and vital information to flow
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efficiently from the management. The following section presents the arguments for
having doctors on boards and using CEO duality structures for not-for-profit hospitals.
Doctors on Boards
Skills for board members entail expertise and qualifications in corporate
management, finance, audit, law, human resources, capital management, strategic
information technology, risk management, and clinical governance. Other important
qualification factors include: (a) integrity and the capacity to understand the needs of the
community and patients; (b) knowledge of the policy context of health, governance
processes, strategic thinking, planning, and leadership skills; and (c) experience in highlevel decision making and in effective consultation and collaboration with various
stakeholders.
The question is whether doctors should be on healthcare boards. Considering that
an effective healthcare board needs to be able to execute both corporate and clinical
governance, and especially to have capacity to understand and reflect the views of the
community and users of health services, it seems that the absence of physicians on the
healthcare board would limit or minimize the board’s effectiveness. Eekloo, Delsie, and
Vleugels (2007) reported that European healthcare professionals have shown vital board
functions with their clinical expertise. Bass (2008), while acknowledging the possibility
of the issues of conflict of interest and voting powers, asserted that doctors on boards are
important and indispensable assets for good governance in healthcare. A survey
conducted by the United States Center for Healthcare Governance concluded that 67% of
CEO and board chairs indicated that they brought physicians to the board because of their
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roles in the organizations, and 42% did so because of their expertise in clinical quality
(Bennington, 2010). In the United States, healthcare boards tend to have 2-3 doctors as
board members (Orlikoff & Totten, 2006). If having a doctor as a board director can
enhance the leadership and governance of health services, then it can be hypothesized
that having doctors as healthcare board members is positively related with financial
performance of the not-for-profit hospitals.
CEO Duality in Healthcare Governance
Under agency theory, powerful chief executive officers and executive
management tend to dominate boards, and knowledgeable and independent directors are
necessary to counterbalance the power of management (Stevenson & Radin, 2009).
However, despite that much regulation has focused on the importance of independent
directors for corporations, American hospital governance does not appear to have great
concern with interlocking directorships, or a number of other practices such as CEO
duality, that agency theory would view as unacceptable (Chambers, 2012).
Proponents of the managerial stakeholder and resource-dependency theories view
directors as independent monitors with consultative functions, using knowledge achieved
from interacting with a social network (Chamber, 2012). Directors bring human capital to
firms, assist organizations in reducing dependencies on external resources or seek
external resources that could benefit the firms, decrease transaction costs, establish
credibility, expand boundary span, and advise the management with strategies and
initiatives that ultimately add to firm performance (Shortell, 1989; Umbdenstock,
Hageman, & Amundson, 1990; Wall, Gerada, Conlon, Ombler-Spain, & Warner, 2006).
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According to Wall et al.(2006), the prohibition on CEOs or senior executives on boards
did not align with approaches and purposes of boards in healthcare organizations.
Considering that CEOs or executives may possesses specialized knowledge valuable to a
healthcare organization, having executives on boards potentially results in greater sharing
of information and opportunities and reduces coordination costs (Brickley, Coles, &
Jarrell, 1997).
In addition to being primarily responsible for providing oversight, advice, and
guidance to CEOs, as well as monitoring and, if necessary, disciplining CEOs, boards
have become strategic partners working in collaboration with management (Anderson,
Melanson, & Maly, 2007). In healthcare, different relationships between CEOs and board
members have emerged (Bevan, 2010; Bjork, 2006). According to Bjork (2006),
leadership in healthcare has become collaborative, involving an overlap between
leadership and governance and between leadership and management. Therefore, I
expected a positive relationship between CEO duality and financial performance of notfor-profit hospitals.
Hospital Financial Indicators
Researchers have used consistently identical performance measures to study
financial performance of for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals. For instance, Joseph,
Thomas, and Robert (2009) applied ratios derived from total operating revenue and other
financial information related to assets, liabilities, and patient admissions to study hospital
costs and efficiency with respect to hospital size and ownership. Similarly, in a study
surveying healthcare executives on key performance measures healthcare leaders
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considered critical, Love, Revere, and Black (2008) concluded that healthcare decision
makers measure operating profit margin, cash on hand, charity care, net profit margin,
bad debt expenses, and days in accounts receivable. Specifically, Prince (1991) asserted
healthcare management groups paid attention to financial measures such as net patient
revenue, other operating revenue, operating expenses, operating margin, and
nonoperating expenses to access financial outcomes of not-for-profit community
hospitals.
Important governmental entities also used similar categories of healthcare
financial data to evaluate states’ not-for-profit health care facilities. For instance, the
OSHPD supports the State of California healthcare delivery system (oshpd.ca.gov, 2011).
OSHPD delivers various services designed to increase healthcare accessibility within
California. Relevantly, OSHPD mitigates capital needs for not-for-profit healthcare
facilities in California by providing loan insurance to these organizations. Regarding
financial measurement, OSHPD uses two financial ratios comprised of operating margin
and total margin, which it considers the most important key indicators to measure a
hospital’s financial performance.
The operating margin. The operating margin, most commonly used in
measuring a hospital’s financial performance, compares a hospital’s total operating
revenue against its total operating expenses (Cleverley, Song, & Cleverley, 2010). If total
operating revenue exceeds total operating expenses, the hospital operates with a profit.
Conversely, when a hospital achieves total operating revenue less than total operating
expenses, it experiences a financial loss. Dividing the difference between total operating
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revenue and total operating expenses by the total operating revenues gives the operating
margin. Total operating revenue is comprised of the sum of net patient revenue (e.g.,
payments received for routine nursing care, emergency services, surgery services, lab
tests, etc.) and other operating revenue such as cafeteria sales, refunds on purchases,
vending machine commissions, parking lot revenue, et cetera. Total operating expenses
include expenses associated with running the hospital, such as salaries, employee
benefits, purchased services, supplies, professional fees, depreciation, rentals, interest,
and insurance. However, total operating expenses do not include bad debts or income
taxes.
The total margin. The operating margin involves revenue derived from
operation, the total margin, often called total profit margin, and is considered the most
popular indicator of hospital profitability (Cleverley et al., 2010). It compares a hospital’s
net income against its total operating revenue. The total margin includes all other sources
of revenue and expenses that are not associated with operations, such as nonoperating
revenues (e.g., investment income, unrestricted contribution, medical office building, gift
shop revenue, etc.) and nonoperating expenses (e.g., office building expenses, gift shop
expenses, loss of sale of hospital properties, etc.), income tax, and any extraordinary
items. Dividing net income by total operating revenue generates the total margin. Net
income is the excess of revenue over expenses. When hospitals report substantial
amounts of nonoperating revenue or expense, the total margin differs significantly from
the operating margin.
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Free cash flow. Free cash flow shows an organization’s cash inflow and outflow
rather than its accounting earnings. Importantly, free cash flow represents the amount of
cash left over after undertaking the firm’s operations and making all investments
necessary to ensure its continuous operation (Horngren et al., 2006). Calculating the
change in net assets plus interest and noncash expenses minus investments in fixed assets
and net working capital generates free cash flow.
Not-For-Profit Hospitals’ Equity
Profitable hospitals retain and reinvest their earnings to gain higher growth in
equity capital. For not-for-profit hospitals, retaining earnings represents the most
important source of equity. While their counterparts raise equity externally by issuing
shares, not-for-profit hospitals have to rely on internal operations to build equity and
supplement growing equity efforts with profitable nonoperating activities, such as raising
funds through donations and gifts and managing their financial investments (Reiter &
Song, 2011).
Most recently, Singh, Wheeler, and Roden (2012) attempted to explore whether
effective revenue cycle management helped not-for-profit hospitals improve their
profitability, strengthen their ability to grow equity, and thus remain financially viable in
the long term. Using fixed effects regression analysis assessing four key financial
indicators, namely operating margin, total profit margin, free cash flow, and the value of
the hospital’s equity capital, Singh et al. found a strong relationship between revenue
cycle management and profitability and equity capital of 1,397 bond-issuing not-forprofit U.S. hospitals.
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As previously mentioned, the goal of this study was to determine the relationship
between CEO duality and the financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals, as well as
the link between healthcare governance boards with doctors as board members and the
financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. Logistics regression has been used in
board leadership and firm performance (Darus, 2011; Elssayed, 2010; Gill & Mathur,
2011; Harjoto, 2008; Peng et al., 2010). The study used a statistical model of estimated
logistic regression to seek the relationships between the financial performance of not-forprofit hospitals (the dependent variables) and the five independent variables (CEO
duality, presence of physicians on hospital boards, hospital age, hospital size, and board
size).
Summary
This literature review focused on corporate governance theories with emphasis on
the two integral opposing theories, namely agency theory and stewardship theory, which
are critical to studies of the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. The
literature review also elaborated the proposed integration of the agency and stewardship
theories that would assist in deriving inclusive results of studies related to CEO duality
and firm performance. Considering that the contextual and contingent aspects of the
healthcare industry, specifically not-for-profit hospitals, the review of uniqueness of
healthcare governance provides the rationale for the study of CEO duality’s effects on
not-for-profit hospitals. Specifically the review covered separation of ownership and
control, CEO duality, corporate governance theories, major themes in studies of CEO
duality, healthcare governance, and hospital financial indicators.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Not-for-profit hospitals face great challenges of competition position and changes
related to operational efficiency, market standing, and financial viability (Alexander &
Lee, 2006). According to Owen (2005), political and community leaders have
increasingly pressed not-for-profit hospitals to enhance their effectiveness and
performance for community benefits. Pay-for-performance initiatives strongly passed and
supported by the government have encouraged not-for-profit hospitals to improve their
performance (Lee, Chen, & Weiner, 2004). Furthermore, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
enacted in 2002 by the U.S. Congress to enforce better regulations of corporations, has
also been made relevant to the practices of external regulations and the oversight of
governance boards and conduct of various not-for-profit organizations (Greene, 2005).
These developments have provided the rationale for designing effective governance for
not-for-profit organizations. Therefore, there is a need for researchers to identify
governance models that not-for-profit hospitals can adopt to enhance their effectiveness
and performance.
As the literature review of this study indicated, the research problem addressed in
this study was that no researchers have sought specifically the relationship between CEO
duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, hospital size, hospital age, board
size, and financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals of the healthcare sector. The
objective was to examine the effects of CEO duality, presence of physicians on
governance boards, hospital age, hospital size, and board size on the financial
performance of not-for-profit hospitals. The outcomes might potentially generate results
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specific for not-for-profit hospitals and their administrators who may seek an appropriate
corporate governance structure that would enhance their organizational effectiveness.
The three research questions, three hypotheses, along with three associated
hypotheses were as follows:
Research Question 1: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age,
hospital size, board size, and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals?
H10: There was no significant statistical relationship between CEO duality,
presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board size,
and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals.
H1a: There was a positive, statistically significant relationship between CEO
duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board
size, and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals. CEO duality and presence of physicians
on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, and board size enhance total margin
of not-for-profit hospitals.
Research Question 2: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age,
hospital size, board size, and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals?
H20: There was no significant statistical relationship between CEO duality,
presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board size,
and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals.
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H2a: There was a positive, statistically significant relationship between CEO
duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board
size, and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals. CEO duality, presence of
physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, and board size enhance
operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals.
Research Question 3: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age,
hospital size, board size, and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals?
H30: There was no significant statistical relationship between CEO duality,
presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board size,
and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals.
H3a: There was a positive, statistically significant relationship between CEO
duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, board
size, and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals. CEO duality, presence of
physicians on the governance board, hospital age, hospital size, and board size enhance
free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals.
In the following sections, I explain the research methodology to test the
hypotheses. In the first section, I outline the research design and approach as well as the
justification for using this design and approach, which was derived logically from the
problem statement of the study. The second section addresses the setting and sampling,
which comprise components of (a) the population from which the targeted not-for-profit
hospitals were drawn, and (b) the sampling method frame including eligibility criteria for
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selecting organizations for the study, the sampling frame, the sample size, and the
rationale for the sample size. The instrumentation section shows the instruments that have
been used to measure variables in past studies examining the relationship between
corporate governance and financial performance and the definitions and explanations of
the calculation of dependent and independent variables. In the fourth section, I present
details of data collection, which include secondary data collected from both public and
private databases. The fifth section involves the data analysis of the study using a
multiple regression model. In the sixth section, I elaborate on the hypothesis formulation.
The last two sections of the chapter include explanations of the protection of the selected
organizations and the dissemination of findings.
Research Design and Approach
This quantitative research included a multiple regression analysis approach using
secondary data as input variables to determine whether there was a significant
relationship between CEO duality, the presence of physicians on governance boards,
hospital size, hospital age, board size, and financial performance of not-for-profit
hospitals. In the following section, I describe the research design and the justification for
selecting it.
Description of Research Design
The objective was to examine the relationship between several independent and
dependent variables. The multiple regression model was as follows:
Yi = bo + b1X1i + b2X2i + … + bnXni+ ɛi
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The subscript i refers to the hospital number and ɛ denotes the error. Yi is the
outcome or dependent variable, b0 is intercept, b1 is the coefficient of the predictor of X1,
b2 is the coefficient of the predictor X2, and bn is the coefficient of the nth predictor Xn.
Justification
Because the goal of this study was to examine the relationship between
independent and dependent variables, I determined that the quantitative approach was the
most appropriate research method. Creswell (2009) suggested that a qualitative research
approach is designed for exploratory study and used in research in which variables and
theories are not known. The theories of agency, stewardship, and clinical governance as
well as variables such as CEO duality and financial indicators, which were used as the
theoretical framework for the study, are well known. Furthermore, Creswell asserted that
quantitative approaches best address problems in situations in which researchers want to
understand what variables or factors influence an outcome. Therefore, for this study, the
quantitative approach was more appropriate than the qualitative approach to determine
whether there was a significant relationship between CEO duality, the presence of
physicians on governance boards, hospital size, hospital age, board size, and financial
performance of not-for-profit hospitals.
Although quantitative approaches have limitations, such as possible assumptions
that may interfere with outcomes, its several advantages outweighed its limitations. As I
investigated the relationships among CEO duality, the presence of physicians on
governance boards, hospital size, hospital age, board size, and financial performance of
not-for-profit hospitals, quantitative research allows for the use of rich archived corporate
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and financial data available from public databases and annual proxy statements of
targeted not-for-profit hospitals. The use of the quantitative research method and archived
data allows unbiased approaches and statistical IBM SPPS software for data analysis,
which are rigors that qualitative approaches lack, making the qualitative approach less
suitable for the objective of this study. Most importantly, the large sampling of not-forhospitals contained in the databases of OSHPD helps achieve reliable outcomes and
generalize the findings of the study to larger population (Anderson, Prause, & Silver,
2011).
Researchers have used combinations of qualitative and quantitative approaches
for CEO duality studies. Brickley and Jarrell (1997) used qualitative research to advocate
for combining the positions of the CEO and chairperson of the board by addressing the
costs associated with the separation of CEO duality leadership structures. Brickley and
Jarrell expanded the study with the quantitative method, using regression analysis of
characteristics and effects of leadership structures of large U.S. firms to show the
efficiency of combining the title of CEO and chairperson of the board. However, the
limitation of Brickley and Jarrell’s study lies within the qualitative component of the
study. Specifically, Brickley and Jarrell’s study did not qualitatively demonstrate the
costs and benefits of dual leadership in order to provide clear and definitive evidence that
combining titles would provide a better leadership structure. Compared with a
quantitative approach, qualitative design is viewed to be less scientific and less rigorous
(Meadow, 2003). Furthermore, findings of studies using qualitative approaches are (a)
limited in the context of generalizations to a broader population, (b) not replicable, (c)
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unable to test hypotheses, and (d) influenced by the researcher’s personal biases and
idiosyncrasies (Anderson, 2010). Therefore, the mixed method, which is comprised of
both qualitative and quantitative approaches, is not appropriate for this study.
In quantitative approaches, researchers have used cross-sectional designs, quasiexperimental designs, preexperimental designs, and secondary data in social sciences
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). According
to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008), cross-sectional designs are used
predominantly in studies using surveys. The quasi-experimental designs are similar to the
cross-sectional designs except that they usually involve more than one sample and are
appropriate in studies examining participants or events over extended periods of time.
The preexperimental designs are ideal for case study and for studies where
experimentation is impossible. Because the survey method and case study were not
applicable to this study, the cross-sectional, quasi-experimental, and preexperimental
designs were not selected as the research designs for this study.
Researchers use secondary data or archived data collected by others and used in
various disciplines to make comparisons and derive interferences concerning events or
issues or to advance prior studies (Singleton & Straits, 2005). Secondary data include
public records and private records (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). The public
records include actuarial records (e.g., records of birth, deaths, marriages, and divorces),
legislative and other official records, governmental documents, and mass media. The
private records include autobiographies, diaries, letters, essays, and the like (FrankfortNachmias & Nachmias, 2008).
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According to Singleton and Straits (2005), the advantages of using secondary data
are that secondary data are available in vast quantities, previously collected and used by
others from within the field or from various fields, and much less expensive to obtain
than collecting primary data. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008) emphasized that
some research problems can be investigated using only secondary data. From a
methodological point of view, secondary data allow replications and advancement of past
studies and increase sample sizes and representativeness, increasing the validity of the
findings and encompassing generalizations. Researchers have examined the effects of
CEO duality on financial performance of firms across different industries. This study
advanced past related research studies in that the goal was to examine specifically the
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, and
financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. Therefore, research based on secondary
data was determined to be the most appropriate method for this study.
Researchers have used multiple regression models in studies of the relationship
between CEO duality and firm performance. For instance, Boyd (1995) used regression
analysis to study the effects of CEO duality on the return on investment of firms
operating in three business environmental conditions, such as munificence (abundance of
resources), dynamism (environmental volatility), and complexity (inequalities among
competitors). Amba (2013) used ordinary least square regression analysis to study the
relationship between a CEO who is a member or the chairperson of the board and firm
performance (e.g., return on assets, return on equity, and assets turnover). Bliss (2011)
employed multiple regression analysis to measure audit fee as a dependent variable and
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the level of independence of board of directors along with other control variables of
financial indicators to determine how CEO duality constrains and affects board
independence. Using a regression model, Braun and Sharma (2007) measured ownership
levels, shareholder return, and other control variables pertaining to firm characteristics to
conclude whether CEOs should also be the chairs of boards of family-controlled public
firms. Cashen (2011) used logistic regression analysis to examine the relationship
between CEO duality and return of assets along with moderating variables of time,
restructuring, or nonrestructuring to explore whether portfolio-restructuring firms exhibit
a decrease in CEO duality in the postrestructuring period.
Because the goal of this study was to understand the relationship between several
independent and dependent variables, the multiple regression model was chosen over
other statistical models, including analysis of variance (ANOVA), correlation analysis,
bivariate linear regression analysis, and nonparametric analysis. While the ANOVA test
evaluates whether the group means on the dependent variables differ significantly among
each other, the nonparametric tests are useful for measurement of nominal and ordinal
levels (Field, 2009; Green & Salkind, 2011). Furthermore, according to Field, Green, and
Salkind (2011), correlation analysis does not distinguish between independent and
dependent variables. Both correlation analysis and bivariate linear regression analysis
examine only two variables, a dependent variable and an independent variable, making
correlation analysis and bivariate linear analysis less ideal for testing the hypotheses.
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Setting and Sampling
In this section, I discuss the population from which the targeted not-for-profit
hospitals were drawn, the sampling method and the associated sampling frame that were
used in the selection of targeted organizations, the sample size, and the rationale for the
sample size. Furthermore, I illustrate the eligibility criteria that were used to select
organizations for the study and the characteristics of the selected not-for-profit hospitals.
Target Population
The target population for this study was the healthcare organizations that were
listed in the OSHPD, which comprehensively contains nonprofit, for-profit, and publicly
owned hospitals in the State of California. The not-for-profit hospitals were drawn from
the target population. Angst and Agarwal (2009) and Young et al. (2000) have used
OSHPD to study the adoption of electronic health records and the adoption of CEO
performance evaluation processes of healthcare organizations, respectively. Information
about governance and board information of the targeted hospitals were retrieved from the
website of each hospital and the Healthcare Atlas website.
Sampling Method and Frame
Researchers often use partial information to provide inferences or generalizations
of their studies, and conclusions based on the outcomes of current research are often
generalized to a population rather than the sample being studied (Frankfort-Nachmias &
Nachmias, 2008). According to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008), because
generalizations are not always possible based on collecting data from all organizations
being studied, this study and data analysis relied on a smaller sample and made
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inferences based on the results for the larger population of healthcare organizations of
interest. In order to arrive at proper inferences, the sampling strategy appropriate for the
research plan was the one that ensured that errors commonly found in sampling frames,
such as incomplete frames, clusters of elements, and blank foreign elements, which often
lead to results’ inaccuracy (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008, p. 165), were
avoided.
The nonprobability sampling or convenience sampling in which targeted
organizations are chosen based on convenience and availability was not an appropriate
sampling method for this study. Instead, the simple random sampling strategy, as part of
probability sampling, was appropriate for the study and its outcomes’ generalizability, as
the random probability sampling could provide a relatively accurate estimation of the
probability that each sampling hospital was included in the samples being investigated.
Furthermore, in the context of sampling frame, the number of targeted not-for-profit
hospitals was potentially large; thus, using the simple random sampling strategy was
more appropriate. Lastly, because systematic sampling, stratified sample, and cluster
sample strategies involve selecting samples based on interval, sizes, and levels of
clusters, these characteristics of sampling were not analytical considerations of the
current study, making these probability sampling techniques irrelevant strategies.
Screening and eligibility criteria. To narrow the scope of the study to a more
manageable number of target organizations and to select a representative sample for the
population, I performed a screening process and a simple random process from the
resulting population. Specifically, in the screening process, I screened the data to select
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not-for-profit hospitals from the list containing both not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals
from the OSHPD database. Then, I performed an additional screening to choose not-forprofit hospitals that had complete data appropriate for testing the proposed model using
the following characteristics:


Corporate governance structure information listed in reports for the period of
2009-2012, such CEO duality or nonCEO duality, and presence or absence of
physicians on boards.



Reports of financial data, such as total margin, operating margin, and cash free
flow in financial reports for the period of 2009-2012.



Market value of at least $50 million.
The assumption was that large not-for-profit hospitals, defined in this study as

organizations having market value of $50 million or more, were more likely to consider
and adopt corporate governance structures than were small and newly established
organizations.
Sampling frame. Regarding the sampling process, I used a simple random
process to draw the final targeted not-for-profit hospitals from the population generated
from separating the not-for-profit hospitals from their counterparts within the OSHPD
database and by selecting the not-for-profit hospitals that have enough data for testing the
proposed model. Probability sampling is more scientifically acceptable than
nonprobability sampling (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). According to
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008), compared to systematic sampling, stratified
sampling, and cluster sampling, probability sampling allows researchers to ensure that
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every organization among the population has equal and known probability to be included
in the sampling for analysis. Probability sampling helps avoid the possibility of
introducing systematic biases in the selection procedure (Babbie, 2005; Singleton &
Strait, 2005; Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). Furthermore, using probability
sampling indicates the selected organizations represent the target population, thereby
making it possible to generalize research findings to the entire population with
confidence.
Sample size and rationale. According to Hektner, Smidt, and Csikszentmihalyi
(2006), the sample size determination is dependent on the standard error value and on the
confident interval width established by the researcher. However, Sherperis (2010)
explained that researchers could rely on statistical power to determine the likelihood that
results obtained from statistical tests are statistically significant and truly different.
Furthermore, Burkholder (2009) suggested one way to compute an effect size is to use
past related research. Zhang, Lu, and Li (2011) conducted a similar study to examine the
effects of CEO duality on customer satisfaction. The effect size was reported to be 0.14
(Zhang, Lu, & Li, 2011, p.291), which is a medium effect, suggesting that it may require
a medium sample size to detect the effect. Using an Alpha level of .05 and the accepted
value for power or the probability that a test will detect a real relationship (Burkholder,
2009) of .80, I determined the sample size of this study should be 107. The general
formula for determining the sample size is 104 + k in a multiple regression test (Field,
2009, p.222), where k is the number of predictors. Therefore, the calculated sample size
was consistent. However, I decided to choose the sample size of 146. To randomly select
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the samples, I assigned consecutive numbers to each not-for-profit hospital in the
preselected list in a spreadsheet, and then randomly choose 146 hospitals by using the
RAND function in Microsoft Excel, which returned an evenly distributed random
number.
Instrumentation
There are no generally accepted CEO duality mechanisms, and rigorous empirical
research directed at CEO duality and corporate and clinical governance is nonexistent.
Consequently, numerous definitions and categorizations have been developed depending
the purpose and interests of researchers. Therefore, several instruments have been used in
studies in the past that measured CEO duality, corporate and clinical governance, and
financial performance.
Measurement
As noted by Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008), measurement is linked to
operational definitions. For the study of the effects of CEO duality and presence of
physicians on governance boards on financial performance, CEO duality, the presence of
physicians on the governance board, and the financial performance are operationally
defined. The three levels of measurement that are important to the study include nominal,
interval, and ratio levels.
First, the nominal level, the lowest level of measurement, which classifies objects
or events into categories possessing qualitative characteristics, was the measurement used
to link the operational definition of the independent variables, which were CEO duality
and physicians on governance boards. The nominal level of measurement was used to
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classify firms into two categories, with a value of 1 for firms with CEO duality or a value
of 0 for firms without CEO duality. The presence of physicians on governance boards
was measured by assigning 1 to each physician present on the board. If no physician was
present on the board, a value of 0 was assigned.
When calculating and analyzing data that contain properties of fixed and equal
units and values that possess natural, absolute, and fixed zero points, measurement at
interval and ratio levels should be used (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008, p. 147).
Therefore, the measurement of the dependent variables, including financial indicators,
such as operating margin, total margin, and free cash flow, involved the measurement of
the interval and ratio levels. Similarly, the calculation of the remaining variables, such as
hospital size, hospital age, and board size, involved the measurement of the interval and
ratio levels.
When variables exhibit some relation to each other (e.g., higher, greater, more
desired, and more difficult), they can be measured at the ordinal level. However, none of
the identified independent and dependent variables for this study possesses the relational
characteristics of the ordinal level. Therefore, measurement of the ordinal level was not
appropriate for this study.
Measurement validity. To ensure that a change in the dependent variables is a
result of a genuine change in the independent variables, researchers have to establish the
measurement validity, which includes content, empirical, and construct validity
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachimas 2008). The content validity means the measurement
instrument covers all the attributes and nothing relevant to the measurement is left out. Of
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the content validity, the sampling validity is the primary concern. This study accounted
for cases or samples representing the targeted population of not-for-profit hospitals and
selected organizations with corporate governance structures and financial performance
that met criteria set by the research design addressed earlier in this research proposal.
Regarding empirical validity of a measurement instrument, researchers are often
concerned with the relationship between a measuring instrument and the measured
outcomes (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachimas, 2008, p.150). Some researchers may
compare outcomes generated by the study undertaken with results generated in similar
past studies in the field, while others model measurement instruments used by other
previous related study. This study measured the financial outcomes, such as total margin,
operating margin, and free cash flow, which are the common financial indicators of
hospitals (Joseph, Thomas, & Robert, 2009; Love, Revenue, & Black, 2008; Prince,
1991). Therefore, with respect to empirical validity, the identified measurement
instrument for the study did address the validity aspect that the instrument should
measure what it is intended to measure.
The construct validity was not a concern of validity measurement for this study.
The construct validity is a concern only when questionnaires are administered to
participants (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachimas, 2008, p.153). Questionnaires were not
used for this study. The analysis of this study used secondary data of financial indicators
and corporate board information for generating descriptive statistics and testing a
multiple regression model. Moreover, Zhang, Lu, and Li (2011), in a study of the
relationship between corporate governance and customer satisfaction, and Kang and
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Zardkoohi (2005), in a study of board leadership and firm performance, did not address
the establishment of construct validity of measurement instruments because these studies
did not employ questionnaires. Therefore, it was reasonable theoretically to claim that the
construct validity concern was not applicable for the study undertaken.
Measurement reliability. Each measurement for a study contains “a true
component and an error component” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachimas, 2008, p.154),
and variable errors are mostly associated with factors, for instance monetary incentives
and instruction ambiguity that influence the response of participants filling questionnaires
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). This study did not employ questionnaires to seek responses
from participants. Therefore, measurement validity due to influencing factors
aforementioned was not a concern.
Researchers address measurement reliability by examining the variance called
reliability measure, which indicates the extent of the errors of the measurement used in
research studies (Shultz & Whitney, 2005). Reliability measures range from 0 to 1, with
value 0 or 1 suggesting the measurement contains all variable errors or no variable errors
at all, respectively. Other research studies on the effects of boards, ownership, and CEO
duality on firm performance and other associated indicators of organizational
effectiveness, such as studies by Brookman and Thriste (2009), Dahya, McConnell, and
Travlos (2002), Fee and Hadlock (2004), Kang and Zardkooki (2005), Pandya (2011),
and Rechner and Dalton (1991), used secondary data to test hypotheses. In these studies,
to address measurement reliability, the authors examined the multicollinearity analysis to
determine whether two or more independent variables were highly correlated. If there is
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high correlation between independent variables, there is possible bias relation between
two independent variables that may affect the accuracy of multiregression test results
(Shultz & Whitney, 2005). The independent variables in the multiple regression model
used to test hypotheses in this study were CEO duality, presence of physicians on
governance boards, hospital age, hospital size, and board size were separate and different
sets of measurement. Therefore, the concern of measurement reliability that the
measurement of the independent variables was similar was addressed in the statistical test
of assumption of this study as presented in Chapter 4.
Operating Margin
The operating margin (OMARG) is the dependent variable of the study. It
compares the total operating revenue against the total operating expenses of a hospital
(Cleverley, Song, & Cleverley, 2010). The OMARG was calculated by dividing the
difference between total operating revenue and total operating expenses by the total
operating revenues. OMARG was expressed in the formula below:
OMARG = (TOEPR –TOEPE) / TOEPR
Where:
TOEPR = Total operating revenue
TOPE = Total operating expense
Total Margin
The total margin (TMARG) is another dependent variable. It compares net
income against total operating revenue and is the most popular indicator of profitability
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of a hospital (Cleverley, Song, & Cleverley, 2010). TMARG was calculated by dividing
net income by total operating revenue and was expressed in the formula below:
TMARG = NICOM / TOPER
Where:
NICOM = Net income
TOPER = Total operating revenue
Free Cash Flow
Free cash flow (FCF) is the third dependent variable. It represents cash inflow and
outflow rather than accounting earnings of a hospital. It shows the amount of cash left
over after accounting for all of the expenses to operate the hospital and making all
necessary investments to ensure its continuous operation (Horngren et al., 2006). The free
cash flow was calculated by subtracting the change in net assets plus interest and noncash
expenses from the investments in fixed assets and net working capital (Singh, Wheeler, &
Roden, 2012). Alternatively, the free cash flow can be estimated by averaging the current
and two prior periods and multiplying by an average annual growth rate of 7.3%, which
is based on data from the American Hospital Association (Singh, Wheeler, & Roden,
2012, p.330). This study adopted the calculation method of the free cash flow used by
Sigh et al. (2012). FCF was expressed in the formula below:
FCF = ((cFCF + priop1FCF +priop2FCF)/3) * 0.073
Where:
cFCF = current FCF
priop1FCF = prior period 1 FCF
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priop2FCF = prior period 2 FCF
CEO Duality
CEO duality (DUAL) is the independent variable representing a CEO who is also
the chairperson of the governance board. This variable is categorical. If CEO duality was
present for a hospital, then 1 was assigned to the organization. If CEO duality is not
present, a 0 was assigned.
Physicians on Governance Board
Presence of physicians on board (PHYGOB) is second independent variable and a
continuous variable, representing the numbers of physicians present on the boards.
Physicians, who are considered to possess clinical experience, often promote clinical
governance, which results in increased hospital performance on quality and finance
(Gauld, Horsburg, & Brown, 2011). A value of 1 was assigned if there was one doctor on
the governance. Similarly, if a board had two doctors serving on the board, then a value
of 2 was given. A value of 0 would be assigned to firms without physicians on
governance boards.
Hospital Size
Past research has shown that size has a positive influence on the performance of a
firm for various reasons including diversification, economic scale, and access to cheaper
resources (Kota & Tomar, 2010). The hospital size (HOSIZE) is the third independent
variable. HOSIZE was measured by the logarithm of total assets as suggested by (Peng,
Li, Xie, & Su, 2010).
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Hospital Age
Older hospitals are considered more efficient than younger firms “because of the
effect of learning curve and survival bias” (Abebe, Angriawan, & Liu, 2010, p.272). The
hospital age (HOSAGE) is the fourth independent variable. HOSAGE was derived from
the logarithm of the difference from the year of this study and the year of the hospital’s
incorporation.
The Board Size
For hospitals, an effective board size is from 8 to 20 members, large enough for
the board to contain an adequate number of members to fulfill responsibilities (Moody’s
Investor Service, 2014). The size of the board should be limited to fewer than 20
members to promote efficiency (Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, 2014). The board
size (BOSIZE) is another independent variable. BOSIZE was measured by number of
directors of the governance board.
Data Collection
The data collection was driven by the need to test three proposed hypotheses and
three alternative hypotheses in an attempt to answer research questions examining the
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, hospital
size, hospital age, board size, and financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. As
substantiated in the literature review, the expectations were that (a) CEO duality was
positively related to financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals, (b) presence of
physicians on governance boards was positively related with financial performance of
not-for-profit hospitals, (c) hospital size was positively related with financial
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performance of not-for-profit hospitals, (d) hospital age was positively related with
financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals, and (e) board size was positively related
with financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals.
The analysis involved secondary data. I searched for not-for-profit hospitals,
financial data, and disclosure reports in the OSHPD database. I retrieved financial
snapshots and websites of not-for-profit hospitals from Healthcare ATLAS websites.
Information on governance members and board structures were retrieved from each
hospital website.
Financial data for statistical analysis included financial reports for a 4-year period
from January 2009 to December 2012. I collected data of financial data such as operating
margins (percentage), current ratio, cash on hands (days), total operating revenue, net
income, total operating expenses, net from operating, market values of assets, and total
assets that were reported by each hospital in the period of 2009 to 2012. Then, I
calculated the average values of these financial data. The financial data, such as operating
margin, total margin, and free cash flow were derived from the average values of the
calculated financial data. Other data included CEO duality, number of physicians on the
board, board size, hospital age, and hospital size. One hundred and forty six not-for-profit
hospitals were determined to be the sample for the analysis of this study.
Data Analysis
Once all the relevant data were collected, analyzed, and calculated for each
variable, the data were entered and analyzed using SPSS statistical software.
Three equations for the multiple regression model were:
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OMARG = a0 + a1 DUAL + a2 PHYGOB + a3 HOSIZE + a4 HOSAGE + a5 BOSIZE + ɛ
TMARG = a0 + a1 DUAL + a2 PHYGOB + a3 HOSIZE + a4 HOSAGE + a5 BOSIZE + ɛ
FCF = a0 + a1 DUAL + a2 PHYGOB + a3 HOSIZE + a4 HOSAGE + a5 BOSIZE + ɛ
Where, a0 = the intercept of the model, DUAL = CEO duality, PHYSGOB = physicians
on governance board, HOSIZE = hospital size, HOSAGE = hospital age, BOSIZE =
board size, a1...a5 are the beta coefficients of the regression model, ɛ is a random error,
OMARG = operating margin, TMARG = total margin, and FCF = free cash flow. The
same independent variables were used in three equations to determine their effects on
operating margin, total margin, and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals.
Statistical Analysis
The data were screened to make sure the following conditions and assumptions
were met:


There were no significant outliers in the data sets of dependent variables.



The dependent variable was normally distributed in the population for each
combination of levels of the independent variables.



The residuals in the model were random, normally distributed with a mean of
zero.



The scores on variables were independent of other scores on the same variables.
Before conducting interferential statistics, the data was checked to make sure that

no outliers existed in the data set. To check for the normality of variable, descriptive data
such as mean, mode, median, standard deviations, range, minimum, maximum,
histogram, and bar graphs were used to screen the data set. Homogeinity and
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multicollinearity were also conducted to account for the integrity and reliability of the
data.
After all stated assumptions are met, regression outputs including multiple
correlation coefficient, F-ratio, R-squared, adjusted R-squared values were examined.
The F-ratio of ANOVA is reported to indicate the overall regression model used for the
statistical analysis of data and whether the independent variables statistically significantly
predict the dependent variables. The R value, the multiple correlation coefficient,
provides the indication of the quality of the prediction of the dependent variables of
OMARG, TMARG, and FCF. The R-squared (R2) and adjusted R-squared (adj. R2), the
coefficient of determination, which varies from 0 to 1, suggest the proportion of variance
in the OMARG, TMARG, and FCF that can be explained by the independent variables of
DUAL and PHYGOB. Furthermore, the statistical significance of the DUAL and
PHYGOB variables was determined by analyzing the t value and the corresponding p
value that suggest whether their coefficients are statistically significantly different from
0.
Hypothesis Formulation
A statistical hypothesis f test was used to determine whether there was a linear
relationship between the operating margin, total margin, free cash flow, and any of the
independent variables. The statistical hypotheses were expressed as:
Hypothesis 1, H10: a1= a2 = a3 = a4 = a5 = 0
H1a: Not all the ai (i = 1…5) were zero
Hypothesis 2, H20: a1= a2 = a3 = a4 = a5 = 0
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H2a: Not all the ai (i = 1…5) were zero
Hypothesis 3, H30: a1= a2 = a3 = a4 = a5 = 0
H3a: Not all the ai (i = 1…5) were zero
I established a level of significance level α of 5%, which means that the null
hypothesis was rejected if the calculated p value less than α, .05 (Field, 2009). If the null
hypothesis held true, there was no linear relationship between the financial performance
and any of the independent variables in the proposed regression equation. However, if the
null hypothesis was rejected, there was statistical evidence of a regression relationship
between the financial performance and at least one of the independent variables in the
model. If such a regression relationship existed, I then conducted five t tests for each of
the beta coefficients (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) to determine which independent variables helped
explain the variation in the values of the dependent variables. The independent variables
having no explanatory power (i.e., if they do not make a statistically significant
contribution to how well the model predicts the outcome variable, the dependent
variable) were removed from the regression model using the stepwise method.
Protection of Selected Organizations of the Study
Walden University requires every study to comply with the University’s ethical
standards of research and with U.S. federal regulations and any applicable international
guidelines. The Walden University Internal Review Board (IRB) granted the permissions
to conduct this study (approval number 12-03-14-0275589). Regarding ethical issues, the
study did not involve human subjects. However, it involved collecting data about
organizations. For the statistical analysis, I used secondary data that included published
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financial reports of multiple years and board structures of not-for-profit hospitals
obtained from public and private databases. Specifically, the proxy statements and
financial statements reflecting board structures and financial indicators were used to
compile statistical analysis using SPSS software. There was a need to anticipate and
address any ethical dilemmas that might arise in this study. Therefore, data integrity and
confidentiality were built into the study to prevent unexpected consequences that might
affect the targeted institutions. Names of the analyzed organizations were blinded to
maintain their confidentiality. For data integrity, the committee chair, the methodologist,
and I were the only individuals who could have access to the raw and analyzed data. I
guarded the data and did not share data with individuals who were not involved in this
project. Data will be stored for 5 years. Afterward, the data will be discarded
appropriately so that they do not fall into hands of others who might misuse them.
Dissemination of Findings
Presenting posters at conferences will provide an opportunity for me to develop
professional experiences and to network with other faculty and students with similar
research interests. As part of attempt to promote scholarly activity and positive social
change, I might present this dissertation or disseminate the results if Walden University
offers me the opportunity to share the study in poster sessions at research symposia. I
ensured I did not engage in fraudulent practices, such as suppression, falsification, or
inventions of findings or outcomes, in order to meet my expectations.
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Summary
Chapter 3 addressed the research design to test hypotheses formulated from
research questions grounded in the literature review and indicated there is need to
examine the relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians, and financial
performance of not-for-profit hospitals. Chapter 3 showed rationales for choosing
quantitative research using secondary data as the most appropriate approach for the study.
This chapter addressed all components associated with quantitative study and specified
the multiple regression model as the statistical model used to test the proposed
hypotheses and the alternative hypotheses.
Chapter 4 shows the results of this study. Chapter 5 indicates an entire overview
of this study, findings, and implications that might be valuable for not-for-profit hospitals
and their administrators seeking appropriate governance models to enhance the
effectiveness of their organizations.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
In this chapter, I present the research findings of the study. The research questions
of the study were whether there were positive, statistically significant relationships
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, and not-forhospitals’ financial performance, namely total margin, operating margin, and total cash
free. The statistical analysis of this study involved descriptive and inferential statistics.
The descriptive statistical analysis was used to generate frequency distribution and
central distribution, as these techniques provided effective methods to organize, describe,
summarize, and quantitatively visualize the data of this study. To show the frequency
distribution and central tendencies associated with descriptive statistics, the mean,
medium, mode, range, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation of financial
performance as well as other data related to CEO duality and governance boards of the
sampled not-for-profit hospitals were tabulated and plotted. The inferential statistical
analysis was used to test the hypotheses of the study and make generalizations from the
sampled not-for-profit hospitals to the population of the not-for-profit hospitals.
Specifically, the inferential statistics based on the results generated from the multiple
regression provided assessment of the relationship between CEO duality, presence of
physicians on hospital governance boards, and the financial performance of not-for-profit
hospitals.
This chapter is organized in three major sections. In the first section, I present the
descriptive statistics of the sampled not-for-profit hospitals. The second major section
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addresses the analysis of inferential statistics of sampled not-for-profit hospitals. Within
the second major section, the findings regarding a relationship between CEO duality,
presence of physicians on governance board, and each of three financial performance
indicators are explained.
Data Collection
One hundred and seven not-for-profit hospitals were determined to be the sample
size for the study as presented in Chapter 3. However, I decided to select 146 not-forprofit hospitals listed in the OSHPD websites and database. The OSHPD stores and
administers the reported financial data, governance data, and other healthcare information
of 4,840 healthcare organizations comprising hospitals, long-terms care facilities, home
health and hospice, and primary and specialty clinics located in the State of California.
Financial and governance data for the period of January 2009 to December 2012 were
retrieved from Excel files available from OSHPD and hospitals’ websites. A detailed
description of the OSHPD identification number, facility name, hospitals’ websites,
relevant financial data, and governance information of the sampled not-for-profit
hospitals are documented in Appendices A, B, C, and D.
Study Results
Analysis of Descriptive Statistics of Sampled Not-For-Profit Hospitals
In this section, I report the descriptive statistics of sampled not-for-profit hospitals
based on the mean, median, mode, range, and standard deviation of operating margin,
total margin, free cash flow, CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance board,
hospital size, hospital age, and board size. These descriptive statistical tests are based on
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central tendency and dispersion that are appropriate for categorical and continuous
variables.
Total Margin Variable
As Table 2 shows, 146 hospitals reported their total margins. On average, the
sampled hospitals had a 6% total margin. Based on the mode value, more hospitals had a
4% total margin compared with other groups of hospitals. The median total margin of
4.8% divided the total margin distribution into two equal parts. The total margins were
between -.28 and .40, suggesting that some hospitals operated with a negative 28% total
margin while some hospitals gained a maximum total margin of 40%. There was a large
range and a large dispersion of total margin (standard deviation of .086 or 8.6%).
However, the central half of the total margin was between 2% and 3%, based on the
interquartile range determined by the lower and upper quartiles values. Figure 2 shows
approximately 2.7 % of hospitals had a 4% total margin as the largest group. Also, as
shown in Figure 2 with the mean value greater than the median value, the total margin
distribution is a positively skewed distribution, suggesting there were more hospitals
earning total margin greater than 4.8%.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics-All Variables except DUAL Variable
TMARG

FCF

PHYGOB

HOSIZE

HOSAGE

BOSIZE

146

146

146

145

146

146

146

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

Mean

.0599

.0525

1,343,739

3.38

8.2580

1.8062

17.32

Median

.0480

.0300

377,908

3.00

8.2750

1.8100

15.00

a

15

N

Valid

OMARG

Missing

Mode

.04

.00

1

4

7.94

1.77

.08636

.05971

2,647,112

2.024

.47551

.21718

9.357

.68

.29

15,768,673

13

2.11

1.28

64

Minimum

-.28

.00

0

0

7.23

.90

4

Maximum

.40

.29

15,768,673

13

9.34

2.18

68

Std. Deviation
Range

Note. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown.
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Figure 2. Bar graph showing central tendency and dispersion of total margin.

Operating Margin
As shown in Table 2, 146 of the sampled hospitals reported their operating
margin. On average, the sampled hospitals had 5.3% of operating margin. Based on the
mode value, more hospitals had a 0% total margin compared with other groups among
the sampled hospitals. The median value of 3% divided the operating margin distribution
into two equal parts. The operating margin values were between 0 and .29, suggesting

93
that some hospitals operated with 0% of operating margin while some hospitals gained a
maximum operating margin of 29%. Figure 3 shows approximately 29% of hospitals had
a 0% operating margin as the largest group. There was a large range and a large
dispersion of operating margin (standard deviation of .06 or 6%). However, the central
half of the operating margin was between 1% and 7%, based on the interquartile range
determined by the lower and upper quartiles values. Moreover, as shown in Figure 3 and
with the mean value greater than the median value, the operating margin distribution is a
positively skewed distribution, suggesting for hospitals with operating margins greater
than zero, about 55% had operating margins greater than 3%.
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Figure 3. Bar graph showing central tendency and dispersion of operating margin.
Free Cash Flow
As shown in Table 2, all the 146 sampled hospitals reported their total assets for
the period of 2009 to 2012. On average, the sampled hospitals had $1,340,000 of free
cash flow. The median free cash flow of $378,000 divided the free cash flow distribution
into two equal parts. The free cash flow was between $0 and $15,768,000, suggesting that
some hospitals had free cash flow of $0 while some hospitals operated with a free cash
value of $15,768,000. Figure 4 shows one hospital with a free cash flow of $0. There was
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a large range and a large dispersion of free cash flow (standard deviation of $2,647,000).
However, as shown in Figure 4, the central half of free cash flow was between $94,180
and $1,364,600.

Figure 4. Bar graph showing central tendency and dispersion of free cash flow.
CEO Duality
Table 3 and Figure 5 reveal information about CEO duality of hospitals. Thirtytwo out of 146 hospitals had CEOs who were also the chairpersons of their respective
governance boards. In other words, about 23% of the hospitals practiced CEO duality.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics--DUAL Variable
N
Sum

Valid
Missing

146
0
32

Figure 5. Bar graph showing CEO duality of hospitals.
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Presence of Physicians on Governance Board
As shown in Table 2, one hospital did not report governance board information.
On average, the sampled hospitals had more than three physicians (mean = 3.38) on their
governance boards. The median number of physicians on governance board (3) divided
the distribution of the number of physicians on the board into two equal parts. There was
a large range and a large dispersion of number of physicians on boards (standard
deviation of 2). Based on the mode value, Figure 6, 27%, 16%, 21%, and 16% of
hospitals had four, three, two, and one physician(s) on their governance boards,
respectively. The number of physicians present on board was between 0 and 13. One
hospital did not have physicians on its governance board, while another hospital had 13
doctors on its governance board.
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Figure 6. Bar graph showing central tendency and dispersion of presence of physicians
on governance board.
Hospital Size
All the hospitals reported their total assets, which are used as a measurement of
hospital size expressed in a logarithm value. As shown in Table 2, on average, hospitals
had total assets of 180 million dollars. The median total assets of $500 million dollars
divided the distribution of the hospital size into two equal parts. The smallest and biggest
hospitals had total assets of 16 million dollars and 2 billion dollars, respectively. The
mode value suggests there were more hospitals with total assets of 80 million dollars. The
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hospital size distribution is an even distribution. As shown in Figure 7, about 4% of
hospitals had total assets of 80 million dollars.

Figure 7. Bar graph showing central tendency and dispersion of hospital size.
Hospital Age
The hospital age was derived from the logarithm of the difference from the year
of this study and the year of the hospital’s incorporation. All the hospitals reported the
years of their establishment, which is used for calculating the hospital age expressed in
logarithm value. As shown in Table 2, the average age of hospitals was approximately

100
63, and more hospitals were 60 years old compared with other groups of hospitals. The
hospital age was between 8 and 150 years, a range of difference of 142 years between the
youngest and the oldest hospitals. The group of hospitals that were 65 years old divided
the hospital age distribution into two equal parts. Even though there was a large range of
hospital ages, most hospitals were between 50 and 90 years of age, which was determined
based on the interquartile range determined by the lower and upper quartiles values.
Figure 8 shows that three major groups, each including 9% of hospitals, were 60, 90, and
110 years old.

Figure 8. Bar graph showing central tendency and dispersion of hospital age.
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Board Size
As shown in Table 2, all the values of the board size variables of hospitals were
accounted for. On average, governance boards had 17 members. The median number of
members (15) divided the distribution of board sizes into two equal parts. Based on the
mode value, more hospitals (11%) had 15 board members compared with other groups of
hospitals. The board size was between 4 and 68, a range of 62 of difference in board size
between the smallest and the biggest governance board. As shown in Figure 9, one
hospital has only four members while another hospital has 68 board members. The
second largest boards had between 46 or 48 members. There was a large range, and a
large dispersion of the size of governance board (SD = 9.0). However, most hospitals had
boards with between 11 and 20 members.
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Figure 9. Bar graph showing central tendency and dispersion of board size.
Analysis of Statistical Assumptions
There are underlying assumptions associated with a statistical test of multiple
regression. The following assumptions were evaluated for the regression model Yi = bo +
b1X1i + b2X2i + … + bnXni+ ɛi:


All the predictor variables were categorical level or continuous level.



The dependent variables were distributed normally in the population for each
combination of levels of the independent variables.
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All the predictors had some non-zero values of variation.



No predictors were highly correlated, meaning there was no perfect
multicollinearity.



The residual terms were uncorrelated for any two observations.



The predictors were uncorrelated with external variables.



The residuals at each level of predictors had the same variance, meaning
homoscedasticity did exist.

Categorical or Continuous Level Assumption of Independent Variables.
The predictor variables of CEO duality and the presence of physicians (the
independent variables) were categorical variables. The hospital size, hospital age, and the
board size variables were continuous variables. Therefore, the assumption of categorical
or continuous level of predictor variables was met for the regression analysis.
Normal Distribution of the Dependent Variables
Figures 10 to 15 show the histograms and the normal P-P plots of the dependent
variables of total margin, operating margin, and free cash flow. The histograms and the
normal P-P plots suggest nearly normally distributed residual; thus, the assumption of
normally distributed errors was met.
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Figure 10. Histogram of nearly normally distributed residual of total margin.
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Figure 11. Normal P-P plot of nearly normally distributed residuals of total margin.
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Figure 12. Histogram of nearly normally distributed residual of operating margin.
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Figure 13. Normal P-P plot of nearly normally distributed residuals of operating margin.
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Figure 14. Histogram of nearly normally distributed residual of free cash flow.
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Figure 15. Normal P-P plot of nearly normally distributed residuals of free cash flow.
Independent Errors Assumption
The Durbin-Watson statistic informs whether the independent errors assumption
is violated. The Durbin-Watson varies between 0 and 4, with a value of 2 meaning the
residuals are uncorrelated. As shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6, the Durbin-Watson values
were 2.06, 2.07, and 2.12, indicating that the assumption of independent errors was not
violated.
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Table 4
Model Summary-Total Margin as Dependent Variable
Mode

R

R

l

Adjusted Std. Error

Square R Square

1

.128

3

.220

5

R Square

F

Estimate

Change

Change

df1

df2

Sig. F

.001

-.006

.08622

.001

.116

1

143

.734

.016

.003

.08585

.016

2.249

1

142

.136

c

.019

-.002

.08603

.003

.411

1

141

.523

d

.048

.021

.08504

.029

4.277

1

140

.040

e

.054

.020

.08508

.006

.896

1

139

.345

.233

Watson

Change

b

.139

4

of the

Durbin-

a

.028

2

Change Statistics

2.064

Note. a. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL
b. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB
c. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE
d. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE, HOSAGE
e. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE, HOSAGE, BOSIZE
f. Dependent Variable: TMARG

Table 5
Model Summary-Operating Margin as Dependent Variable
Model R

R Square Adjusted R Std. Error Change Statistics
Square
of the
R Square F
df1
Estimate
Change
Change
.003
-.004
.05987
.003
.450
1

df2
143

Sig. F
Change
.504

1

.056a

2

.141

b

.020

.006

.05957

.017

2.410

1

142

.123

.146

c

.021

.000

.05974

.002

.217

1

141

.642

.239

d

.057

.030

.05885

.036

5.303

1

140

.023

5
.247
.061
.027
.05894
Note. a. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL

.004

.567

1

139

.453

3
4

e

b. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB
c. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE
d. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE, HOSAGE
e. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE, HOSAGE, BOSIZE
f. Dependent Variable: OMARG

DurbinWatson

2.073
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Table 6
Model Summary-Free Cash Flow as Dependent Variable
Model R

R

Adjusted R Std. Error Change Statistics

Square Square

of the

R Square

F

Estimate

Change

Change

Durbindf1

df2

Sig. F

Watson

Change

1

.029a

.001

-.006

2,662,085 .001

.117

1

143

.733

2

.064b

.004

-.010

2,667,063 .003

.467

1

142

.496

3

.483c

.233

.217

2,348,993 .229

42.059 1

141

.000

4

.486d

.236

.214

2,352,679 .003

.559

1

140

.456

5

.487e

.237

.210

2,359,230 .001

.224

1

139

.637

2.118

Note. a. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL
b. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB
c. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE
d. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE, HOSAGE
e. Predictors: (Constant), DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE, HOSAGE, BOSIZE
f. Dependent Variable: FCF

Multicollinearity Assumption
Tables 7, 8, 9 show correlation matrix of the multiple regression test, which was
used to test if there was high correlation between the CEO duality and presence of
physicians on board governance predictors, as well as other independent variables. If
there were highly correlated predictors, then the Pearson correlation would be equal to
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.955 and the Sig (1-tailed) of .000 < .05. There were no Pearson correlations greater than
.50, suggesting the CEO duality and presence of physicians on board governance
predictors and the governance board and hospital characteristic predictor variables were
not highly correlated. Therefore, the assumption that there was no perfect
multicollinearity existing in the regression test for the model was met.
Table 7
Correlation-Total Margin as the Dependent Variable
TMARG

Pearson
Correlation

Sig. (1-tailed)

N

DUAL

PHYGOB

HOSIZE

HOSAGE

BOSIZE

TMARG

1.000

-.028

.124

.072

-.132

-.037

DUAL

-.028

1.000

.032

.035

.017

.015

PHYGOB

.124

.032

1.000

.163

.045

.375

HOSIZE

.072

.035

.163

1.000

.383

.219

HOSAGE

-.132

.017

.045

.383

1.000

.194

BOSIZE

-.037

.015

.375

.219

.194

1.000

TMARG

.

.367

.069

.195

.057

.329

DUAL

.367

.

.352

.336

.421

.431

PHYGOB

.069

.352

.

.025

.294

.000

HOSIZE

.195

.336

.025

.

.000

.004

HOSAGE

.057

.421

.294

.000

.

.010

BOSIZE

.329

.431

.000

.004

.010

.

TMARG

145

145

145

145

145

145

DUAL

145

145

145

145

145

145

PHYGOB

145

145

145

145

145

145

HOSIZE

145

145

145

145

145

145

HOSAGE

145

145

145

145

145

145

BOSIZE

145

145

145

145

145

145
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Table 8
Correlation-Operating Margin as the Dependent Variable
OMARG

Pearson Correlation

Sig. (1-tailed)

N

DUAL

PHYGOB

HOSIZE

HOSAGE

BOSIZE

OMARG

1.000

-.056

.127

.057

-.155

-.026

DUAL

-.056

1.000

.032

.035

.017

.015

PHYGOB

.127

.032

1.000

.163

.045

.375

HOSIZE

.057

.035

.163

1.000

.383

.219

HOSAGE

-.155

.017

.045

.383

1.000

.194

BOSIZE

-.026

.015

.375

.219

.194

1.000

OMARG

.

.252

.064

.247

.031

.378

DUAL

.252

.

.352

.336

.421

.431

PHYGOB

.064

.352

.

.025

.294

.000

HOSIZE

.247

.336

.025

.

.000

.004

HOSAGE

.031

.421

.294

.000

.

.010

BOSIZE

.378

.431

.000

.004

.010

.

OMARG

145

145

145

145

145

145

DUAL

145

145

145

145

145

145

PHYGOB

145

145

145

145

145

145

HOSIZE

145

145

145

145

145

145

HOSAGE

145

145

145

145

145

145

BOSIZE

145

145

145

145

145

145
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Table 9
Correlations-Free Cash Flow as Dependent Variable
FCF
FCF

Pearson Correlation

N

PHYGOB

HOSIZE

HOSAGE

BOSIZE

1.000

.029

.058

.482

.134

.123

DUAL

.029

1.000

.032

.035

.017

.015

PHYGOB

.058

.032

1.000

.163

.045

.375

HOSIZE

.482

.035

.163

1.000

.383

.219

HOSAGE

.134

.017

.045

.383

1.000

.194

BOSIZE

.123

.015

.375

.219

.194

1.000

.

.366

.244

.000

.054

.070

DUAL

.366

.

.352

.336

.421

.431

PHYGOB

.244

.352

.

.025

.294

.000

HOSIZE

.000

.336

.025

.

.000

.004

HOSAGE

.054

.421

.294

.000

.

.010

BOSIZE

.070

.431

.000

.004

.010

.

FCF

145

145

145

145

145

145

DUAL

145

145

145

145

145

145

PHYGOB

145

145

145

145

145

145

HOSIZE

145

145

145

145

145

145

HOSAGE

145

145

145

145

145

145

BOSIZE

145

145

145

145

145

145

FCF

Sig. (1-tailed)

DUAL

Analysis of Inferential Statistics of Sampled Not-For-Profit Hospitals
This section reports inferential statistics based on the multiple regression analysis
of the relationship between the CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance
boards, governance board and hospital characteristics, and financial performance of
sampled not-for profit hospitals. It begins with linear relationship analysis and regression
results of CEO duality, presence of physicians, hospital size, hospital age, board size, and
total margin of the sampled not-for-profit hospitals.

115
CEO Duality, Presence of Physicians on Boards, Board Size, Hospital Size and Age,
and Total Margin
Research Question 1 asked whether there was a positive, statistically significant
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board,
board size, hospital size and age, and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals. The
multiple regression equation model with the total margin as the dependent variable and
CEO duality, presence of physicians on boards, board size, hospital size, and age as the
independent variables, and other control variables was:
TMARG = a0 + a1 DUAL + a2 PHYGOB + a3 HOSIZE + a4 HOSAGE + a5 BOSIZE + ɛ
Where
a0 = the intercept of the model,
DUAL = CEO duality,
PHYSGOB = physicians on governance board,
HOSIZE = hospital size,
HOSAGE = hospital age,
BOSIZE = board size,
a1...a5 = the beta coefficients of the regression model,
ɛ is a random error, and
TMARG = total margin
The prediction of the outcome of total margin by the weighted combination for
CEO duality and presence of physicians on governance, hospital size, hospital age, and
board size was tested using an f distribution test and ANOVA at the confidence interval

116
of alpha level of 5%. The null hypothesis stated that there was no significant statistical
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, hospital
size, hospital age, board size, and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals, meaning that all
of the coefficients are zero. So,
H1o: a1 = a2 = a3 = a4 = a5 = 0
The alternative hypothesis stated that there was a positive, statistically significant
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, and
total margin of not-for-profit hospitals, meaning at least one of the variables belongs in
the regression model or at least one ai (i = 1… 5) is not zero. So,
H1a: At least one ai is not zero
The multiple regression analysis using the Enter procedure and Stepwise model
was conducted to evaluate whether CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance
board, hospital size, hospital age, and board size predict the total margin of the sampled
not-for-profit hospitals. The multiple regression results are shown in Table 4 and Table
10. The multiple regression equation with total margin as the dependent variable is
presented as follows:
TMARG = -0.022 - 0.007*DUAL + 0.006*PHYGOB + 0.024* HOSIZE –
0.068*HOSAGE – 0.01*BOSIZE + ɛ
The correlation matrix resulting from the multiple regression indicated that the
independent variables were not highly correlated (Pearson correlation r < .955, p > .05).
Thus, all of the independent variables were included in the analysis. Table 4 shows that
the p value for CEO duality (DUAL), presence of physicians on board (PHYGOB),
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hospital size (HOSIZE), and board size (BOSIZE) is >.05. Therefore, I cannot reject the
null hypotheses that a1, a2, a3, and a5 are 0. Thus, CEO duality, presence of physicians on
board, hospital size, and board size are statistically insignificant and cannot be used to
predict the total margin (TMARG) of the sampled not-for-profit hospitals.
The hospital age (HOSAGE) is significantly related to the total margin
(TMARG), F (1, 146) = 4.277, p = .04 < .05). The correlation coefficient was .220, and
the hospital age accounts for 4.8 % of the variation in total margin. The constant,
standardized errors, the standardized betas, and their significance value are summarized
in Table 10.

118

Table 10
Bivariate and Parial Correlation of Predictors With Total Margin
Step 1
1

2

3

4

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

.062

.008

DUAL

-.006

.017

(Constant)

.044

.014

DUAL
PHYGOB

-.007
.005

.017
.004

(Constant)

-.035

.125

DUAL
PHYGOB
HOSIZE

-.007
.005
.010

.017
.004
.015

(Constant)

-.009

.124

DUAL
PHYGOB
HOSIZE
HOSAGE

-.007
.005
.023
-.073

.017
.004
.016
.035

(Constant)

-.022

.125

DUAL
-.007
.017
PHYGOB
.006
.004
5
HOSIZE
.024
.016
HOSAGE
-.068
.036
BOSIZE
-.001
.001
2
2
Note. R = .019 for Step 4, ΔR = .029 for Step 5 (p < .05). ** p < .05

Beta

-.028

-.032
.125

-.034
.116
.054

-.033
.113
.125
-.185

-.034
.143
.135
-.173**
-.086
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CEO Duality, Presence of Physicians on Boards, Board Size, Hospital Size and Age,
and Operating Margin
Research Question 2 asked whether there was a positive, statistically significant
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board,
board size, hospital size and age, and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals. The
multiple regression equation model with the operating margin as the dependent variable
and the CEO duality, and presence of physicians on boards, board size, hospital size, and
age as the independent variables, and other control variables is below:
OMARG = a10 + a11 DUAL + a12 PHYGOB + a13 HOSIZE + a14 HOSAGE + a15
BOSIZE + ɛ Where
a10 = the intercept of the model,
DUAL = CEO duality,
PHYSGOB = physicians on governance board,
HOSIZE = hospital size,
HOSAGE = hospital age,
BOSIZE = board size,
a11...a15 = the beta coefficients of the regression model,
ɛ = a random error, and
OMARG = operating margin
The prediction of the outcome of operating margin by the weighted combination
for CEO duality, and presence of physicians on governance was tested using f distribution
test and ANOVA at the confidence interval of alpha level of 5%. The null hypothesis
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stated that there was no significant statistical relationship between CEO duality, presence
of physicians on the governance boards, and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals,
meaning that all of the coefficients are zero. So,
H2o: a11 = a12 = a13 = a14 = a15 = 0
The alternative hypothesis stated that there was a positive, statistically significant
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, and
operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals, meaning at least one of the variables belongs
in the regression model or at least one ai (i = 11… 15) is not zero. So,
H2a: At least one ai is not zero
The multiple regression analysis using Enter procedure and Stepwise model was
conducted to evaluate whether CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance
boards, hospital size, hospital age, or board size predict the operating margin of the
sampled not-for-profit hospitals. The multiple regression results are shown in Table 5
(Model Summary-Operating Margin as Dependent Variable), and Tables 11. The
multiple regression equation with total margin as the dependent variable is presented as:
OMARG =0.015 - 0.009*DUAL + 0.004*PHYGOB + 0.016* HOSIZE –
0.054*HOSAGE – 0.00*BOSIZE + ɛ
The correlation matrix resulted from the multiple regression indicated that the
independent variables were not highly correlated (Pearson correlation r < .955, p > .05).
Thus, all of the independent variables were included in the analysis. Table 5 shows that
the p value for CEO duality (DUAL), presence of physicians on board (PHYGOB),
hospital size (HOSIZE), and board size (BOSIZE) is >.05. Therefore, I cannot reject the
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null hypotheses that a11, a12, a14, and a15 are 0. Thus, CEO duality, presence of physicians
on board, hospital size, and board size are statistically insignificant and cannot be used to
predict the operating margin (OMARG) of the sampled not-for-profit hospitals.
The hospital age (HOSAGE) is significantly related to the operating margin
(OMARG), F (1, 140) = 5.303, p = .023 < .05). The correlation coefficient was .239, and
the hospital age accounts for 5.7% of the variation in operating margin. The constant,
standardized errors, the standardized betas, and their significance values are summarized
in Table 11.
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Table 11
Bivariate and Parial Correlation of Predictors With Total Margin
Model
1

2

3

4

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

.055

.006

DUAL

-.008

.012

(Constant)

.042

.010

DUAL
PHYGOB

-.009
.004

.012
.002

(Constant)

.002

.087

DUAL
PHYGOB
HOSIZE

-.009
.004
.005

.012
.002
.011

(Constant)

.022

.086

DUAL
PHYGOB
HOSIZE
HOSAGE

-.009
.004
.015
-.056

.012
.002
.011
.024

(Constant)

.015

.086

DUAL
-.009
.012
PHYGOB
.004
.003
5
HOSIZE
.016
.011
HOSAGE
-.054
.025
BOSIZE
.000
.001
2
2
Note. R = .021 for Step 4, ΔR = .036 for Step 5 (p < .05). ** p < .05

Beta

-.056

-.060
.129

-.061
.123
.039

-.061
.119
.118
-.205

-.061
.143
.126
-.195**
-.068
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CEO Duality, Presence of Physicians on Boards, Board Size, Hospital Size and Age,
and Free Cash Flow
Research Question 3 asked whether there was a positive, statistically significant
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board,
board size, hospital size, age, and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals. The multiple
regression equation model with free cash flow as the dependent variable and the CEO
duality, presence of physicians on boards, board size, hospital size, and age as the
independent variables, and other control variables was:
FCF = a20 + a21 DUAL + a22 PHYGOB + a23 HOSIZE + a24 HOSAGE + a25 BOSIZE + ɛ
Where
a20 = the intercept of the model,
DUAL = CEO duality,
PHYSGOB = physicians on governance board,
HOSIZE = hospital size,
HOSAGE = hospital age,
BOSIZE = board size,
a21….a25 = the beta coefficients of the regression model,
ɛ = a random error, and
FCF = free cash flow
The prediction of the outcome of total margin by the weighted combination for
CEO duality and presence of physicians on governance was tested using an f distribution
test and ANOVA at the confidence interval of alpha level of 5%. The null hypothesis
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stated that there was no significant statistical relationship between CEO duality, presence
of physicians on governance boards, and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals,
meaning that all of the coefficients are zero. So,
H3o: a20 = a21 = a23 = a24 = a25 = 0
The alternative hypothesis stated that there was a positive, statistically significant
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, and free
cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals, meaning at least one of the variables belongs in the
regression model or at least one ai (i = 21… 25) is not zero. So,
H3a: At least one ai is not zero
The multiple regression analysis using the Enter procedure and Stepwise model
was conducted to evaluate whether CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance
board, hospital size, hospital age, and board size predict the free cash flow of the sampled
not-for-profit hospitals. The multiple regression results are shown in Table 6 and Table
12. The multiple regression equation with total margin as the dependent variable is
presented as:
FCF = 0.015 - 0.009*DUAL + 0.004*PHYGOB + 0.016* HOSIZE –
0.054*HOSAGE – 0.00*BOSIZE + ɛ
The correlation matrix resulting from the multiple regression indicated that the
independent variables were not highly correlated (Pearson correlation r < .955, p > .05).
Thus, all of the independent variables were included in the analysis. Table 6 shows that
the p value for CEO duality (DUAL), presence of physicians on board (PHYGOB),
hospital age (HOSAGE), and board size (BOSIZE) is >.05. Therefore, I cannot reject the
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null hypotheses that a20, a21, a24, and a25 are 0. Thus, CEO duality, presence of physicians
on board, hospital age, and board size are statistically insignificant and cannot be used to
predict the free cash flow (FCF) of the sampled not-for-profit hospitals.
The hospital size (HOSIZE) is significantly related to the free cash flow (FCF), F
(1, 141) = 42.059, p < .01). The correlation coefficient was .233, and the hospital age
accounts for 21.7 % of the variation in free cash flow. The constant, standardized errors,
the standardized betas, and their significance values are summarized in Table 12.
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Table 12
Bivariate and Parial Correlation of Predictors With Total Margin
Step
1

2

3

4

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

1312779.496

250427.938

DUAL

182277.911

533079.264

(Constant)

1061766.086

444930.774

DUAL
PHYGOB

170656.919
75038.400

534346.978
109844.117

(Constant)

-20879763.074

3405888.922

DUAL
PHYGOB
HOSIZE

76973.486
-27941.635
2701015.968

470843.209
98038.751
416482.693

(Constant)

-20620381.550

3428841.002

DUAL
PHYGOB
HOSIZE
HOSAGE

78309.903
-29333.442
2829537.365
-729349.325

471585.328
98210.226
451190.333
975858.854

(Constant)

-20438610.158

3459815.533

DUAL
78995.790
472900.749
PHYGOB
-47160.481
105454.694
HOSIZE
2805875.399
455206.151
HOSAGE
-793644.657
987979.728
BOSIZE
10948.612
23156.692
2
2
Note. R = .004 for Step 3, ΔR = .229 for Step 4 (p < .01). * p < .01
5

Beta

.029

.027
.057

.012
-.021
.485

.012
-.022
.508
-.060

.012
-.036
.504*
-.065
.039
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Summary
The results showed that some of the independent variables identified in this study
had significant impact on financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. The findings
of the study are summarized as follows:
1. No significant relationships were found between CEO duality, presence of
physicians on governance boards, hospital size, board size, and total margin of
not-for-profit hospitals. The results showed a significant relationship between
hospital age and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals, although it was
negative relationship.
2. No significant relationships were found between CEO duality, presence of
physicians on the governance boards, hospital size, board size, and operating
margin of not-for-profit hospitals. The results showed a significant
relationship between hospital age and operating margin of not-for-profit
hospitals.
3. No significant relationships were found between CEO duality, presence of
physicians on the governance boards, hospital age, board size, and free cash
flow of not-for-profit hospitals. The results showed a significant positive
relationship between hospital size and free cash flow of not-for-profit
hospitals.
The results of the study showed that hospital age and hospital size have an impact
on the total margin and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals. Chapter 5 will present
an overview of the study, its findings, implications, and suggestions for future researchers
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in the field to pursue to investigate further other factors or variables that can impact the
financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
Good corporate governance is critical to the survival and growth of organizations.
Due to immoral management and poor governance that have triggered corporate scandals
and debacles as well as the recent global financial meltdown, both professionals and
academics have searched more proactively for more appropriate corporate governance
structures and thus have identified CEO duality as one of critical aspects of corporate
governance of modern companies. Agency theorists and administrative theorists have
divergent views of CEO duality. Agency theorists have argued that because executives
and managers do not always act in the best interests of owners, but rather for their own
benefits, CEO duality may lead to dominant CEOs who undermine the effectiveness and
the independence of board of directors (Aguilera et al., 2008; Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
Rechner & Dalton, 1991). Thus, CEOs may adversely affect organizational performance.
In contrast, stewardship or administrative theorists have upheld the proposition that
because executive and managers act for organizational objectives rather than for their
personal agendas, CEO duality allows CEOs to lead organizations with unified authority
and unambiguous leadership, resulting in improved performance for organizations (Boyd,
1995; Carty, 2012; David et al., 1997; Kang & Zardkoohi, 2005; Nicholson & Kiel
2007).
The opposing views between agency and stewardship theories have stimulated
scientists to conduct research for more than 2 decades to examine the influences of CEO
duality and other board characteristics on organizational performance. However, the
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results have been ambiguous. Moreover, researchers have not conducted empirical
studies to understand the effects of CEO duality on the organizational performance of
hospitals, especially of not-for-profit hospitals. Considering the economic size, potential
impacts on society and people, and unique nature and challenges of not-for-profit
hospitals, an appropriate and effective healthcare governance board is integral to their
survival and growth.
In this study, I examined the effects of CEO duality, the presence of physicians on
healthcare governance boards, hospital size, hospital age, and board size on not-for-profit
hospitals’ financial performance, as measured by total margin, operating margin, and free
cash flow. Comparing and contrasting the outcomes of past research studies grounded in
the divergent views of agency and stewardship theories, this study reconciled these views
with the argument that the agency and stewardship theories could work complementarily,
thus serving as the theoretical framework that guided the study. In addition, I
hypothesized that CEO duality and clinical governance as perceived attributes of
effective healthcare governance would improve financial performance of not-for-profit
hospitals.
I used a screening process and a simple random sampling process to choose 146
not-for-profit hospitals from comprehensive public databases and websites of OSHPD.
This office administers financial reports and governance information of more than 4,840
healthcare organizations comprising of hospitals, long-terms care facilities, home health
and hospice, and primary and specialty clinics in the State of California. Other relevant
board governance and hospital information was obtained from the website of each
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sampled hospital. The research questions sought to establish whether there was linear
relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on healthcare governance
boards, hospital size, hospital age, and board size, and financial performance of not-forprofit hospitals. In measuring CEO duality, the independent variable, I assigned 1 to the
hospitals whose CEOs were also the chairpersons of their governance boards. Otherwise,
a 0 was assigned. To measure the second independent variable, the presence of
physicians on the governance board, a value of 1 was assigned for each doctor serving on
governance boards of hospitals. A 0 was assigned when no physician was present on the
board. Financial performance was measured using operating margin, total margin, and
total cash free of the selected hospitals. Hospital age, hospital size, and board size were
collected from the website of hospitals and incorporated in the multiple linear regression
models examining the relationship between the variables of interest.
The results of the study showed that, as measured by total margin and operating
margin, CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance boards, hospital size, and
board size have no relationship to financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals.
However, the results indicated hospital age is negatively significantly related to financial
performance of not-for-profit hospitals, as measured by total margin and operating
margin. When measuring free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals, the results suggested
that CEO duality, presence of physicians on governance boards, hospital age, and board
size have no relationship with financial performance. However, the results indicated
hospital size is positively and significantly related to financial performance of not-forprofit hospitals, as measured by free cash flow.
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Interpretation of Findings
In this dissertation, I sought to answer the following research questions:
Research Question 1: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age,
hospital size, board size, and total margin of not-for-profit hospitals?
Research Question 2: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age,
hospital size, board size, and operating margin of not-for-profit hospitals?
Research Question 3: Was there a positive, statistically significant relationship
between CEO duality, presence of physicians on the governance board, hospital age,
hospital size, board size, and free cash flow of not-for-profit hospitals?
CEO Duality, Presence of Physicians on Boards, Hospital Age, Hospital Size, Board
Size, and Total Margin
Considering that extensive past studies have been done to examine the
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance across industries, that empirical
results of these studies have not been conclusive, and that CEO duality and firm
performance are contextually specific to each type of industry, I sought to examine
effects of CEO duality on financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. Based on
literature review, my rationale was that the CEO duality is good for governance boards of
not-for-profit hospitals because with specialized knowledge, CEOs who also serve as
chairpersons of director boards comprised primarily of volunteers will have a positive
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influence on the performance of the hospitals. However, as indicated by the statistical test
results presented in Chapter 4, CEO duality was not significantly related to financial
performance of not-for-profit hospitals, as measured by total margin. Although I did not
reach a conclusion consistent with my hypothesized outcomes, the results of the CEO
duality effects of this study were consistent with conclusions of some past studies that
CEO duality had no relationship to organizational performance.
As presented in the literature review of this dissertation, some healthcare scholars
argued that because an effective healthcare board needs to execute both corporate and
clinical governance, physicians serving on boards would provide effective governance.
Therefore, I hypothesized that having doctors as healthcare board members could be
positively related to financial performance of the not-for-profit hospitals. However, the
results of this study suggested that the presence of physicians on governance boards was
not significantly related to financial performance, as measured by total margin. Although
I did not reach a conclusion consistent with my hypothesized prediction, the finding that
presence of doctors on governance board is not related to organizational performance can
be considered an incremental contribution to the field because I have not found any study
examining the relationship between having doctors on boards and financial performance.
Past studies suggested that the size of an organization could have a positive
influence on organizational performance. Moreover, a small board would not have
adequate numbers of board members to fulfill diverse responsibilities. In contrast, large
boards tend to succumb to inefficiency due to too divergent views for making effective
decisions. The results of this study regarding the effects of hospital size and board size
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did not confirm the preceding conclusions. Based on the results of the statistical test, I did
not find any significant relationship between hospital size, board size, and financial
performance, as measured by total margin.
Hospital age plays a role in the efficiency of organizations because older hospitals
tend be more efficient than younger hospitals. Therefore, I expected there would be
positive significantly relationship between hospital age and financial performance.
However, the results of the study showed the opposite outcome, suggesting that hospital
age is significantly negatively related to financial performance. The negative relationship
between hospital age and financial performance may be explained by suggesting that
when a hospital exists for a long time, it can become bigger and develop high
expenditures, thus reducing net income and consequently decreasing its total margin.
CEO Duality, Presence of Physicians on Boards, Hospital Age, Hospital Size, Board
Size, and Operating Margin
Based on the literature review and rationale discussed in Chapter 2 that the effects
of CEO duality on firm performance can be contextually dependent on the type of
industry, and that CEO duality may provide a positive influence on performance of notfor-profit hospitals, I expected there would be a significant relationship between CEO
duality and financial performance of hospitals. However, the statistical test results
presented in Chapter 4 showed CEO duality on hospital governance boards was not
significantly related to financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals, as measured by
operating margin. Although the conclusion does not match the hypothesized outcomes,
the results of CEO duality effects of this study were consistent with the conclusions of
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some past studies that CEO duality had no relationship with organizational performance
(Baliga et al., 1996; David & Dalton, 1993; Krause et al., 2013; Lawal, 2013; Shukeri,
2012).
Moreover, this study also shows that having physicians on hospital governance
boards may not always affect the financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. As
measured by operating margin, the results of this study did not confirm the predicted
outcomes that organization size and board size would have positive effects on the
financial performance. Nevertheless, the results of the study suggested hospital age is
significantly negatively related to financial performance, which is the opposite of the
predicted conclusion that hospital age would have positive effects on financial
performance when using operating margin as a financial indicator. As operating margin is
measured using total operating expenses, it is possible that when hospitals have been in
business for a long time, they can grow bigger in size and number of employees and
eventually incur high expenditures, causing high total operating expenses, and thus
reducing operating margin. This negative relationship between higher operating
expenditure and lower operating margin when organizations grow bigger perhaps
explains the negative relationship between hospital age and financial performance as
measured by operating margin.
CEO Duality, Presence of Physicians on Boards, Hospital Age, Hospital Size, Board
Size, and Free Cash Flow
Through the literature review presented in Chapter 2, I postulated that there would
be a significant relationship between CEO duality, presence of physicians on hospital

136
governance boards, and the financial performance of hospitals, as measured by total cash
free. The rationale for this assumption is that CEO duality and presence of physicians on
board governance may facilitate an effective performance of not-for-profit hospitals.
However, as the statistical test results presented in Chapter 4 indicated, CEO duality and
presence of physicians on hospital governance boards were not significantly related to
free cash flow. It is important to note that although this finding differs from the
hypothesized claim, the results that CEO duality had no relationship to financial
indicators of total cash free of not-for-profit hospitals was consistent with conclusions of
some past studies that CEO duality had no relationship with organizational performance
across industries (Baliga et al., 1996; David & Dalton, 1993; Krause et al., 2013; Lawal,
2013; Shukeri, 2012).
Similarly, the results also suggested that having physicians on hospital
governance boards may not have any impact on total cash free of not-for-profit hospitals.
As measured by free cash flow, board size was not significantly related to financial
performance. There was evidence in the literature that an inefficient board or a board
with divergent views may not have any impact on financial performance of an
organization. Because free cash flow was calculated by subtracting the change in net
assets plus interest and noncash expenses from the investments in fixed assets and net
working capital, I expected that old or new hospitals may have varied investment and
working capitals used for growth opportunities. However, the results showed otherwise,
suggesting that hospital age was not related to free cash flow. Importantly, the finding
that there was a significantly positive relationship between hospital size and free cash

137
flow of not-for-profit hospitals was consistent with the fact that bigger organizations have
larger total assets, which is often used to calculate the size of an organization.
Other Interpretations
According to Monks and Minow (2008), 54% of American companies practiced
CEO duality. Recently, Abels and Martelli (2011) provided an update regarding CEO
duality and suggested the percentage of companies with CEO duality governance
structures has increased to 61%. Based on the descriptive analysis presented in Chapter 4
of this study, 23% of the sampled not-for-profit hospitals had CEOs who also held
chairperson positions of the governance boards. I did not reach the conclusion that CEO
duality had a positive influence on financial performance, as measured by total margin or
operating margin, or free cash flow. However, CEO duality can be good for governance
boards of not-for-profit hospitals because of the specialized knowledge of CEOs, which
may result in greater sharing of information and opportunities and reduced coordination
costs (Brickley et al., 1997), and the overall trend of increased adoption of CEO duality
among companies (Abels & Martelli, 2011). Therefore, I anticipate that the number of
not-for-hospitals having CEO duality will likely increase in the future.
Study results presented in Chapter 4 showed that, on average, the sampled notfor-hospitals had more than three physicians (mean = 3.38) on their governance boards.
The average number of physicians present on hospital boards in this study is consistent
with the fact that healthcare boards in the United States tend to have two to three doctors
as board members (Orlikoff & Totten, 2006). Moreover, the results of this study showed
that 99% (145 out of 146) of sampled hospitals had physicians serving on their
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governance boards. However, only 67% of healthcare organizations reported the presence
of physicians serving on their boards in the survey by the United States Center for
Healthcare Governance (Bennington, 2010). The much higher number of hospitals
bringing physicians to their boards in this study may suggest that in reality hospitals have
more actively recruited physicians to serve on their governance boards.
The results showed that, on average, governance boards had 17 members, and
most hospitals had between 11 and 20 members. These data confirm that an effective
hospital board size should be eight to 20 members and not more than 20 members in
order for the board to have an adequate number of members to fulfill responsibilities
(Moody’s Investor Service, 2014) and to promote efficiency (Chubb Group of Insurance
Companies, 2014).
Limitations of the Study
This study had limitations. The primary limitation was the use of secondary data,
which were not originally collected for the purpose of this study. This is a potential
problem because secondary data only approximate the kind of data intended for testing
the proposed hypotheses. Using secondary data can potentially introduce errors to the
conclusions and the generalization of this study. The second limitation was that
triangulation of data to reduce the potential error, thus enhancing the accuracy of the
outcomes of the study, was not possible. All the financial data and other relevant data of
the sampled not-for-profit hospitals were collected only from the Excel files available on
the websites and databases of California OSHPD and the website of each hospital.
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Another limitation is related to possibly missing of relevant variables that may
generate different outcomes or may change the findings of this study. Variables relevant
to corporate governance constructs, such as organizational leverage, market
environments, board independence, and organizational identification of CEO, were not
included in the regression model used in the research design and the analysis of this
study. Moreover, the outcomes of this study cannot be generalized to all not-for-profit
hospitals in the United States and worldwide because the not-for-profit hospitals were
sampled in the list of all hospitals operating in the State of California. Perhaps, future
researchers can contribute to the field by studying hospitals in other states rather than
California.
Recommendations for Further Study
First, because triangulation of data was not possible in this study, to enhance the
accuracy of the outcome of this study and reduce potential errors, other researchers can
collect and compare archived data from other databases or websites that may store the
same financial reports of the hospitals listed in the OSHPD database. Second, future
researchers can investigate the effects of other variables relevant to corporate governance
constructs on the financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. For instance, research
questions examining whether organizational leverage, market environments, board
independence, and organizational identification of CEO affect the financial indicators of
not-for-profit hospitals in California or in the United States of America would be
worthwhile to answer. Using triangulation of data, other relevant variables, and perhaps
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other corporate governance mechanisms or constructs could generate new research
findings.
The financial indicators included in the statistical model used for the analysis of
this study were only the total margin, the operating margin, and the free cash flow. Future
researchers can investigate the effects of CEO duality, presence of physicians, and other
independent variables relevant in this study on other financial performance indicators
such as Approximate Tobin’s q, return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), Z score,
and liquidity ratios (current ratios, quick ratios, and cash ratios).
This study analyzed financial data available in OSHPD database of California for
the period of 2009 to 2012. OSHPD is a comprehensive database that stores governance
and financial data covering report periods from 1995 to 2013. This study can be
expanded using a more comprehensive methodology by analyzing financial data covering
a report period longer than 4 years (2009-2012) as the outcomes may suggest new
findings.
The OSHPD also contains information and financial data of other for-profit and
not-for-profit healthcare organizations, including long-term care facilities, primary care
and special clinics, home health and hospice, and professional providers. It would be a
worthy effort to duplicate this study with other not-for-profit healthcare organizations
listed in the OSHPD, beyond not-for-profit hospitals. Moreover, because this study
focused on not-for-profit hospitals, future researchers may want to study for-profit
hospitals listed in the OSHPD.
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The implications of CEO duality and the presence of physicians on governance
boards can be significant for the overall performance rather than simply the financial
performance for not-for-profit hospitals. Because this study used the archived data and
focused on measurement of financial performance, a recommendation for further research
regarding the effects of CEO duality and presence of physicians on boards on other
performance measurements of not-for-profit hospitals, such as employee satisfaction and
development, leadership development, clinical governance, community services, and
other charity efforts. This can be accomplished using research methodologies such as
surveys and interviews.
In addition, the outcomes of this study can be applied only to not-for-profit
hospitals providing healthcare in the State of California. It would be beneficial to further
this study by using more comprehensive data so that the outcomes can be generalized to
all not-for-profit hospitals operating in the United States and worldwide.
Implications for Social Change
This study is different from past studies examining corporate governance and
financial performance. No prior researchers examined specifically the implication of
CEO duality, the presence of physicians, other characteristics pertaining to hospital size
and age, and board size on the financial performance of healthcare organizations,
especially not-for-profit hospitals. Moreover, in addition to corporate governance,
successful healthcare governance boards will need to incorporate clinical governance as
part of their functions to monitor and transform their organizations (Colin-Thome, 2013).
This study furthers the investigation of the governance effects on financial performance
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by considering of the role of clinical governance provided by physicians serving on
hospital governance boards. By examining the effects of CEO duality and exploring the
impacts of the presence of physicians on governance boards, this study was an attempt to
generate results that might provide insights for not-for-profit hospitals to become
successful and efficient with their governance and financial management, thus enhancing
their organizational effectiveness to commit to charitable missions of community services
and transformation of local communities and societies.
Although initiated and mainly applied to corporations, the implementation of the
Sarbanes-Oxly Act of 2002 has affected not-for-profit hospitals in meeting external
regulations and adopting appropriate board governance structures (Greene, 2005). The
results of this study can assist not-for-profit hospitals or their administrators to justify and
explain why they opt to operate with current governance structures. Specifically, as
presented in Chapter 4, the outcomes of this study suggested that not-for-profit hospitals
can choose to operate with or without CEO duality and with or without physicians
serving as members of hospital boards. It is important for administrators of not-for-profit
hospitals to understand that while board size does not affect total margins, operating
margins, or free cash flow, hospital size and hospital age do affect financial performance.
Conclusions
Good corporate governance is critical to the growth and sustainability of modern
corporations. Some companies operate with a governance structure in which the CEO is
also the chairperson of the board of directors, a structure called CEO duality. Some
researchers argued against CEO duality because they posited that when acting as CEO
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and chairperson of corporate board, a CEO might become too powerful and adversely
influence the monitoring function of the board. Therefore, CEO duality can potentially
interfere with a board’s effectiveness in governing the organization and evaluating the
performance of the top executive team, negatively affecting organizational performance
(Aguilera et al., 2008; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). In contrast,
other researchers considered CEO duality as a way to allow executive teams to manage
organizations with clear and unambiguous leadership and facilitate an effective
communication between shareholders, boards of directors, and managers (Boyd, 1995;
David et al., 1997; Kang & Zardkoohi, 2005; Nicholson & Kiel 2007). Therefore, CEO
duality may help lead to a system that is more effective and efficient in reaching
organizational objectives and financial performance.
For more than two decades, researchers have focused substantial work on the
influences of roles, size, structure, composition of boards, and CEO duality on firm
performance and still generated ambiguous results (Krause, 2013; Lawal, 2012).
However, no researchers have examined specifically the relationship between CEO
duality and financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. The focus of this study was
to fill this gap. Furthermore, this study is different from other studies in that it included
an exploration of the impact of the presence of physicians on governance boards.
The outcomes of this study are consistent with the results generated by other
studies that CEO duality had no relationship with organizational performance.
Specifically, I found CEO duality and presence of physicians on boards were not related
to financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. As not-for-profit hospitals are
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integral to the healthcare system and the well-being of people and communities, it is
important for these not-for-profit organizations to operate with efficiency, sustainability,
and with a desired governance structure. The results of this study suggest that not-forprofit hospitals can choose to operate without having a CEO duality governance structure
and that the presence of physicians on boards may not be necessary for improving
financial performance.
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Appendix A: List of Not-For-Profit Hospitals
Order
Sequence

Facility
Number

Hospitals’ Name

1

106400466

ARROYO GRANDE COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

2

106150722

BAKERSFIELD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

3

106184008

BANNER LASSEN MEDICAL CENTER

4

106190052

BARLOW HOSPITAL

5

106090793

BARTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

6

106330120

BETTY FORD CENTER OF EISENHOWER

7

106190081

8

106010776

9

106304113

BEVERLY HOSPITAL
CHILDRENS HOSPITAL & RESEARCH CENTER AT
OAKLAND
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL AT MISSION

10

106204019

CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL CENTRAL CALIFORNIA

11

106190170

CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF LOS ANGELES

12

106300032

CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF ORANGE COUNTY

13

106190636

CITRUS VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER - QV CAMPUS

14

106190176

CITY OF HOPE HELFORD CLINICAL RESEARCH HOSPITAL

15

106100005

CLOVIS COMMUNITY MEDICAL CENTER

16

106361323

COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF SAN BERNARDINO

17

106270744

18

106560473

19

106100717

COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF THE MONTEREY PENINSULA
COMMUNITY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL - SAN
BUENAVENTURA
COMMUNITY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

20

106390846

DAMERON HOSPITAL

21

106440755

DOMINICAN SANTA CRUZ HOSPITAL - SOQUEL

22

106190243

DOWNEY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

23

106196168

EARL & LORRAINE MILLER CHILDRENS HOSPITAL

24

106010805

EDEN MEDICAL CENTER

25

106331168

EISENHOWER MEDICAL CENTER

26

106430763

EL CAMINO HOSPITAL

27

106500867

EMANUEL MEDICAL CENTER

28

106190280

ENCINO HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER

29

106040962

ENLOE MEDICAL CENTER - ESPLANADE CAMPUS

30

106040875

FEATHER RIVER HOSPITAL

31

106190298

FOOTHILL PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL

32

106400480

FRENCH HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER
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33

106270777

GEORGE L. MEE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

34

106190323

GLENDALE ADVENTIST MEDICAL CENTER

35

106190522

GLENDALE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTER

36

106420483

GOLETA VALLEY COTTAGE HOSPITAL

37

106190392

GOOD SAMARITAN HOSPITAL- LA

38

106160725

HANFORD COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

39

106190949

HENRY MAYO NEWHALL MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

40

106301205

HOAG MEMORIAL HOSPITAL PRESBYTERIAN

41

106190400

HUNTINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

42

106380842

JEWISH HOME

43

106071018

JOHN MUIR MEDICAL CENTER-CONCORD CAMPUS

44

106070988

JOHN MUIR MEDICAL CENTER-WALNUT CREEK CAMPUS

45

106196404

JOYCE EISENBERG KEEFER MEDICAL CENTER

46

106361246

LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER

47

106190525

48

106434040

49

106201281

LONG BEACH MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER
LUCILE SALTER PACKARD CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL AT
STANFORD
MADERA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

50

106420493

MARIAN MEDICAL CENTER

51

106211006

MARIN GENERAL HOSPITAL

52

106090933

MARSHALL MEDICAL CENTER

53

106500939

MEMORIAL HOSPITAL MODESTO

54

106340947

MERCY GENERAL HOSPITAL

55

106150761

MERCY HOSPITAL - BAKERSFIELD

56

106344029

MERCY HOSPITAL - FOLSOM

57

106450949

58

106240942

59

106340950

MERCY MEDICAL CENTER
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER MERCED-COMMUNITY
CAMPUS
MERCY SAN JUAN HOSPITAL

60

106340951

METHODIST HOSPITAL OF SACRAMENTO

61

106190529

METHODIST HOSPITAL OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

62

106190524

MISSION COMMUNITY HOSPITAL - PANORAMA CAMPUS

63

106301262

MISSION HOSPITAL REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

64

106361166

MONTCLAIR HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER

65

106190552

MOTION PICTURE & TELEVISION HOSPITAL

66

106481357

NORTH BAY MEDICAL CENTER

67

106190568

NORTHRIDGE HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER

68

106430837

O'CONNOR HOSPITAL

69

106410852

PENINSULA MEDICAL CENTER
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70

106190630

POMONA VALLEY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER

71

106190631

PRESBYTERIAN INTERCOMMUNITY HOSPITAL

72

106281047

QUEEN OF THE VALLEY HOSPITAL

73

106370673

RADY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL - SAN DIEGO

74

106361308

REDLANDS COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

75

106580996

RIDEOUT MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

76

106150782

RIDGECREST REGIONAL HOSPITAL

77

106190796

RONALD REAGAN UCLA MEDICAL CENTER

78

106361318

SAN ANTONIO COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

79

106150788

SAN JOAQUIN COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

80

106420514

81

106190687

82

106491064

SANTA BARBARA COTTAGE HOSPITAL
SANTA MONICA-UCLA MEDICAL CENTER &
ORTHOPAEDIC HOSPITAL
SANTA ROSA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

83

106371256

SCRIPPS GREEN HOSPITAL

84

106371394

SCRIPPS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL - ENCINITAS

85

106370771

SCRIPPS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL-LA JOLLA

86

106370744

SCRIPPS MERCY HOSPITAL

87

106410891

SEQUOIA HOSPITAL

88

106410817

SETON MEDICAL CENTER

89

106370875

SHARP CHULA VISTA MEDICAL CENTER

90

106370689

SHARP CORONADO HOSPITAL & HEALTHCARE CENTER

91

106370714

SHARP GROSSMONT HOSPITAL

92

106370694

SHARP MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

93

106370745

SHARP MESA VISTA HOSPITAL

94

106190708

95

106344114

96

106291023

97

106560525

98

106554011

SHERMAN OAKS HOSPITAL & HEALTH CENTER
SHRINERS HOSPITALS FOR CHILDREN NORTHERN
CALIFORNIA
SIERRA NEVADA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
SIMI VALLEY HOSPITAL & HEALTH CARE SERVICES SYCAMORE
SONORA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER-GREENLEY

99

106100899

ST. AGNES MEDICAL CENTER

100

106361339

ST. BERNARDINE MEDICAL CENTER

101

106521041

ST. ELIZABETH COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

102

106190754

ST. FRANCIS MEDICAL CENTER

103

106380960

ST. FRANCIS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

104

106281078

ST. HELENA HOSPITAL

105

106190756

ST. JOHN'S HEALTH CENTER

106

106560508

ST. JOHN'S PLEASANT VALLEY HOSPITAL
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107

106560529

ST. JOHN'S REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

108

106121080

ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL - EUREKA

109

106301340

ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL - ORANGE

110

106391042

ST. JOSEPH'S MEDICAL CENTER OF STOCKTON

111

106301342

ST. JUDE MEDICAL CENTER

112

106434138

ST. LOUISE REGIONAL HOSPITAL

113

106190053

ST. MARY MEDICAL CENTER

114

106190053

ST. MARY MEDICAL CENTER - LONG BEACH

115

106190053

ST. MARY MEDICAL CENTER - LOS ANGELES

116

106380965

ST. MARY'S MEDICAL CENTER-SAN FRANCISCO

117

106010967

ST. ROSE HOSPITAL

118

106190762

ST. VINCENT MEDICAL CENTER

119

106430905

STANFORD UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL

120

106034002

SUTTER AMADOR HOSPITAL

121

106310791

SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL

122

106084001

SUTTER COAST HOSPITAL

123

106574010

SUTTER DAVIS HOSPITAL

124

106070934

125

106444012

126

106341051

SUTTER DELTA MEDICAL CENTER
SUTTER MATERNITY & SURGERY CENTER OF SANTA
CRUZ
SUTTER MEDICAL CENTER - SACRAMENTO

127

106490919

SUTTER MEDICAL CENTER OF SANTA ROSA

128

106311000

SUTTER ROSEVILLE MEDICAL CENTER

129

106481094

SUTTER SOLANO MEDICAL CENTER

130

106391056

SUTTER TRACY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

131

106190782

TARZANA TREATMENT CENTER

132

106190422

TORRANCE MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER

133

106190159

TRI-CITY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

134

106381154

UCSF MEDICAL CENTER

135

106231396

UKIAH VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER - HOSPITAL DRIVE

136

106370782

UNIVERSITY OF CALIF - SAN DIEGO MEDICAL CENTER

137

106341006

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS MEDICAL CENTER

138

106301279

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE MEDICAL CENTER

139

106194219

USC UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL

140

106484001

VACA VALLEY HOSPITAL

141

106190812

VALLEY PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL

142

106014050

VALLEYCARE MEDICAL CENTER

143

106190818

VERDUGO HILLS HOSPITAL

144

106361370

VICTOR VALLEY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL
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145

106190878

WHITE MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER

146

106571086

WOODLAND MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
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Appendix B: Hospitals and Websites
Hospital Name

Websites

ARROYO GRANDE COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

http://www.arroyograndehospital.org

BAKERSFIELD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

http://www.bakersfieldmemorial.org

BANNER LASSEN MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.BannerHealth.com

BARLOW HOSPITAL

http://barlowhospital.org

BARTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

http://www.bartonhealth.org

BETTY FORD CENTER OF EISENHOWER

http://www.emc.org/body.cfm?id=140

BEVERLY HOSPITAL
CHILDRENS HOSPITAL & RESEARCH CENTER AT
OAKLAND

http://Beverly.org

CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL AT MISSION

http://www.choc.org

CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL CENTRAL CALIFORNIA

http://www.childrenscentralcal.org

CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF LOS ANGELES

http://www.childrenshospitalla.org

CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF ORANGE COUNTY

http://www.choc.org

CITRUS VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER - QV CAMPUS
CITY OF HOPE HELFORD CLINICAL RESEARCH
HOSPITAL

http://cvhp.org

CLOVIS COMMUNITY MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.communitymedical.org/

COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF SAN BERNARDINO
COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF THE MONTEREY
PENINSULA
COMMUNITY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL - SAN
BUENAVENTURA

http://www.chsb.org

COMMUNITY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.communitymedical.org

DAMERON HOSPITAL

http://www.cmhshealth.org

DOMINICAN SANTA CRUZ HOSPITAL - SOQUEL

http://www.dominicanhospital.org

DOWNEY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.drmci.org

EARL & LORRAINE MILLER CHILDRENS HOSPITAL

http://www.memorialcare.org

EDEN MEDICAL CENTER

http://edenmedcenter.org

EISENHOWER MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.emc.org

EL CAMINO HOSPITAL

http://www.elcaminohospital.org

EMANUEL MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.emanuelmedicalcenter.org

ENCINO HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.encinomed.com

ENLOE MEDICAL CENTER - ESPLANADE CAMPUS

http://www.enloe.org

FEATHER RIVER HOSPITAL

http://www.frhosp.org

FOOTHILL PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL

http://cvhp.org

FRENCH HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.frenchmedicalcenter.org

GEORGE L. MEE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

http://www.meememorial.com

GLENDALE ADVENTIST MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.glendaleadventist.com

http://www.childrenshospitaloakland.org

http://www.coh.org

http://www.chsb.org
http://www.cmhshealth.org
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GLENDALE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH
CENTER

http://www.glendalememorialhospital.or
g

GOLETA VALLEY COTTAGE HOSPITAL

http://www.cottagehealthsystem.org

GOOD SAMARITAN HOSPITAL- LA

http://www.goodsam.org

HANFORD COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

http://www.adventisthealthcv.com

HENRY MAYO NEWHALL MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

http://www.henrymayo.com

HOAG MEMORIAL HOSPITAL PRESBYTERIAN

http://www.Hoaghospital.org

HUNTINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

http://www.huntingtonhospital.com

JEWISH HOME

http://jhsf.org

JOHN MUIR MEDICAL CENTER-CONCORD CAMPUS
JOHN MUIR MEDICAL CENTER-WALNUT CREEK
CAMPUS

http://www.johnmuirhealth.com

JOYCE EISENBERG KEEFER MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.jha.org

LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.lomalindahealth.org

LONG BEACH MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER
LUCILE SALTER PACKARD CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL
AT STANFORD

http://www.memorialcare.org

MADERA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

http://www.maderahospital.org

MARIAN MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.marianmedicalcenter.org

MARIN GENERAL HOSPITAL

http://www.maringeneral.org

MARSHALL MEDICAL CENTER

http://marshallmedical.org

MEMORIAL HOSPITAL MODESTO

http://memorialmedicalcenter.org

MERCY GENERAL HOSPITAL

http://www.mercygeneral.org

MERCY HOSPITAL - BAKERSFIELD

http://www.mercybakersfield.org

MERCY HOSPITAL - FOLSOM

http://www.mercyfolsom.org

MERCY MEDICAL CENTER
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER MERCED-COMMUNITY
CAMPUS

http://www.mercymercedcares.org

MERCY SAN JUAN HOSPITAL

http://www.mercysanjuan.org

METHODIST HOSPITAL OF SACRAMENTO

http://www.methodistsacramento.org

METHODIST HOSPITAL OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
MISSION COMMUNITY HOSPITAL - PANORAMA
CAMPUS

http://www.methodisthospital.org

MISSION HOSPITAL REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.mission4health.com

MONTCLAIR HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.montclair-hospital.org

MOTION PICTURE & TELEVISION HOSPITAL

http://www.mptvfund.org

NORTH BAY MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.northbay.org

NORTHRIDGE HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.northridgehospital.org

O'CONNOR HOSPITAL

http://www.oconnorhospital.org

PENINSULA MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.mills-peninsula.org

POMONA VALLEY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.pvhmc.org

http://www.johnmuirhealth.com

http://www.lpch.org

http://www.mercymercedcares.org

http://mchonline.org
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PRESBYTERIAN INTERCOMMUNITY HOSPITAL

http://www.whittierpres.com

QUEEN OF THE VALLEY HOSPITAL

http://www.thequeen.org

RADY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL - SAN DIEGO

http://www.rchsd.org

REDLANDS COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

http://www.redlandshospital.org

RIDEOUT MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

http://www.frhg.org

RIDGECREST REGIONAL HOSPITAL

http://www.rrh.org

RONALD REAGAN UCLA MEDICAL CENTER

http://uclahealth.org

SAN ANTONIO COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

http://www.sach.org

SAN JOAQUIN COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

http://www.sanjoaquinhospital.org

SANTA BARBARA COTTAGE HOSPITAL
SANTA MONICA-UCLA MEDICAL CENTER &
ORTHOPAEDIC HOSPITAL

http://www.cottagehealthsystem.org

SANTA ROSA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

http://stjosephhealth.org

SCRIPPS GREEN HOSPITAL

http://www.scripps.org

SCRIPPS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL - ENCINITAS

http://www.scripps.org

SCRIPPS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL-LA JOLLA

http://www.scripps.org

SCRIPPS MERCY HOSPITAL

http://www.scripps.org

SEQUOIA HOSPITAL

http://www.sequoiahospital.org

SETON MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.setonmedicalcenter.org

SHARP CHULA VISTA MEDICAL CENTER
SHARP CORONADO HOSPITAL & HEALTHCARE
CENTER

http://www.sharp.com

SHARP GROSSMONT HOSPITAL

http://www.sharp.com

SHARP MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

http://www.sharp.com

SHARP MESA VISTA HOSPITAL

http://www.sharp.com

SHERMAN OAKS HOSPITAL & HEALTH CENTER
SHRINERS HOSPITALS FOR CHILDREN NORTHERN
CALIFORNIA

http://www.shermanoakshospital.com

SIERRA NEVADA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
SIMI VALLEY HOSPITAL & HEALTH CARE SERVICES
- SYCAMORE

http://www.snmh.org/

SONORA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER-GREENLEY

http://www.sonoramedicalcenter.org

ST. AGNES MEDICAL CENTER
ST. BERNARDINE MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.samc.com
http://www.stbernardinemedicalcenter.or
g

ST. ELIZABETH COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

http://redbluff.mercy.org

ST. FRANCIS MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.stfrancismedicalcenter.org

ST. FRANCIS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

http://www.saintfrancismemorial.org

ST. HELENA HOSPITAL

http://www.sthelenahospital.org

ST. JOHN'S HEALTH CENTER

http://stjohn.org

ST. JOHN'S PLEASANT VALLEY HOSPITAL

http://www.stjohnshealth.org

http://uclahealth.org

http://www.sharp.com

http://shrinershq.org

http://www.simivalleyhospital.com
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ST. JOHN'S REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.stjohnshealth.org

ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL - EUREKA

http://www.stjosepheureka.org

ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL - ORANGE

http://www.sjo.org

ST. JOSEPH'S MEDICAL CENTER OF STOCKTON

http://www.stjosephscares.org

ST. JUDE MEDICAL CENTER
ST. LOUISE REGIONAL HOSPITAL

http://www.stjudemedicalcenter.org
http://www.saintlouiseregionalhospital.or
g

ST. MARY MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.stmarymedicalcenter.org

ST. MARY MEDICAL CENTER - LONG BEACH

http://www.stmarymedicalcenter.org

ST. MARY MEDICAL CENTER - LOS ANGELES

http://www.stmarymedicalcenter.org

ST. MARY'S MEDICAL CENTER-SAN FRANCISCO

http://www.stmarymedicalcenter.org

ST. ROSE HOSPITAL

http://www.StRoseHospital.org

ST. VINCENT MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.stvincentmedicalcenter.com

STANFORD UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL

http://www.stanfordhospital.com

SUTTER AMADOR HOSPITAL

http://sutteramador.org

SUTTER AUBURN FAITH HOSPITAL

http://sutterauburnfaith.org

SUTTER COAST HOSPITAL

http://www.suttercoast.org

SUTTER DAVIS HOSPITAL

http://sutterdavis.org

SUTTER DELTA MEDICAL CENTER
SUTTER MATERNITY & SURGERY CENTER OF
SANTA CRUZ

http://www.sutterdelta.org

SUTTER MEDICAL CENTER - SACRAMENTO

http://www.suttermedicalcenter.org

SUTTER MEDICAL CENTER OF SANTA ROSA

http://www.suttersantarosa.org

SUTTER ROSEVILLE MEDICAL CENTER

http://sutterroseville.org

SUTTER SOLANO MEDICAL CENTER

http://suttersolano.org

SUTTER TRACY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

http://www.suttertracy.org

TARZANA TREATMENT CENTER

http://www.tarzanatc.org

TORRANCE MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.torrancememorial.org

TRI-CITY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

http://tri-cityrmc.org

UCSF MEDICAL CENTER
UKIAH VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER - HOSPITAL
DRIVE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIF - SAN DIEGO MEDICAL
CENTER
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS MEDICAL
CENTER
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE MEDICAL
CENTER

http://www.ucsfhealth.org

USC UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL

http://www.uscuniversityhospital.org/

VACA VALLEY HOSPITAL

http://www.northbay.org

VALLEY PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL

http://ValleyPres.org

VALLEYCARE MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.valleycare.com

http://www.suttersantacruz.org/

http://www.uvmc.org
http://health.ucsd.edu/
http://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu
http://www.ucihealth.com
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VERDUGO HILLS HOSPITAL

http://www.vhhospital.org

VICTOR VALLEY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

http://vvgmc.com/

WHITE MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER

http://www.whitememorial.com

WOODLAND MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

http://www.woodlandhealthcare.org
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Appendix C: Operating Margin, Total Margin, and Free Cash Flow
Order
Sequence

Facility
Number

Ratio of
Operating
Margin

Ratio of
Free Cash
Total Margin Flow

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

106400466
106150722
106184008
106090793
106330120
106190081
106304113
106204019
106190170
106190636
106190176
106100005
106270744
106560473
106100717
106440755
106190243
106196168
106331168
106430763
106500867
106040962
106040875
106190298
106270777
106190323
106190522
106190392
106160725
106190400
106380842
106071018
106196404

-0.04
0.08
0.22
0.18
-0.05
-0.01
0.06
0.13
-0.03
0.04
0.01
0.15
0.09
0.07
0.05
0.10
-0.07
0.02
-0.09
0.07
0.01
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.00
0.02
-0.08
-0.02
0.08
0.02
-0.17
0.00
0.25

-0.043
0.098
0.287
0.087
-0.054
-0.004
0.061
0.179
0.020
0.048
0.059
0.172
0.103
0.101
0.070
0.126
-0.044
0.028
-0.016
0.090
0.036
0.048
0.033
0.045
0.015
0.031
-0.070
0.043
0.099
0.056
0.016
0.012
0.338

42,146
5,397,651
13,020
475,842
44,144
414,168
361,654
383,124
94,180
748,496
1,211,918
101
1,171,622
188,593
2,262,248
1,406,347
242,346
173
2,508,987
1,617,166
270,301
487,508
3
171,461
15,541
1,364,598
11,713
446,017
405,214
1,270,849
149,411
237,416
135

176
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

106361246
106190525
106201281
106420493
106211006
106500939
106340947
106150761
106450949
106240942
106340950
106190529
106190524
106301262
106190552
106481357
106190568
106410852
106190630
106190631
106370673
106361308
106580996
106190796
106361318
106190687
106491064
106371256
106370771
106370744
106410891
106370875
106370689
106370714
106370745
106190708
106344114
106560525

0.07
0.12
0.06
0.03
0.07
0.13
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.05
0.03
0.00
0.02
0.08
-0.21
0.00
0.08
0.04
0.03
0.08
0.14
0.01
0.00
0.13
0.02
0.15
0.05
0.22
0.15
0.05
0.07
0.01
0.04
0.03
-0.03
0.05
-0.08
-0.02

0.071
0.153
0.065
0.043
0.013
0.162
0.074
0.112
0.147
0.031
0.037
0.004
0.023
0.094
-0.088
0.014
0.086
0.082
0.030
0.101
0.077
0.032
0.030
0.141
0.090
0.174
0.059
0.276
0.180
0.056
0.103
0.035
0.064
0.048
-0.016
0.084
-0.072
-0.009

2,494,723
3,116
581,802
2,158,073
1,142,201
837,532
24,279
2,472,349
2,480,452
477,917
267
1,235,923
259,013
2,755,548
83,189
260,822
10,989,273
219,273
1,423,959
94,374
272,657
231,768
338,517
13,096,582
1,364,558
726,712
2,656,471
4
17
7
2,218,726
64,059
24,987
1,514,872
0
142,750
1
16,068

177
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
108
109
110

106554011
106100899
106521041
106190754
106380960
106190756
106560508
106560529
106301340
106391042
106301342
106190053
106190053
106190053
106190762
106430905
106310791
106084001
106574010
106444012
106341051
106490919
106481094
106391056
106190782
106190159
106381154
106231396
106341006
106301279
106194219
106190812
106014050
106190818
106190878
106121080
106301340
106391042

0.06
-0.00
0.14
0.03
-0.02
-0.39
-0.01
-0.05
0.01
0.02
0.07
0.07
-0.03
-0.02
-0.06
0.08
0.03
-0.01
0.20
0.29
0.11
0.02
-0.04
0.19
-0.03
-0.03
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.11
-0.10
0.04
0.03
0.00
0.04
0.05
0.01
0.02

0.070
0.000
0.181
0.050
0.015
-0.283
-0.002
-0.046
0.044
0.040
0.111
0.076
-0.035
-0.039
-0.046
0.061
0.043
-0.006
0.248
0.400
0.127
0.017
-0.032
0.242
0.044
0.017
0.073
0.054
0.084
0.133
-0.091
0.049
0.028
0.019
0.087
0.053
0.044
0.040

1,253,286
3,296,167
1,462,536
631,343
239,643
984,745
567,818
452,241
5,255,429
2,813,767
3,132,764
64,682
43,129
43,131
607,428
15,768,673
213,756
96,824
159,502
81,848
1,043,315
112,832
198,056
134,484
614,340
276,110
8,388,210
620,514
5,220,523
896
15,668,038
156,177
529,300
18,129
9,433,091
346,697
5,255,429
2,813,767

178
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

106301342
106434138
106190053
106190053
106190053
106380965
106010967
106190762
106430905
106034002
106310791
106084001
106574010
106070934
106444012
106341051
106490919
106311000
106481094
106391056
106190782
106190422
106190159
106381154
106231396
106370782
106341006
106301279
106194219
106484001
106190812
106014050
106190818
106361370
106190878
106571086

0.07
-0.01
0.07
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
-0.09
-0.06
0.08
0.04
0.03
-0.01
0.20
0.01
0.29
0.11
0.02
0.17
-0.04
0.19
-0.03
0.03
-0.03
0.06
0.06
0.08
0.07
0.11
-0.10
0.17
0.04
0.03
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.03

0.111
-0.017
0.076
-0.035
-0.039
0.005
-0.048
-0.046
0.061
0.044
0.043
-0.006
0.248
0.029
0.400
0.127
0.017
0.221
-0.032
0.242
0.044
0.077
0.017
0.073
0.054
0.108
0.084
0.133
-0.091
0.234
0.049
0.028
0.019
0.020
0.087
0.019

3,132,764
137,097
64,682
43,129
43,131
2,196,091
372,693
607,428
15,768,673
155,409
213,756
96,824
159,502
286,508
81,848
1,043,315
112,832
697,422
198,056
134,484
614,340
733,197
276,110
8,388,210
620,514
144,760
5,220,523
896
15,668,038
24,965
156,177
529,300
18,129
122,701
9,433,091
28,252

179
Appendix D: DUAL, PHYGOB, HOSIZE, HOSAGE, and BOSIZE

Order
Sequence

Facility
Number

DUAL

PHYGOB

HOSIZE
(Total Assets-$)

HOSAGE
(Logarithm)

BOSIZE

1

106400466

0

1

26,165,147

1.72

19

1

301,528,141

1.76

23

2

106150722

1

3

106184008

0

1

55,606,811

1.18

13

4

106190052

0

6

23,957,662

2.05

11

5

106090793

0

3

129,650,625

1.73

10

6

106330120

1

4

54,082,630

1.63

32

7

106190081

0

4

76,585,432

1.81

14

8

106010776

1

4

431,074,500

2.00

12

9

106304113

1

3

35,455,755

1.70

20

10

106204019

1

2

482,307,792

1.81

24

7

1,221,144,871

1.91

68

3

222,835,435

1.70

20

2

181,736,245

1.54

11

1

513,760,115

2.00

11

5

181,533,347

1.69

15

4

59,628,945

2.02

15

11
12
13
14
15
16

106190170
106300032
106190636
106190176
106100005
106361323

0
1
1
1
0
0

17

106270744

1

4

473,120,386

1.90

15

18

106560473

1

7

212,975,808

2.05

21

19

106100717

0

5

855,286,908

2.04

14

20

106390846

0

1

178,254,074

2.01

12

21

106440755

0

4

233,335,346

1.86

12

22

106190243

0

2

108,767,558

1.74

24

23

106196168

0

4

193,655,424

1.67

15

5

106,342,858

1.78

15

4

757,956,389

1.63

32

3

957,592,720

1.70

9

2

210,087,654

1.95

8

5

25,033,124

0.90

8

6

274,236,218

2.00

16

24
25
26
27
28
29

106010805
106331168
106430763
106500867
106190280
106040962

1
0
0
0
0
1

30

106040875

1

4

87,168,421

1.81

12

31

106190298

1

2

46,447,191

1.61

11

32

106400480

0

4

45,379,332

1.45

22

33

106270777

0

2

38,200,301

1.72

8

180
34
35

106190323
106190522

0
1

1

298,087,148

2.04

9

4

132,407,998

1.94

15

36

106420483

1

3

34,512,430

2.09

11

37

106190392

1

3

237,760,337

1.83

16

38

106160725

0

4

146,926,174

1.69

18

39

106190949

1

3

215,028,172

1.59

13

40

106301205

1

4

1,926,543,411

1.79

19

41

106190400

0

6

635,009,818

2.08

24

42

106380842

0

4

81,516,856

2.16

14

10

187,434,486

1.92

20

10

701,497,251

1.92

20

6

78,685,066

2.01

25

6

1,041,453,006

2.04

36

4

553,885,160

2.04

30

2

1,497,280,000

1.98

20

43
44
45
46
47
48

106071018
106070988
106196404
106361246
106190525
106434040

0
1
0
0
0
0

49

106201281

0

4

58,162,409

1.63

25

50

106420493

0

4

203,087,605

1.87

21

51

106211006

0

3

112,604,986

1.79

10

52

106090933

0

3

184,815,178

1.74

11

53

106500939

0

3

462,533,687

1.64

18

54

106340947

0

4

343,822,762

1.93

16

55

106150761

0

1

189,566,238

1.34

21

56

106344029

0

4

145,154,251

1.98

16

2

352,862,876

1.96

15

1

312,513,969

1.45

10

2

357,912,611

1.65

15

2

113,143,881

1.96

15

4

221,858,541

2.00

37

1

69,706,469

1.70

8

57
58
59
60
61
62

106450949
106240942
106340950
106340951
106190529
106190524

0
0
0
0
0
0

63

106301262

0

3

426,652,774

1.81

13

64

106361166

0

2

16,855,878

1.61

6

65

106190552

0

0

209,213,585

1.97

15

66

106481357

0

2

163,892,676

1.73

8

67

106190568

1

1

310,615,626

1.77

10

68

106430837

0

1

194,307,401

2.10

8

69

106410852

0

9

710,781,940

1.78

21

4

310,759,781

1.89

24

3

794,491,000

1.74

24

1

285,532,615

1.75

11

70
71
72

106190630
106190631
106281047

0
0
1

181
73
74

106370673
106361308

1
1

5

788,498,585

1.80

12

2

195,489,996

2.04

22

75

106580996

0

4

373,595,594

2.03

13

76

106150782

0

2

128,832,079

1.84

11

77

106190796

0

4

1,729,210,292

1.77

20

78

106361318

0

2

365,410,966

2.03

9

79

106150788

0

4

162,857,894

1.62

13

80

106420514

0

2

918,537,866

2.09

11

81

106190687

0

2

512,168,935

2.01

8

2

341,673,496

1.81

21

3

253,866,188

1.95

16

3

87,522,406

1.95

16

3

287,254,103

1.95

16

3

226,711,502

1.95

16

6

293,963,321

1.88

16

82
83
84
85
86
87

106491064
106371256
106371394
106370771
106370744
106410891

0
0
0
0
0
1

88

106410817

0

1

178,512,770

2.01

9

89

106370875

0

3

168,348,071

1.77

13

90

106370689

0

4

26,154,407

1.77

15

91

106370714

0

2

358,831,584

1.77

11

92

106370694

0

4

655,499,956

1.77

17

93

106370745

0

4

30,620,948

1.77

24

94

106190708

0

2

32,669,021

1.30

6

95

106344114

0

95,160,735

1.96

15

0

2

182,333,397

1.75

11

5

115,461,365

1.70

13

3

83,406,335

1.69

13

3

623,400,059

1.93

15

1

134,038,630

1.92

10

2

99,722,576

1.99

22

96
97
98
99
100
101

106291023
106560525
106554011
106100899
106361339
106521041

0
1
0
0
0

102

106190754

0

2

352,349,324

1.84

13

103

106380960

1

3

267,662,154

2.04

20

104

106281078

1

1

77,629,872

2.13

7

105

106190756

0

2

492,201,622

1.79

14

106

106560508

0

1

65,937,134

2.01

19

107

106560529

0

1

229,941,677

2.01

19

108

106121080

0

4

112,230,888

1.78

18

1

812,085,075

1.93

10

2

307,890,920

2.06

17

2

579,984,364

1.70

29

109
110
111

106301340
106391042
106301342

0
0
1

182
112
113

106434138
106190053

0
0

1

37,281,956

1.40

8

4

87,098,778

1.96

46

114

106190053

0

4

87,098,778

1.96

46

115

106190053

0

4

87,098,778

1.96

46

116

106380965

1

4

169,623,756

1.96

46

117

106010967

1

3

70,636,995

1.57

24

118

106190762

0

2

159,713,299

2.00

15

119

106430905

0

5

2,200,740,192

1.74

22

120

106034002

0

4

63,135,131

1.38

17

4

69,107,522

1.68

17

2

35,329,486

1.45

8

4

41,008,316

1.30

17

1

120,610,271

1.60

9

6

24,391,450

1.26

22

6

747,272,314

1.84

27

121
122
123
124
125
126

106310791
106084001
106574010
106070934
106444012
106341051

0
0
0
0
0
0

127

106490919

0

8

74,109,047

1.89

32

128

106311000

0

4

363,415,725

1.79

17

129

106481094

0

4

87,460,963

1.97

17

130

106391056

0

2

73,439,752

1.82

15

131

106190782

0

2

28,293,124

1.62

15

132

106190422

0

1

590,670,650

1.95

12

133

106190159

0

1

29,478,406

1.72

6

134

106381154

0

5

1,123,320,860

2.18

24

6

46,522,614

1.20

16

3

681,596,631

1.72

12

5

1,356,407,816

2.04

48

13

719,435,998

1.69

13

7

415,233,114

2.10

27

2

65,880,231

1.76

8

135
136
137
138
139
140

106231396
106370782
106341006
106301279
106194219
106484001

1
0
0
0
0
0

141

106190812

0

7

111,929,340

1.75

19

142

106014050

0

4

200,990,819

1.36

14

143

106190818

0

4

41,564,433

1.83

16

144

106361370

0

1

32,563,577

1.67

4

145

106190878

0

3

500,677,247

1.82

16

146

106571086

0

3

65,385,830

1.67

8
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Appendix E: Communication With Lexie Bloyd of OSHPD Database

Anh Pham < >
11/27/14
to lexie.bloyd <>
Dear Lexie Bloyd,
My name is Anh Pham. I am a PhD student in the School of Management of Walden
University, Minneapolis, Minnesota. I am undertaking a dissertation study examining the
effects of CEO duality (CEO who is also Chairman of Boards of Directors) and presence
of physicians on governance boards on financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. I
am hoping the outcomes of this study could suggest an appropriate governance structure
to administrators of not-for-profit hospitals seeking policies or processes that would help
them sustain and enhance their finance performance and organizational missions. My
dissertation committee includes Dr. Jeffrey Prinster, Dr. Thomas Spencer, and Dr.
Godwin Igein, who are prestigious professors of the most excellent institute of Walden
University. I feel so fortunate to have a committee that has been guiding and supporting
me to a full extent, and has reviewed and approved my dissertation proposal.
For data collection, I would like to be able to access publicly reported financial data such
total margins, operating margins, and other financial indicators submitted by not-forprofits listed in the databases of OSPH and SIERA. For data related to governance, I
would like to be able to examine the governance structure of each of not-for-profit
hospital to determine whether there is presence or absence of CEO duality or physicians
on governance board. The collected data are entered into statistical software for running
statistical tests using statistical correlation and multiple regression models, and the results
will be used to determine whether CEO duality and presence of physicians on governance
boards are good for financial performance of not-for-profit hospitals. All data will be
carefully safeguarded, kept confidential and will be disposed properly once the study is
over.
Regarding accessibility to public databases, I am aware that I can access to relevant
information and data from the public OSPH database in the format of Excel files without
any restriction of required user identification and password. However, the SIERA
database requires that users need to be authorized and set up an account before having
access to the SIERA database.
Therefore, I am writing earnestly to request you to grant me permission to access the
SIERA database. If my enquiry is not within your authority, I am very grateful if you can
kindly direct me to appropriate individuals, offices, or institutes that can assist me in
getting access to the SIERA database. Moreover, I also respectfully ask you to inform me
whether the data contained in SIERA are similar and identical to those of the OSHPD
database.
Thank you very much for your consideration, and I am looking forward to hearing from
you soon.
Respectfully,

184
-Anh Pham
Walden University
Student ID#A00275579
PhD Management, LOC
Email
Anh Pham < >
11/27/14
to lexie.bloyd < >
Dear Lexie Bloyd,
I would like to add that I have proposed that I would use statistical correlation and
multiple regression and SPSS software to analyze secondary data or archived data of
financial indicators from 107 U.S not-for-profit organizations selected from the Office of
Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) databases of States of California,
for the period of 2010 to 2012.
Best regards,
Anh Pham

Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < >
12/1/14
to me
Anh –
The data that is contained in the SIERA database is the same data contained on our
website.
http://oshpd.ca.gov/HID/DataFlow/
Here you will find information from several separate databases. The SIERA system was
designed to assist report preparer’s in the submission process only. It is NOT for data
dissemination. If you would like to view a specific facility’s report, you can find
individual financial disclosure reports here:
https://siera.oshpd.ca.gov/FinancialDisclosure.aspx.
If I can assist you in navigating through the data, please feel free to contact me.
Lexie
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Anh Pham < >
12/1/14
to Lexie.Bloyd
Thank you, Lexie!
This is a great news. I am most grateful for your offer to assist me in navigating through
the data. I will defintely need help on this area. When the time comes, I would like to
contact you.
Would it be OK with you if I can contact you by telephone? Thank you very much!
Best regards,
Anh

Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < >
12/1/14
to me
Yes, you may call me to go over the data. Perhaps you can email me to let me know
when you plan on calling so I can free my calendar.
Lexie
Anh Pham < >
12/1/14
to Lexie.Bloyd
Hi Lexie,
I have one question. Do not-for-profit hospitals report their governance information such
CEO, CEO/Chairman, presence of physicians on the boards? In other words, does
OSHPD database contain the governance information of not-for-profit hospital I am
looking for?
Thanks for helping me!
Best regards,
Anh

Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < >
12/2/14
to me
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Anh –
Yes, on Page 3.2 on the Hospital Annual Disclosure Report, we collect a Statement of
Compensation of Owners and their Relatives and on Page 3.3, we collect Hospital
Owners and Governing Board Members. We ask that they complete the occupation of
these owners and board members as well.
Lexie

Anh Pham < >
12/2/14
to Lexie.Bloyd
Hi Lexie,
Thank you so very much! I think all the data I need is available in the OSHPD database.

Anh Pham < >
12/3/14
to Lexie.Bloyd
Hi Lexie,
Today, I just received an approval from my educational institute (Walden University) to
go ahead and work on data collection and analysis. I am so thankful to get this far
because I was able to show that you as the OSHPD administrator confirmed the
availability and accessibility of the database. Thank you very much for your kindness and
offer to help me! I am very grateful.
I was wondering if you are available on Monday 12/04/14 for me to call you so you can
assist me in going through the data. I am very flexible with day and time. Please pick any
day and time that is convenient for you to help me.
Sincerely,

From: Anh Pham [ ]
Sent: Saturday, December 06, 2014 11:15 AM
To: Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD
Subject: Anh_Pham Request of Help
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Dear Lexie,
Thanks again for your kindness and genuine offer to help me with data collection!
As I am about to start the process of data collection and try understanding what data and
its meaning, I would like to take the opportunity to explain the scope of my search of
data. I will choose randomly 107 not-for-profit hospitals the list of not-profit hospitals
listed in OHSPD database and examine the financial data and governance information of
the selected hospitals.
For financial data, I will analyze the annual financial reports for 2009 to 2012 for each
hospital. The financial data that I will examine include operating margin, total margin,
and free cash flow. Please correct me if I am wrong. Below are how I think I will
calculate the operating margin, total margin, and free cash flow. So please provide me
any comments you may have regarding the calculation of these variables.
The Operating Margin is calculated by dividing the difference between total operating
revenue and total operating expenses by the total operating revenues and expressed as
ratio of [(Total operating revenue – Total operating expense)/ Total operating revenue]
The Total Margin is calculated by dividing net income by total operating revenue and
expressed as Net Income/ Total Operating Revenue
Free Cash Flow represents cash inflow and outflow rather than accounting earnings of a
hospital. It shows the amount of cash left over after accounting for all of the expenses to
operate the hospital and making all necessary investments to ensure its continuous
operation. The Free Cash Flow is calculated by subtracting the change in net assets plus
interest and noncash expenses from the investments in fixed assets and net working
capital (Singh, Wheeler, & Roden, 2012). Alternatively, the free cash flow can be
estimated by averaging the current and two prior periods and multiplying by an average
annual growth rate of 7.3%, which is based on data from the American Hospital
Association (Singh, Wheeler, & Roden, 2012, p.330). I adopted the calculation method of
the free cash flow used by Sigh et al. (2012). FCF is expressed in the formula below:
FCF = ((cFCF + priop1FCF +priop2FCF)/3) * 0.073
Where:
cFCF = current FCF
priop1FCF = prior period 1 FCF
priop2FCF = prior period 2 FCF
Actually, as a preliminary search and examination of the OHSPD website, I took the
liberty and explored the Annual Financial Data Complete Data Set and Pivot Profiles
contained in Healthcare Information Division/Data/Financial link of the OHSPD website.
I looked at the income statement and ratio data of a LTC Pivot report of a hospital (as
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captured below) and realized that the report has some financial ratios, especially the
Operating Margin, formulated and calculated already.
I am respectfully hoping that you can direct me to where I can find the Total Margin and
hopefully some hints about how to calculation the Free Cash Flow based on the data
available and presented in the LTC Pivot report.
Inline image 1
Regarding the corporate governance data of hospitals, I will collect data such as CEO
duality (CEO who is also the chairperson of the governance board), Physicians on
Governance Board, hospital size, hospital age, board size. I would be very grateful if you
can provide some tips on how to efficiently collect and download these information of the
107 not-for-profit hospitals I will select from the OHSPD.
Would you kindly inform if you are available on Tuesday 12/09 or Wednesday 12/10 or
Thursday 12/11 or Friday for me to contact you via telephone for assistance with
questions related to data? I am flexible with the dates and times. Please let me the date
and time that are most convenient for you. Thank you for helping me, and I am excitedly
looking forward to hearing from you!
Sincerely,
Anh Pham
-Anh Pham
Walden University
Student ID#A00275579
PhD Management, LOC
Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < >
12/11/14
to me
Dear Anh,
Due to unforeseen circumstances, I was not able to be in the office this morning. I
sincerely apologize about missing today’s telephone conference. I will reschedule once I
get back in office. As a recap, you are correct in your assumption of the total operating
margin and total margin; however, I am unsure as to the LTC pivot profile providing you
information that you need free cash flow analysis.
Sincerely,
Lexie Bloyd, LTC Unit Supervisor
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Healthcare Information Division

Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < >
12/11/14
to me
Hi Anh –
Again, I apologize, but there is a severe storm in Sacramento today and things have been
hectic. Perhaps you can give me some times that are good for you?
Thank you and I apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused you.
Lexie
Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < >
12/11/14
to me
Hi Anh –
I tried calling and received an automated message saying that the number was
disconnected. The number I called was :
949-825-1831
I will try again tomorrow…
Lexie
Walden < >
12/11/14
to Lexie.Bloyd, bcc: me
Hi Lexie
No worries! You are doing me favor. So, I am absolutely very flexible with your
schedule.
I apologized for leaving you a wrong number to call back. The number is I think I will
not come in to work tomorrow due to expected heavy rains because of storm. The
highway to my workplace could be closed tomorrow, so I figured I should be home for
safety reason.
If you call me, please call my cell at. Otherwise I can call you if you don't mind.
Thank you for helping me!

190
Best,
Anh Ph m

Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < >
12/17/14
to me
https://www.alirts.oshpd.ca.gov/default.aspx
Enter FAC_NO in search box.
I hope this helps!!
Anh Pham < >
Attachments 12/17/14
to Lexie.Bloyd
Dear Lexie,
Thanks for your time and patience this afternoon to go over data from your website. I am
very grateful for that. Also, thanks for the link. I will definitely check it out to search for
other necessary data.
Can you kindly do me a favor? Please view the Excel file enclosed and confirm with me
the following things:
Columns DN, DQ, and DW are total operating revenue, net from operation, and net
income, respectfully.
Thanks!
Best,
Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < >
12/22/14
to me
Anh –
That is correct.
Lexie
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Anh Pham < >
12/22/14
to Lexie.Bloyd
Thanks, Lexie.
is DP the data column for Total Operating Expense?
Best,
Anh
Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < >
12/29/14
to me
No. AW is total Healthcare expense. DP is Housekeeping expense.

Walden < >
12/29/14
to Lexie.Bloyd, bcc: me
Thanks, Lexie. Would the total healthcare expenses be considered as the Total operating
expenses?
Anh Ph m
Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < >
12/29/14
to me
Yes.

Anh Pham < >
Jan 11
to Lexie.Bloyd
Dear Lexie,
Hope your New Year starting well!
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I have another question. Based on past research, the hospital size was measured by the
logarithm of total assets (Peng, Li, Xie, & Su, 2010). Would you please tell me what
column of the files on the 2007 Excel Version on the link below that indicate total assets
of hospitals.
http://oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/Hospitals/AnnFinanData/CmplteDataSet/index.asp
Thank you for helping me!
Best regards,
Anh
Bloyd, Lexie@OSHPD < >
Jan 14 (12 days ago)
to me
Hi Anh –
In the 38th Year Complete Data set for hospitals, Column BRB represents Total Hospital
Assets reported on the Balance Sheet.
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Appendix F: Communication With Kyle Rowert of OSHPD Database

Anh Pham < >
12/16/14
to kyle.rowert
Dear Kyle,
It is Anh Pham, PhD student of Walden University. I had contacted you earlier regarding
the access of data of OSHPD. Thanks again for your kindness and genuine offer to help
me with data collection!
As I am about to start the process of data collection and try understanding what data and
its meaning, I would like to take the opportunity to explain the scope of my search of
data. I will choose randomly 107 not-for-profit hospitals the list of not-profit hospitals
listed in OHSPD database and examine the financial data and governance information of
the selected hospitals.
For financial data, I will analyze the annual financial reports for 2009 to 2012 for each
hospital. The financial data that I will examine include operating margin, total margin,
and free cash flow. Please correct me if I am wrong. Below are how I think I will
calculate the operating margin, total margin, and free cash flow. So please provide me
any comments you may have regarding the calculation of these variables.
The Operating Margin is calculated by dividing the difference between total operating
revenue and total operating expenses by the total operating revenues and expressed as
ratio of [(Total operating revenue – Total operating expense)/ Total operating revenue]
The Total Margin is calculated bydividing net income by total operating revenue and
expressed as Net Income/ Total Operating Revenue
Free Cash Flowrepresents cash inflow and outflow rather than accounting earnings of a
hospital. It shows the amount of cash left over after accounting for all of the expenses to
operate the hospital and making all necessary investments to ensure its continuous
operation. The Free Cash Flow is calculated by subtracting the change in net assets plus
interest and noncash expenses from the investments in fixed assets and net working
capital (Singh, Wheeler, & Roden, 2012). Alternatively, the free cash flow can be
estimated by averaging the current and two prior periods and multiplying by an average
annual growth rate of 7.3%, which is based on data from the American Hospital
Association (Singh, Wheeler, & Roden, 2012, p.330). I adopted the calculation method of
the free cash flow used by Sigh et al. (2012). FCF is expressed in the formula below:
FCF = ((cFCF + priop1FCF +priop2FCF)/3) * 0.073
Where:
cFCF = current FCF
priop1FCF = prior period 1 FCF
priop2FCF = prior period 2 FCF
Actually, as a preliminary search and examination of the OHSPD website, I took the
liberty and explored the Annual Financial Data Complete Data Set and Pivot Profiles
contained in Healthcare Information Division/Data/Financial link of the OHSPD website.
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I looked at the income statement and ratio data of a LTC Pivot report of a hospital (as
captured below) and realized that the report has some financial ratios, especially the
Operating Margin, formulated and calculated already.
I am respectfully hoping that you can direct me to where I can find the Total Margin and
hopefully some hints about how to calculation the Free Cash Flow based on the data
available and presented in the LTC Pivot report.
Inline image 1
Regarding the corporate governance data of hospitals, I will collect data such as CEO
duality (CEO who is also the chairperson of the governance board),Physicians on
Governance Board, hospital size,hospital age, board size. I would be very grateful if you
can provide some tips on how to efficiently collect and download these information of the
107 not-for-profit hospitals I will select from the OHSPD.
Would you kindly inform if you are available on Wednesday 12/17 or Thursday 12/18 or
Friday 12/19 or Monday 12/22, or Tuesday 12/23 for me to contact you via telephone for
assistance with questions related to data? I am flexible with the dates and times. Please let
me the date and time that are most convenient for you. Thank you for helping me, and I
am excitedly looking forward to hearing from you!
Please provide me your office number to call me whenever it is convenient. Thanks!
Sincerely,
Anh Pham
Rowert, Kyle@OSHPD < >
12/18/14
to me
Hi Anh,
I’m a little busy at the moment but will answer a few of your questions and give you
some tips on where to find your data.
Your formulas are correct.
You can get Operating Margin and Total Margin from the “Profile” worksheet on our
Pivot Profiles located here:
http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/Hospitals/AnnFinanData/PivotProfles/default.asp
Operating Margin would be found in cell G19
Total Margin would be in cell G20
For cash flows, I wanted to point out that we do have a statement of cash flows from the
hospital that shows the beginning and ending cash amounts as well as the cash going in
and out due to various activities. This can be found on our annual reports from the
following link:
https://siera.oshpd.ca.gov/FinancialDisclosure.aspx
just type the hospital name and year range and click “go” to get a list of reports. Click on
the PDF icon to download the report.
The Statement of Cash Flows is on page 31.
You can also find some of your other information on this report.
Governing Board information would be on page 13.
Hospital bed size can be found on page 7.

195
We wouldn’t have any data on hospital age.
If you are looking to do only LTC hospitals then you should contact Lexie Bloyd at < >
otherwise I can help you with the acute hospital financial data.
I have meetings today and tomorrow but would be available to talk on Monday,
December 22.
Thank you Anh
Kyle Rowert
Hospital Unit Supervisor
Healthcare Information Division
Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development
400 R Street, Suite 250
Sacramento, CA 95811
E-mail:
Web Page: www.oshpd.ca.gov
Walden < >
12/18/14
to Kyle.Rowert, bcc: me
Hi Kyle,
You have provided me great info on what areas I can maneuver to search the data I need
from the database. I am grateful for your help.
For now I will analyze the data, and if you don't mind, I would like to email you
questions I have as I progress. That way, I will not occupy your time with telephone calls.
Thank you!
Best,
Anh Ph m
Anh Pham < >
12/18/14
Hi Kyle,
I have a question
If I defined the free cash flow is calculated by subtracting the change in net assets plus
interest and non-cash expensesfrom the investments in fixed assets and net working
capitals, then I am looking at the item 225 (cash at the end of year) pulled from the
Statement of Cash Flows on page 31. Please see image below. Thanks!
Best regards,
Anh
Rowert, Kyle@OSHPD < >
12/23/14
to me
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Hi Anh,
You are close, line 225 is the cash the hospital has at the end of the reporting period and
would be the result of Net Income, change in assets and liabilities for operating activities
during the year, cash flows from investing and financing activities, and the beginning
cash balance at the start of the year.
Please let me know if you have any additional questions Anh.
Kyle
Anh Pham < >
12/23/14
to Kyle.Rowert
Dear Kyle,
Thanks!
I am looking at Licensed Beds, Available Beds, and Staffed Beds. Could you please tell
me which one reflects the actual hospital bed size (or the hospital size) in your opinion?
Thanks!
Best,
Anh
Anh Pham < >
12/23/14
to Kyle.Rowert
Regarding your answer below:
"For cash flows, I wanted to point out that we do have a statement of cash flows from the
hospital that shows the beginning and ending cash amounts as well as the cash going in
and out due to various activities. This can be found on our annual reports from the
following link:
https://siera.oshpd.ca.gov/FinancialDisclosure.aspx
just type the hospital name and year range and click “go” to get a list of reports. Click on
the PDF icon to download the report.
The Statement of Cash Flows is on page 31."
My question is: Is there a report containing the statement of cash flow of each of
hospital. In other words, I have list of more 100 hospitals. I am looking for a file that
helps me retrieve of Free Cash Flow from a file instead of typing each name of hospital
and downloading 100 files of reports.
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Thanks!
Rowert, Kyle@OSHPD < >
Jan 2
to me
Hi Anh,
I think most people would look at licensed beds to see how large a hospital is.
Kyle
Rowert, Kyle@OSHPD < >
Jan 2
to me
Hi Anh,
Unfortunately there isn’t a report that just gets you cash flow for all hospitals but we do
have a datafile that includes all data items for all hospitals for a particular reporting year.
The file can be found here:
http://oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/Hospitals/AnnFinanData/CmplteDataSet/index.asp
The Statement of Cash Flows starts on column CZR on the 2007 Excel version. Row 1-3
shows the page, column and line number of the annual report respectively. For example,
if you were looking for cash at the end of the year, which is on page 9, column 1, line 225
of the report, you would find that data on column DBJ.
Please let me know if you have any additional questions Anh and have a great weekend.
Kyle
Anh Pham < >
Jan 11
to Kyle.Rowert
Dear Kyle,
Based on past research, the hospital size was measured by the logarithm of total assets
(Peng, Li, Xie, & Su, 2010). Would you please tell me what column of the files on the
2007 Excel Version on the link below that indicate the total assets of hospitals.
http://oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/Hospitals/AnnFinanData/CmplteDataSet/index.asp
Thank you for helping me!
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Best regards,
Anh
Rowert, Kyle@OSHPD < >
Jan 13 (13 days ago)
to me
Hi Anh,
Total Assets can be found on column BRB.
Please let me know if you have any additional questions Anh.
Kyle
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Appendix G: NIH Certificate of Completion

